

JPRS-NEA-85-146

11 December 1985

Near East/South Asia Report

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11 December 1985

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REGIONAL AFFAIRS

ARAB CAPITAL URGED TO INVEST IN ARAB COUNTRIES

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic 31 Aug-6 Sep 85 p 31

[Article by Muhammad 'Abd-al-Tawwab: "Available Opportunity May Be Lost Soon; There Is No Alternative to Return of Expatriate Arab Money"]

[Text] Cairo--At a time when economic experts estimate Arab investments abroad at nearly \$420 billion, all investments in joint projects between the Arab countries in the Arab homeland do not exceed \$23 billion. The figures may vary a little or a lot but the bitter fact continues to fill the ears in the wake of the collapse of oil prices on the world market, of the drop in the revenues of the rich Arab countries, and of the emergence of deficits in the budgets of these countries for the first time. What is certain is that the oil war, which started 12 years ago and after which oil prices rose from \$14 a barrel to nearly \$36 a barrel, was nothing but the beginning of the end of the oil era whose hypothetical lifespan has begun to diminish. Will expatriate Arab money return to the Arab homeland before it is too late?

It is said that what looks harmful may be beneficial. Will the drop in the Arab countries' petrodollar revenues and the fact that these countries are compelled to squeeze their budgets hasten the use of expatriate Arab money for rescue, or will this Arab money do no more than change its financial center of gravity by emigrating from the dollar area to more secure currency areas, such as those of the pound sterling, the mark, the yen and the Swiss franc? The Arab investors are suffering from a financial crisis whose primary impact will fall on the world economy. The drop in oil revenues has motivated Arab investors, be they government, joint, or private investors, to turn to liquid short-term investments or to shift to real estate investment in a country like the United States or to financial investments in banks.

In 1983, the oil-producing Arab countries withdrew nearly \$14.2 billion from the international banking system, including nearly \$6 billion from U.S. banks. The figure rose to \$12.2 billion and then to \$16.2 billion in 1984 and the first 6 months of 1985 successively, whereas the Arab deposits increased marginally due to the drop in financial revenues, which amounted to \$151 billion in 1983 and to \$138 billion in 1984 compared to \$250 billion in 1981.

It is perhaps this shortfall which has motivated Arab investors to shift from real estate and long-term U.S. bonds to short-term financial investment in banks. This may ultimately lead to selling these liquid investments and returning Arab money to the Arab homeland. While the statistics confirm that nearly 70 percent of the Arab investors prefer the dollar investment area because Arab oil, and perhaps Arab policy, is governed by the dollar, Arab money has begun to move to the pound sterling, yen, mark, and Swiss franc areas and may ultimately end up returning to the Arab homeland under the slogan that the homeland deserves more attention.

Withdrawal of Arab money across the Pacific and the Atlantic to Britain, Switzerland, and Germany has generated escalating pressures on U.S. interest rates and may lead to increasing these interest rates in an attempt to attract Arab money, or to tempt them to stay. However, withdrawal of Arab money has had a stronger impact on the bond, stock, and real estate market than on the money and currency market.

This is how the features of Arab investments abroad seem to be. On the other hand, a glance at the structure of joint Arab investments confirms the obvious deficiency and the stunning contradiction between expatriate Arab money's acceptance of all calculated and uncalculated risk possibilities beyond the Arab homeland's borders and this money's reluctance and refraining from participating in the development efforts of the Arab countries which are forced to borrow from the IMF, the World Bank, or the U.S. Export-Import Bank on unfair terms.

The joint projects represent the minimal limit of Arab economic integration, even though they are the most suitable form for the Arab world's economic development reality. Moreover, such projects broaden the scope of the regional market. Joint projects between the Arab states amount to 490 projects, with a total capital of \$23.2 billion. This is in addition to joint Arab-international projects in the Arab homeland with a total capital of nearly \$38.5 billion. This means that the volume of the direct and indirect Arab investments amounts to nearly \$61.7 billion. But a single look at the countries benefiting from these investments (Jordan, Libya, UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Syria) proves that there has been a failure to spread these investments in the Arab land. This failure of joint Arab investments is due to the following reasons:

The lack of a financial surplus in some Arab countries, the insistence of some economic organizations on getting administrative approval and a nomination by the ministry of trade of the individuals and firms participating in these projects, the lack of administrative independence, and the unavailability of economic feasibility studies.

The tendency to impose strict restrictions on banking remittances to the outside world, multiplicity in the official exchange rates of Arab currencies, the ambiguity of investment laws and regulations in a number of Arab countries, the instability and inconsistency of such laws and the subjugation of the economic projects to the influence of transient political differences.

The lack of infrastructure projects, such as utility, service, communications, and transportation networks.

The tendency to impose a kind of untrained local labor on the projects or to price products at local rates that are below the production cost and failure to provide customs protection vis-a-vis alternative foreign goods.

These problems facing the return of expatriate Arab money will not be insurmountable if the Arab economic organizations, especially the Arab Economic Unity Council, the Arab Economic Council, the Arab Economic Development Fund, the Organization of Arab Petroleum-exporting Countries, and the Gulf Cooperation Council, exert efforts to solve them.

The existing joint Arab investment projects and similar projects being implemented do not encompass the Arab homeland's development aspirations, whether in terms of numbers or of the size of the investments channeled for them. The joint Arab project experiment represents one of the means of enlarging the absorption capacity of the Arab regional economies and of the Arab economy at the level of the entire Arab homeland.

The 12 years of oil strife from 1973 to 1985 and the attempts at attack and retreat between the OPEC on the one hand and the International Energy Agency on the other confirm that the opportunity must be taken before it is too late and that expatriate Arab money must return to the homeland.

8494/12781
CSO: 4404/23

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

ISRAELI ARTICLE ON 1980'S STRATEGIC GOALS ANALYZED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 21 Sep 85 pp 25-27

[Article by Adib Sa'ib: "Israel's Strategy in 1980's: Paralyze Arab Military Capabilities, Reoccupy Sinai, and Balkanize Area; Zionist Document Says: Israel Must Regain Sinai Peninsula, Annex West Bank and Fragment Arab Entities"]

[Text] "The opportunity available to Israel in the 1980's is to paralyze Arab military capabilities and then fragment all of the area's entities on a racial and religious basis. Unless Israel takes advantage of this golden opportunity, then it will not survive as a state. But if it does take advantage, it will become the final refuge for world Jewry and its sole survival option because it is impermissible for the Jews of the United States, Europe, and Latin America to continue as they are at present."

These words are the words of a Jewish journalist who has worked for a long time with the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs and they embody the intellectual background of Israel's current policy. The words are quoted from a long article published by this journalist, named Oded Eynon, in the quarterly KIVUNIM.

Our purpose behind shedding light on this document-like article is to draw the attention of the Arab rulers and decision makers to what is happening around them, keeping in mind that the primary decision maker is the citizen. This is why we are eager to see the Arab citizen gain knowledge and work to foil the plots hatched against him secretly or openly.

The journalist says that the Arab world constitutes the biggest danger to Israel and that to avert this danger, the existing Arab entities must be fragmented. It is his opinion that these entities are susceptible to cracking and collapsing because they are formed by ethnic and religious minorities:

"The Islamic Arab world is built like a paper house which will last only for a short time. It was created by the French and the British in the 1920's without taking into consideration the wishes and aspirations of the area's inhabitants. It has been haphazardly divided into 19 states, each comprised of ethnic minorities and groups so hostile to each other that each Islamic Arab state is nowadays facing ethnic and social perdition from within. In some of these states, the caldron of civil war has begun to boil over."

The conclusion Oded Eynon comes to is the following: "A very grievous and stormy condition is engulfing Israel and creating challenges, problems, and dangers for it. But at the same time, this condition offers Israel far-reaching possibilities for the first time since 1967. The golden opportunity which was missed then will become possible to achieve in the 1980's to an extent that we cannot imagine at present."

Eynon goes on to say that there is an obstacle impeding the available opportunity, namely the "policy of peace" and of giving back the occupied territories--a policy in whose framework successive Israeli governments have put themselves since 1967 under pressure from the United States.

What this policy has produced is the peace treaty with Egypt that has caused Israel to lose the oilfields in the Gulf of Suez and the enormous oil and gas reserves and other natural resources in the Sinai Peninsula. This loss is likely to cause in the short run energy depletion and a draining of the Israeli economy, keeping in mind that Israel allocates one-fourth of its net national product and one-third of its budget to buy oil. This is why Israel's primary political objective vis-a-vis Egypt "is to regain the Sinai Peninsula with its apparent and potential resources."

It is the journalist's opinion that the Egyptians themselves will not need to preserve the peace treaty with Israel now that they have regained the Sinai and that they will exert the utmost efforts to return to the embraces of the Arab world and of the Soviet Union, which means that U.S. aid to Egypt will not continue for long.

For its part, Israel should restore to the Sinai the situation prevalent prior to al-Sadat's visit to Jerusalem and his conclusion of the peace treaty with Israel in March 1979. Israel must spare no effort, whether directly or indirectly, to regain its control over the Sinai as a strategic, economic, and vital guarantee in the long run. The journalist adds that Egypt's military situation poses no real threat to Israel because Israel can, in a day or so, restore the Egyptian situation, which has been shattered by internal conflicts, to what it was on the morrow of the June 1967 war.

To insure that Egypt remains weak so that it may not regain the Sinai at a future time, its internal conflicts must be exploited and its unity must be fragmented on a geographic and religious basis. This is Israel's political objective on the western front in the 1980's. If Egypt collapses, then Libya, Sudan and the Maghreb countries will follow. With the creation of a Christian Coptic state in Upper Egypt, a number of weak mini-states with limited local powers will emerge. This would mean the disappearance of Egypt's unity and its central authority, according to the journalist's claims.

Model of Lebanon

If Israel's objective on the western front is to fragment the Egyptian entity as a step toward fragmenting the Arab entities in the west, then its objective insofar as the eastern front is concerned is, according to Eynon,

to fragment, first, Syria and Iraq into ethnic and religious entities similar to those emerging in Lebanon after destroying these two countries' military power and then to divide Lebanon into five provinces, each representing a precedent and a model for the entire Arab world.

Eynon believes that the entire Arab Peninsula is likely to disintegrate by the force of internal and external factors, regardless of the continuation or non-continuation of the economic strength of Saudi Arabia, which is based on oil.

There remains Jordan. Its fragmentation is Israel's immediate objective, which should be achieved as soon as possible. This fragmentation will happen, in the view of the Zionist theoretician, by ending King Husayn's rule and putting power in the hands of the Palestinians. Afterward, Jordan will not, in the Jewish journalist's view, pose a threat to Israel. Liquidating the Jordanian entity is likely to solve the West Bank problem because the Arab inhabitants can be evicted to the East Bank by war or by "peaceful" economic and demographic isolation. Had such a step been taken immediately after the 1967 war and had Jordan been given to the Palestinians, Israel would have been able to avoid what is happening these days by "neutralizing" the Palestinian problem faced by the West Bank--a problem for which unsound solutions have been formulated, such as self-determination, autonomy, or the return or division of territories.

Eynon adds that Israel must take active steps to speed up and implement this task as soon as possible: "It is impossible to continue to live in Israel in the present manner unless the two nations are separated, with the Arabs on the east side of the Jordan River and the Jews on the west. Real coexistence and peace will not prevail in the land until the Arabs realize that they will have no existence or security between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and that they will not have their own homeland except in Jordan."

The West Bank is, therefore, an urgent geographic and survival requirement for the Jews because it is no longer possible, according to this journalist, for three-quarters of the Jews to live in the densely populated narrow coastal strip. The sole guarantee for the Jews' national survival is the area of "Judaea, Samaria, and Galilee" in which a large number of Jews must be settled. Unless they become a majority in the mountains, they will not be able to rule Israel. Rather, "they will become like the Crusaders who lost Palestine and who, however, were alien to it." Thus, the most important internal objective at present is to "reorganize the country demographically, strategically, economically, and in terms of its existence." This cannot be done unless the Jewish grip on the mountains from Beersheba to the Upper Galilee is tightened.

In the face of this racist logic that is in conflict with all the sublime humanitarian values, the following question must be asked: Can the West, led by the United States, turn a blind eye to this flagrant violation of all the values in which the West finds the meaning of its existence, which it urges the entire world to embrace, and for whose restoration to parts where

they are lost and establishment in parts where they are absent it launches its wars? The Israeli viewpoint we have presented swerves completely from the above-mentioned political and personal values, all of which focus on respect for man's dignity and fundamental rights and on freedom, justice, equality, and democracy.

The fact is that the Zionist journalist has an answer to this question--an answer which he has used as the intellectual mainstay of his article. It is his opinion that Israel is compelled to abandon the "rational-humanitarian view which has constituted the main basis of Western life and civilization since the Renaissance Age." Israel does so not because it does not believe in freedom, justice, and equality but because the adoption of these values and principles has been voided by "contemporary historical and universal developments." The most important of these developments is the scarcity of natural resources and the fact that these resources are confined to limited areas. There is no doubt that the journalist means primarily oil and river water. These resources are available in a number of neighboring Arab countries.

The journalist adds that the option left open to Israel in the 1980's urges it to stand alone, with military, strategic, and economic independence from the West, which is led by the United States and which will not be able to stand fast in the face of Soviet pressures in the world. It is his opinion that Israel can achieve this independence without any bargaining. He means that this is possible by way of the Jews in the Diaspora whom, he says, the inevitability of history will uproot from the United States, Europe, and Latin America to plant in the Zionist entity. With their mass arrival in the "promised land," the Jews will carry with them the West's nuclear expertise to block the main Soviet objective in the Middle East and Africa, namely controlling the Gulf's vast oil resources and the mineral resources in the southern part of the African continent in accordance with "Ghorshkov's principle" advocating Soviet control of the oceans and Third World areas rich with minerals and, subsequently, imposing Marxism on the world through nuclear war. If the danger to Israel's security in the short run comes from Arab military strength, then the main long-range danger to the "survival of Israel and of the rest of the Western world" comes from Soviet nuclear and conventional weapons, from the Soviet Union's belief that nuclear war is essential for achieving its objectives, and from its belief that it can survive such a war.

West's Contradiction

The above is an analytical review of a very serious document in whose light a lot of current events in the Arab world can be understood. Understanding what is taking place is not confined to keeping up with the daily and partial details but goes beyond to linking the events with each other and profoundly examining their causes, motives, and objectives.

There is no doubt that there is a hand working to fragment the Arab world into ethno-sectarian entities. The document we have reviewed is a proof of this. This document is not the only one of its kind but we have chosen it

because its author tries to rely on "intellectual" grounds to justify making Israel the loyal guard of Western civilization in the face of ideological and military challenges. But to preserve this line, there has to be an "intellectual revolution" that overturns the "humanitarian-rational" values embraced by Western civilization. Otherwise, how could Israel justify, in the name of Western civilization, occupying other people's territories, expelling their inhabitants from them, expanding the scope of its occupation in order to absorb all the Jews of the world, exploiting the resources of other countries, and destroying their political and organizational identities and their cultures?

But if these concepts, whose best advocate and defender prior to their emergence in the West were Islam and Eastern Christianity, are destroyed, then what is the meaning of the journalist's insistence on Israel's belonging to Western civilization and his insistence on defending this civilization against the Communist tide?

The fact is that Israel has never belonged to this humanitarian-rational heritage. Israel's very presence is antithetical to this heritage which eschews ethno-racial entities and which is founded on freedom, justice, and equality. The Zionist entity, considering that it is founded on Jewish nationalism, cannot belong to the open human heritage because human openness is opposed to racial-religious rigidity.

What is regrettable is that the West, which has made liberal democracy--i.e., the political system founded on separating church and state without fighting religion in society and on insuring freedom, justice, and equality to all citizens without discrimination because of race, color, or religion--the political model for modern states, has supported the Zionist entity which is, by its nature, the antithesis of liberal democracy. It is not an unlikely possibility that the West has adopted this Zionist entity to rid itself of its Jews who have never at any time in history owed their allegiance to the nationalities of the Western societies in which they live.

Arab Humanitarianism

Oded Eynon, the article's writer, gives his opinions the quality of finality, saying that these things are either happening or will inevitably happen. In this respect, he tries to don the personality of the old prophets, perhaps believing that the Arabs make up a nation which submits to fate. But if we, for the sake of the argument, agree with Eynon that the Arab entities are susceptible to cracking, then is it inevitable to accept the racialist or religious alternative? Isn't it possible that the Arab political regimes will develop, as they are now developing in Syria, Iraq, and other countries, toward one form of democratic secularism or another which an ethnic-based and racist Israel cannot achieve or strive for?

The Arab entities are not the world's only entities in whose structures various ethnic and religious groups are involved. We scarcely find in the world a country that is not a mixture of races, religions, and cultures. The West itself, to which the contemporary wise men of Zion claim to belong,

is the best proof of what we are saying. We have in France, Britain, and especially the United States the evidence of racial, religious, and cultural multiplicity. Every society is, like it or not, a multiple society, at least in the numerical sense of the word. If Israel's Western supporters wish to embrace the Zionist political philosophy espoused by the said article, then it will be necessary for them to partition France, Britain, the United States, and the other Western countries along racial or sectarian lines.

The racist premise on which (Eynon's) article is based is that unity is impossible in the presence of multiplicity or diversity. But the Western political system is founded in its entirety on democratic liberalism which means fundamentally achieving unity within the framework of diversity. The slogan of "unity in multiplicity" is the essence of the U.S. political system.

We are not about to put the West, especially the United States, on trial here for defending a racist state that contradicts the essence of the West's political system and its humanitarian traditions. But we fear that some sectors of the Arab world also imagine that unity is impossible with multiplicity and that unity erases multiplicity or diversity. Acting on the strength of such a conviction means achieving Israel's objectives in the Arab world in the best manner possible because the ultimate outcome of such action is the exploitation of the racial, religious, and other contradictions and, consequently, the fragmentation of the Arab entities and the establishment of weak sectarian mini-states instead of a strong Arab bloc. Israel will have thus achieved its objectives while watching as an outside spectator. When the Arab world weakens through numerous divisions, Israel will be able to finish it off and plunder its resources.

In the face of these challenges, the Arab world must move forward to achieve the model of the modern state that is founded on unity within all kinds of multiplicity and diversity, without the principle of unity itself being racial or religious. A strong and united Arab front based on common historical, geographic, social, and cultural elements and a strong army must be created to fight the common racist enemy--Israel, yes, Israel.

8494/12781
CSO: 4404/23

ARMENIAN AFFAIRS

SOVIET VOTE IN GENEVA AGAINST ARMENIAN GENOCIDE EXAMINED

Montreal HORIZON in Armenian 7 Oct 85 p 1

[Text] As is known, last August, at the 38th session of the UN Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities in Geneva, a report prepared by special reporter Benjamin Whitaker was approved by a vote of 14 in favor, 1 against and 4 abstentions. The sole dissenting vote came from the Soviet delegate Vsevolot Sofinsky.

We do not know exactly what rationale Sofinsky offered for his negative stance. Whereas some delegates opposed the report from the outset, Sofinsky's ambiguous statements on the Armenian question in private conversations had given rise to hopes in some circles that he too would support Whitaker's references to the Great Genocide in his report. In previous meetings of the subcommission, Sofinsky had not made his objections very clear on other issues although he was given every opportunity to do so. In the end, when initial opponents of the report either voted in favor of endorsing it or abstained, Sofinsky's "no" caused shock and outrage among Armenians, particularly among those of us who have traditionally placed high hopes on the government that he represents and who deeply believe in that government's willingness to defend our rights. For example, the Boston BAYKAR, a Ramgavar [Democratic Liberal Party] paper, noted in its 7 September edition that "the recognition of the Armenian genocide cannot be linked international political maneuvers, national interests and the prevalent conditions; it supersedes them because it is related to the extermination of an entire nation." It added that the country that would vote against the Whitaker report would be the biggest loser "because it [would] be the country which poses to the world as the defender of justice and human rights but which tramples upon the justice to be accorded to a nation."

Here we would not want to get embroiled in political analyses to understand Sofinsky's attitude. Let us just say that he is not such a bad deviant because he is a true reflection of the Soviets' current--and past--policies. The country which legally represents Soviet Armenia before the world and which would be expected to be the leading supporter of our efforts to have the Armenian genocide officially recognized in an international forum, plays a game of ambivalence on the Armenian cause. On the one hand, we are permitted to build a [genocide] monument at Dzidzernagabert, to keep an eternal flame there that has burned for the last 20 years, to go on pilgrimage there on every April

24, to remember the Great Genocide in the Armenian as well as the all-Union press and to condemn Turkish distortions of history, while on the other hand, the Sofinskys play the fool with us and assure our foes that all that is for internal consumption only and that the Soviet Union has no demands from Turkey as far as the Armenians are concerned.

LE MONDE's Geneva correspondent Isabelle Vishniak asked in the 20 August edition of the paper whether the attempts to delete references to the Armenian genocide of 1915 from Whitaker's report do not stem from the fear or concern that "a revival of national identity may take place in Soviet Armenia." Perhaps. There is also diplomatic sensitivity of not offending the Turkic peoples of the Soviet Union and the looming peril of their growing numbers etcetera, etcetera.

However, these very understandable justifications notwithstanding, we cannot remain silent, and we cannot swallow insults such as Sofinsky's "no" against the dignity of our nation.

9588

CSO: 4605/14

ARMENIAN AFFAIRS

ARMENIAN QUESTION DISCUSSED AT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT SESSION

Istanbul MARMARA in Armenian 10 Oct 85 p 1

[Text] Strasbourg--According to some observers, a European Parliament session and a conference sponsored by the Armenians have neither produced the results expected nor generated the interest predicted by some circles. At the "Franco-Armenian Solidarity Union" conference, which was held to discuss the Armenian question with the participation of several foreign scholars and jurists, the chairman of the conference declined to permit Professor Sina Akcin to speak. Professor Akcin wanted to present documented information to the participants in order to shed light on the issue.

The speakers at the conference, who came from various European countries, described the Armenian question as a true genocide and urged that Turkey not be admitted to the EEC until it acknowledges the genocide perpetrated against the Armenians.

Evidently, this was a virtual crusade undertaken against Turkey. One of the speakers, Gianni Bozzo, an Italian cleric, spoke so sharply against Turkey that he even claimed that this country does not have the right to consider itself a European nation.

The Greek delegate, Spiridon Plaskovidhis, declared that as a Greek he supports the Armenians and their viewpoint because the Ottoman Empire has subjected the Armenians to a genocide similar to the one perpetrated by Hitler against the Jews during World War II.

When the Armenians realized that they would not accomplish any tangible results from this conference they resorted to a tactic of winning over moderate, primarily Christian Democratic, members of the European Parliament. Willie Kupers, a Flemish nationalist parliamentarian from Belgium who is in agreement with special reporter Jacques Vandemeulbrouck presided over the meeting.

Belgian jurist Wehrhoven said that this "genocide" could be debated on international forums and added: "If a genocide has been committed then Turkey must acknowledge it. Otherwise, any decision taken against Turkey would have no legal value. In that case, the issue would resemble the case of an illegitimate child: his existence is indisputable, but whether the mother is his own is debatable."

9588
CSO: 4605/13

ALGERIA

INCREASED AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION MEASURES REVIEWED

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 3 Oct 85 p 7

[Text] Increased production is the best measurement criterion for action in the agricultural sector and the degree of effectiveness of its organization. Kasdi Merbah, alternate member of the Political Bureau, and minister of agriculture and fishing, in citing this principle clearly indicated to leaders of agriculture, who met on 17 and 18 September 1985, that the sector's goal can be none other than increasing agricultural production, and thus establishing the necessary conditions for doing so.

On this occasion, the minister of agriculture and fishing recalled the numerous measures that the government has taken this year to benefit this sector, measures that confirm its importance and implement the priority assigned to agriculture in the development of our economy.

These measures took the form of development of specific action programs involving the main products--grains, potatoes, milk, meat, and poultry-raising.

The common factor in all these programs was increasing agricultural production through raising yields, which implies improvement of techniques and their modernization, through training at the various levels, and organization of logistical and technical support for the offices, specialized cooperatives and development institutes.

The agricultural personnel attending thus had the opportunity to evaluate each of the developed programs. It should be recalled in this connection that these programs were subject to regular and sustained followup throughout the past season, through organization of periodic followup and control meetings that enabled a progressive and objective evaluation every 2 months of their impact, and on the spot.

Referring to the report on the past season presented by the technical departments of the central administration, the minister cited the spectacular increases in the main agricultural products: which reflect significant results from the increase-oriented programs conducted by the sector.

Thus:

--Grain production increased from 14 million quintals in 1983-1984 to 30 million quintals in 1984-1985;

--Production of in-season potatoes increased from 250,000 tons in 1983-1984 to 500,000 tons in 1984-1985;

--Milk production showed a productivity increase of 50 percent;

--Egg production doubled.

Another result, and not the least, which confirmed the recovery of the agricultural sector, was the 81-percent reduction in the financial deficit in the enterprise sector from 151 billion centimes last year to 28 billion this year, results achieved through requiring strictness in daily management, greater use of production capacities, more rational use of all land, and a significant increase in production through improving yields.

Grains: Unequaled Production

In the field of plant production, the 1984-1985 season has been marked by development of a series of programs to intensify basic products to achieve higher volume through increased yields. This has involved grains, potatoes and vegetable and "plasticulture."

In regard to grain intensification, the effort has involved, as a priority, regularization of the entire production process in the high potential areas, or about one-third of the grain-growing area. The actions carried out involved mainly rationalization of distribution of the production factors, improvement of growing techniques, establishment of a system of followup and control of each phase of application of the intensification program, at both the central and local levels, and finally better organization of the product harvesting and marketing operations in order to reduce the significant losses usually experienced in these operations.

The improvement of the intensification program for grain production has involved both the public and private sectors.

The results constitute an unequaled production, estimated at almost 30 million quintals, with a national yield of about 10 quintals per hectare, compared to a previous average yield of 6 quintals per hectare.

In regard to intensification of potato-growing, an action program has involved mainly increasing season production, and this through better distribution of the factors of production, dissemination and application of a better production technique, and establishment of a network for permanent followup and evaluation for technical and logistic support to the farmers.

This program has devoted particular attention to the private sector, which is responsible for 62 percent of the area under potatoes.

The results achieved have clearly demonstrated the increase in yields, which

have risen from a national average of 63 quintals per hectare in 1983-1984 to 104.5 quintals per hectare in 1984-1985, for a total season production of 500,000 tons.

In numerous wilayas, yields have reached satisfactory levels: Tafi 175.2 quintals per hectare; Constantine 169.39; Tipaza 168.7; Mascara 147.2; Boumerdes 143; Tizi-Ouzou 143; Bida 142 quintals per hectare, etc.

In regard to the development of plasticulture, the program has involved in particular the strengthening of greenhouse crop capacity, which will reach almost 3,600 hectares at the beginning of this campaign. There was a 1,300 hectares increase in this capacity during the year 1984-1985.

The introduction of expertise acquired in expanding the area of protected crops through the efforts for rationalization of production, as well as a greater effectiveness in support to production, would make possible an average greenhouse production of almost 200,000 tons of dry vegetables.

Paralleling the foregoing basic activities, a program for development of dried fruit production (dry raisins, prunes, almonds) was approved during the 1984-1985 season. As an experiment, a profitability comparison operation was carried out with these products during the summer of 1985. The results were as follows:

--Processing of the production of Sultaine vineyard resulting in production of 260 tons of dry raisins.

--Processing of part of the industrial prune harvest of Medea wilaya (85 tons): the low capacity of the dehydration equipment precluded processing the total national production, estimated at 1,300 tons of fresh fruit.

--Marketing of all the almond production of the socialist sector estimated at 2,700 tons by public distribution organs.

The 1985-1986 season, during which the dry fruit program will be carried out at full scale, will show a significant increase in volume of production to process.

"Overproduction of Eggs"

In regard to animal production, the past year marked an improvement in production, particularly poultry products, bringing increased earnings for producers. Thus, the public sector had an increase in value of raw products from 731 million dinars to 1.181 billion dinars, or 61.56 percent. On the other hand, animal production's share of the public sector agricultural production, while remaining low, nevertheless showed progress, since it increased from 12.76 percent in 1983-1984 to 16.17 percent in 1984-1985. It should be pointed out that this serious imbalance between animal production and plant production must be corrected as rapidly as possible in order to achieve a high output agriculture. In Europe, in fact, the ratio of animal production to plant production is opposite: 55 percent to 45 percent.

In regard to poultry production, the past season was marked by a strong

increase, particularly in consumer eggs, which increased from 980 million units produced during the calendar year 1984 to 1.06 billion just for the first 8 months of 1985.

The rate of introduction of new batches of good layer hens enables an estimate of production at 1.8 billion units for the calendar year 1985.

However, this doubling of egg production did cause marketing problems during the summer period. In July 1985 an "overproduction" of 60 million eggs was thus partially stored in refrigeration warehouse for later marketing.

The production volume achieved during this season is the result of the resources granted by the government, to the private sector in particular, consisting of issuance of bank loans as subsidies for poultry feed, organization of distribution of production factors, and extension of tax relief measures.

Dairy: A growing Herd

As regards dairy production, the efforts have concentrated mainly on improvement of yields and herd management. Thus, during a 6-month period from December 1984 to May 1985, the yield per dairy cow increased from 6.92 liters per day to 10.39 liters per day, or an average yield over the period of 8.65 liters per day, an increase of 50 percent. This improved yield is the result of the efforts made to create a better balance of livestock food rations, development of a program to combat the main animal diseases, and elimination of unproductive cows.

However, this yield increase remains insufficient to affect the overall production volume. Also, the number of dairy cows must be progressively increased. To this end, about 4,000 gestating heifers were imported during the spring of 1985, of which 50 percent were marketed to private sector producers.

This effort to increase the productive capital will be continued during the 1985-1986 agricultural campaign by the additional importation of 10,000 heifers, of which more than 50 percent will go to small breeders.

Effort in Stock Raising Techniques

In regard to red meat production, here also there was a significant increase in production.

The slaughter rate increased by 15 percent in the first quarter of 1985 compared to that of 1984.

This increase was still low in comparison to the increase in consumption. Therefore, a program to develop this sector has been studied and developed, with the goal of increasing ovine and bovine stock raising, on the basis of better mastery of the technical conditions for stock raising.

This program, whose results will only be felt in the medium and long terms, is based particularly on improvement of steppe and tellian pastures, intensification and diversification of fodder crops, both dry and irrigated,

and improvement of livestock population productivity. The detailed implementation of this program will soon be coordinated with all the operators involved.

Rationalization of Management Norms

This increase in production, which remains the sole objective of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fishing, has a secondary effect, a clear improvement in the financial results of the Socialist Agricultural Properties (DAS). During the entire agricultural season just completed, the Ministry of Agriculture and Fishing initiated a series of actions to remove a maximum of limitations and to make profitable as soon as possible the production potential.

Rationalization of the management norms was applied to all the DAS, while assuring an increase in production. This was necessary, because the results of the 1982-1983 season (the first year) resulted in an overall net deficit of 1.868 billion DA, with only 398 DAS showing a profit, or 13 percent of all the properties. Efficiency for this 1982-1983 season was thus only 0.60, and no wilaya showed a profit, except for the old wilaya of Biskra.

Thus, in the light of these results, a profitability program for the DAS was approved, and actions relating to rationalization of management of the DAS were undertaken beginning in the 1983-1984 season. They were intended to assure a rapid recovery in production and financial results of the DAS.

All activities with a direct effect on the economic status of production were the target of special and sustained attention by all the agricultural staff as well as by the wilaya officials.

Among these activities we should note:

- Maximum use of the Useful Agricultural Surface (SAU)

- Increase and judicious use of the irrigated areas, and establishment of hill retainers, among others

- Application of growing techniques appropriate to each project to increase the yield per hectare

- Improvement of the yields of existing livestock

- Diversification and intensification of animal production (poultry-raising, other small raising, and sheep)

- Improvement of the internal organization of the DAS by effective maintenance and use of the management records to control use of the factors of production, and make the best use of available material and human resources in order to reduce expenses and finally to adhere to the growing calendar

- Put into condition equipment and infrastructure directly related to production, and particularly, insure the maintenance and good use of agricultural equipment

--Judicious use of the factors of production relating to, or used in, the production process

--Priority implementation of worker training activities

--Continuation of the operation to rationalize use of labor, and rapid completion of pension files

--Strict application of internal regulations, and insistence on work discipline

--Insure better labor productivity and reduce the number of work positions not attributable to production

--Mobilization of the offices and institutes above and below production to assure effective support to production.

Clear Financial Recovery

The actions undertaken by the sector throughout the two preceding agricultural seasons resulted in an initial improvement in financial result in the 1983-1984 season, and thus had an impact on the results of the 1984-1985 season.

The very marked improvements are demonstrated by the following indicators:

1. The unprocessed production of agriculture in the public sector for 1984-1985 (before final balance sheet) totaled 166 percent of the 1982-1983 production, and 127 percent of the 1983-1984 production.

1982-1983:	4.396 billion DA
1983-1984:	5.729 billion DA
1984-1985:	7.3 billion DA

The makeup of unprocessed production showed an increase of 34 percent for plant production and 62 percent for animal production compared to the 1983-1984 season.

2. The number of wilayas and DAS making a profit was improved markedly.

The number of wilayas making a net profit rose from one (Biskra) in 1982-1983 to three in 1983-1984 (Blida, Tipaza, Chlef), to 16 in 1984-1985 (Chlef, Ain Defla, Sidi Bel Abbes, Oum El Bouaghi, Mila, Tizi-Ouzou, Bouira, Tipaza, Bordj Bou Arreridj, Khenchela, Batna, Tebessa, Blida, Setif, Targui, and M'Sila).

The number of DAS with a positive result increased from 400 in 1982-1983 (13 percent of the total number of DAS) to 600 in 1983-1984 (17.6 percent), to 1,428 in 1984-1985 (42 percent).

3. The overall deficit of the DAS was reduced from 1.867 billion dinars in 1982-1983 to 1.510 billion in 1983-1984, and 285 million in 1984-1985.

The deficit level was thus reduced by 85 percent compared to 1982-1983 and by 81 percent compared to 1983-1984.

4. There was a very marked recovery of the financial situation of the wilayas, which had shown a significant deficit in 1983-1984, due to the ad hoc recovery plans that were implemented for them. Among these wilayas, whose results are presented below, the case of Sidi-Bel-Abbes is very significant because while it showed a deficit of 224 million dinars in 1983-1984, it turned a profit of 34 million in 1984-1985. The other wilayas showed reduction of their deficit by 50 to 75 percent.

Results 1984-1985

Sidi-Bel-Abbes: + 34.8
Oran: - 32.4
Tiaret: - 46
Mostaganem: - 42.8
Tlemcen: - 51
Mascara - 95

The financial results for Mascara wilaya worsened despite the very marked progress achieved in grain and potato production; this in the wake of the severe deterioration of the wilaya's citrus orchards caused by lack of irrigation water and a severe attack of aleurode.

The year 1985 was thus a good agricultural year, which it is now a matter of consolidating and expanding. The following targets have been set:

--To make 80 percent of the DAS profitable;

--To reduce the overall financial deficit

--To increase agricultural production by a proportion at least equal to the increased need of the population (demographic growth and rise in consumption level); these are the objectives of the coming 1985-1986 agricultural campaign.

In this context, the minister of agriculture and fishing recommended continuation of the various programs underway, while improving their effectiveness.

Moreover, new complementary programs will be undertaken relating to development of red meat production and dairy production, restoration of citrus capacity, and intensification of growing of dry vegetables, prunes, dry raisins and almonds.

Greatest Effectiveness for New Performance Levels

The objective to increase production will also be approached through improvement and growth of existing productive capital (SAU) by improving yields and exploitation of all the cultivable areas, and by reducing fallow time in areas of good potential; also by developing new land in the south and in the mountain zone, greater mobilization of water resources, and increase in irrigated surfaces.

The productivity gains that are to be achieved will be obtained through modernization of production techniques, and this through training activities, whose organization will be strengthened. All these actions directed toward production will be manifested in greater attention to the farmers of the private sector, stressing, in particular, the training effort for young farmers. The popularization system will be oriented toward improvement of techniques and will involve all the operators in the sector: the offices, the specialized service cooperatives, the development institutes and the experimental farms attached to them, as well as the pilot farms.

In conclusion, the minister of agriculture and fishing stressed the necessary followup in application of the aforementioned programs, which should be the basis for the activity of the managers of agriculture and of the economic and technical operators who constitute the environment of agricultural production.

The 1984-1985 agricultural season has thus demonstrated that our agricultural results can be improved and lead to encouraging results as long as we have the will to do it and each participates fully. It is thus a matter of developing the potentials of our land with the greatest possible effectiveness and with the highest possible performance.

9920

CSO: 4519/10

ALGERIA

MEASURES TAKEN TO COMBAT POLLUTION

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 22 Oct 85 p 4

[Interview with Environment Minister Aissa Abdellaoui with APS;
date and place not specified]

[Text] Environmental protection in Algeria is suddenly something tangible, something advancing every day as the result of a collective stirring of awareness, involving simultaneously the ordinary citizen, the Ministry responsible for it, local communities, and economic forces.

The measures that evoked this encouraging finding came from Aissa Abdellaoui, deputy minister for the environment and forest. In an interview granted APS following the latest government decisions in this area.

In response to those decisions, which became law on 5 February 1983, and which had to do with overall protection of the environment, a series of actions has been undertaken whose thrust runs along two major axes.

The first is designed to require all business and industry as well as local communities to contribute to this assumption of responsibility for whatever aspect of their operations endangers the environment.

The second part of the program calls for mobilizing the sector responsible for the environment by giving it whatever it takes to get the job done.

The current approach consisted in herding together a score of ministries and setting up six interministerial groups that have spent several months in studying the details of the problem from the following aspects:

Industrial pollution: marine pollution; public health and sanitation; dietary hygiene; impact studies; training, education, and consciousness-raising in environmental issues.

These groups focused on evaluation of the situation and on what measures should be taken in each sector.

We find now that the program is large and complex indeed, and that as a consequence it will call for setting priorities among the areas of action determined. Their implementation must be a function of several parameters, among them the kinds of units set up and the ways in which they affect the environment. Simply learning about them and the various and sundry kinds of pollution they generate is a massive challenge, one that will require competent cadre, cost a lot of money, and must be done.

However, the practical aspect of application must be given predominance by moving first to deal with the simplest projects that will do substantial good.

Making the general public and the business and industry concerned aware of the problem is vital in getting their active participation in the fight against pollution and for preservation of the environment.

In parallel with this effort, and under the aegis of the Party's social concerns sector, and following seminars in every wilaya, and every region, came a national seminar bringing together representatives of all the wilayas, the central and local administrations, the businesses and industries involved, and the labor and profession organizations, was organized in May 1985.

Abate Industrial Pollution

In practical terms, it amounts to multiform and multidimensional measures. Those of general nature are:

- Making a national land-use map and requiring environmental impact studies prior to permitting any projects that might have a harmful impact on the environment;

- Beef up the national system of pollution-source monitoring and maintain continual surveillance over the state of the environment;

Build and staff the three regional environmental analysis laboratories.

Measures designed to reduce pollution may be summed up as follows:

- Setting up corps of environmental inspectors and monitors;

- establishing six interministerial groups responsible for monitoring existing anti-pollution measures at the local-unit level;

- Bring defective or obsolete anti-pollution installations back into working order;
- Identifying industrial units which are in urgent need of anti-pollution systems;
- Speed up the process of getting planned anti-pollution systems off the drawing-boards, and getting the ones now under construction completed;
- Conduct a new inventory of polluting industrial units operated by small and medium industry;
- Devise a national arrangement for control of pesticide residues;
- Set up a national disposal system for toxic or hazardous wastes;
- Set up a national system for disposal of residual sludge from water-filtration plants;
- Set up management agencies in industrial zones.

Waste-Water Treatment Plants

Actions planned to abate marine pollution:

- Reactivation of waste-water treatment plants in coastal urban and tourist centers ;
- Complete construction of urban waste-water treatment stations now under way;
- Reactivate facilities for receiving ballast-water;
- Provide villages and tourist resorts along the coast with beach-cleaning equipment;
- Demolish the derelict seaside "Minisea";
- Install a permanent monitoring device to insure healthful water quality at all bathing beaches;
- Provide adequate waste-water management and disposal systems for coastal and tourist centers;
- Beef up the national capacity for intervention during accidental maritime spills of polluting substances.

Pollution and nuisances in urban environments are also targeted by some of the measures:

- Require regular inspection of automobile engines;
- Redesign traffic flows in the major cities so as to expedite it and avoid gridlock;
- Equip all automotive vehicles with catalytic convertors;
- Encourage utilization of LPG as automobile fuel;
- Transfer to industrial zones all activities that generate pollution within the cities;
- Curb nuisances due to excessive noise.

In the area of information and environmental awareness, plans now call for:

- Making sure appropriate training is provided for people assigned to operating and maintaining anti-pollution devices;
- expanding studies and research in the environmental area through international cooperation to train experts in the environmental field as post-graduate students
- set up a national documentation center in the area of environmental sciences and technologies
- instituting a national prize for environmental contributions
- fostering creation of centers to interpret nature
- building fauna and flora museums
- publishing a national environmental magazine.

Elsewhere, a plan to protect nature and fight desertification will shortly be submitted to the government. Measures already taken in this effort are the following:

The interministerial groups are already at work with the Light Industries Ministry which has been in business for more than a year now, and has already unanimously moved to take certain measures:

-- technical requirements and rules are in the works, following an area-by-area approach to problem activities (cement, textiles, hides and leathers, wood and paper);

-- Establishment of the National Environmental Protection Agency at the end of 1984;

-- Action plans calling for protection of fragile ecosystems, including the Saida water-table, Oued Mazafran, and the Reghaia swamp, have been drafted, and their implementation followed very closely by the ministries and local authorities. The plans also call for harsh sanctions against polluters who fail to comply with the standards, sanctions that run all the way up to shutting down the plant permanently.

6182

CS0: 4519/15

EGYPT

U.S. MEDIA RESPONSE TO SHIP HIJACKING DISCUSSED

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 15 Oct 85 p 7

[Commentary by Salah Muntasir in Frankfurt in the "Just an Opinion" column:
"New Examination"]

[Text] From my previous first-hand experience with American TV in the United States, I am familiar with the TV networks mania and frantic competition to cover news about America. Besides long news reports, commentaries and talk shows conducted everywhere, TV stations interrupt regular programming to repeat a news item on an average of at least once every 10 minutes. The American TV station that is beamed to Germany 24 hours a day to accommodate the soldiers of the largest American base in Europe located in Frankfurt has been trying since the incident to portray the news as a great victory for America which helped it win World War III!

For many days, the only thing this station did was to relate through photos and painful detail how American President Reagan gave his order to intercept the Egyptian plane from his personal aircraft while flying from Washington to Chicago. As soon as Reagan's order came out, TV cameras transmitted photos of the Phantom aircraft taking off from the aircraft carrier "Saratoga" as though its mission were to shoot down an outerspace planet on its way to invade America. Through animation, TV stations showed how the Phantom aircraft caught up with the Egyptian passenger plane surrounded it and forced it to land.

Details are plentiful. But the most important detail is the show of force America tried to portray, as confirmed by headlines in the American press, one of which said: "We Got Them This Time."

This headline demonstrates very succinctly the true feelings of the American people. Americans had been subject to many attempts in Lebanon, Iran and elsewhere, but were unable to "get them" until this time. Therefore, they wanted to make up for everything they had missed, hence the show of force they photographed against the target their airplanes went after, although it was just a civilian airplane without one bullet aboard to defend itself. Moreover, it belonged to a friendly not a hostile, state and was unable to make contact with Egypt.

Therefore, it was natural that the Egyptian reaction be one of strong outrage. This is the message American TV got recently when it carried photos of President Husni Mubarak's recent press conference in which he told the true story of what actually happened and sincerely expressed the deep sense of hurt he felt as a citizen and as president of a people who value their pride and dignity and place it above all else.

That is why the voices of the American show of force died down days ago and it became clear that a reexamination process was underway to assess the gains and losses of an operation which added one more monstrous mistake to the long list of American mistakes in the Middle East.

12929/12502

CSO: 4504/48

EGYPT

FOUR YEARS OF MUBARAK RULE SEEN IN POSITIVE LIGHT

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 14 Oct 85 p 1

[Editorial: "Four Years of Giving"]

[Text] Today is the 4th anniversary of President Mubarak's ascent to power in Egypt. If we were to characterize these 4 years in one brief sentence, we can truly and unhesitatingly say that they have been years of giving and hard work for the sake of Egypt and for a better future for its upcoming generations.

Although the life of a people is not measured in months or years, we have been able during this limited number of years to perceive bright signs on the road of the struggle for a better future for Egypt and its struggling people as well as the main features of Mubarak's clear and realistic system of rule.

On the internal front, accomplishment has been established as the only criterion for evaluation, appraisal and comparison in the belief that actions speak louder than words and that what the country needs is hard work to solve its problems, not glittering promises or rosy dreams.

Perhaps it is a significant coincidence that the last day of the 4th year of Mubarak's regime should witness the inauguration of two big projects: the Jala' Tunnel, which adds another new civilizational feature to the Egyptian capital and contributes to the solution of its problems, and the inauguration of new housing in 6 October City which augments the housing pool with new units that help alleviate the housing problem.

One main character of Mubarak's system of rule is a seriousness in dealing with problems and solving major problems through radical solutions that get to the causes of the problem and are not satisfied with treating the effects and using fast-acting tranquilizers to conceal its severe symptoms.

Big problems, in Mubarak's view, require long-term solutions and hard work through a development plan that sets priorities which cannot be overstepped in the quest for cheap popularity or for applause that does not alter the truth in any way.

Government, in Mubarak's view, is a great responsibility for the future of the people and their generation. Concealing problems and deferring solutions until they get out of hand is not a loyal and trustworthy course to take.

In keeping with his belief in serious work and the magnitude of the responsibility for a people's destiny, Mubarak never made promises he could not keep nor did he delude the toiling people with dreams of prosperity from heaven. Rather, he asked everyone to work with him with devotion for the sake of Egypt, reaffirming his belief that without higher production, prosperity cannot be achieved and problems will not be solved.

This course of his is in keeping with his profound belief that there is no alternative to democracy as a way for the people to share responsibility for their country and their destinies and that different opinions are the surest way to arrive at the best decision.

President Mubarak was the one who released political prisoners a few days after he assumed power. They went right from prisons and detention camps to meet with him. He was also the one who allowed opposition newspapers to resume publication and who received opposition leaders to consult with them on important issues. He was the one who declared his faith in everyone's patriotism and national loyalty, supporters and opponents alike, asking them all to work for the sake of Egypt.

There is no room here to count all the brilliant signs on Mubarak's road during the last 4 years at home or abroad, but it seems beneficial to pause before some outstanding marks in Mubarak's record.

During these 4 years, the Arab character of Egypt has been established through experiences, ordeals and genuine Arab stances. Egypt's leading personality, which agitators tried to obliterate, came into prominence. Witness Egypt's withdrawal of its ambassador to Israel following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, its genuine Arab stance in supporting Iraq in its war in the Gulf, its strong position following the raid on Tunis, its refusal to receive the negotiating delegation on Taba and its support of the PLO leadership and its resistance to attempts to control Palestinian decisions.

As for the international front, Egypt's international personality reemerged and gained the respect of the international community during the last 4 years of Mubarak's regime. Egypt was elected to the Security Council, returned to the Islamic Conference and resumed its role in the non-aligned movement, and its leading role in the African community came into prominence. As for its persistent and sincere efforts to set in motion the peace process, regain Arab rights and solve the Palestinian problem, the international community has attested to such efforts and made great progress in polarizing international support for Arab rights.

The record goes on and on, both internally and externally. Because great peoples are always able to achieve their great goals, we have a deep faith that our great people will continue on the road of struggle and giving alongside Mubarak in order to achieve their goals.

12929/12502
CSO: 4504/48

EGYPT

MUBARAK'S WIFE SPEAKS OUT ON SOCIAL ISSUES

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 18 Oct 85 p 8

[Article: "Family Planning Success Depends on Rural Woman"]

[Text] Mrs Husni Mubarak said that the success of family planning depends on the rural woman because she represents the great majority of women who for a long time were deprived of their rights, most of which they have regained in recent years. She said that it was necessary to support the social activities of women and provide them with health and educational services through social organizations. She added that rural women play an active role in the fields of public work and objectives related to families, children and working women.

Mrs Mubarak emphasized that Egyptian children receive an ample share of government care and attention.

At the reception held yesterday at the Ramses Hilton Hotel on the occasion of the visit by Mrs Dorothy Broom, international president of the (INRUL) Clubs, to Egypt, the First Lady added that the message the social action clubs all over the world offer is that they do not discriminate against people on the basis of color, race or creed because the human being is the ultimate end, regardless of any other consideration.

The First Lady said that the reception was an appropriate occasion for presenting a general comprehensive evaluation of the feminist movement worldwide, especially since we are at the threshold of the end of the UN Women's Decade, which held its last international conference last July in Nairobi where the largest international gathering in the history of women was held.

Mrs Mubarak alluded to the Nairobi conference by saying that it represented an important experience for the Egyptian woman worthy of further study to uncover the most important results of this female gathering, which included 14,000 women. She said that Egypt played an outstanding leading role at this conference in its capacity as president of the 77 Group, which means that it headed the delegations of 139 UN members representing the continents of the world.

The First Lady said that we in Egypt afford children the kind of care and attention they need as the shapers of the future. Therefore, elementary

schools have received a large share of time and effort spent in public service. The year 1985 was the year of the library on the national level because in a society which is building its present and looking forward to its future, the cultivation of the mind is as important as good health.

The reception began with a speech by Mrs Huda al-Dib, the Egyptian president of the 95th District, in which she welcomed Mrs Mubarak and Mrs Dorothy Broom and it was attended by Dr Amal 'Uthman, minister of social security and social affairs, and by club members.

It is noteworthy that Mrs Dorothy Broom arrived in Egypt last Tuesday on a 9-day visit during which she will visit social action organizations and inspect the work of the Egyptian (INRUL) Club as part of her official tour of the countries which are members of the World (INRUL) Clubs.

12929/12502

CSO: 4504/51

EGYPT

PROMINENT JOURNALIST WRITES FROM TUNIS AFTER ISRAELI RAID

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 Oct 85

[Commentary by Ahmad Baha'-al-Din in the "Diary" Column]

[5 Oct 85 p 16]

[Text] Regardless of their different countries or political leanings, no two Arab or foreign political observers in Tunis disagree about the fact that the Israeli raid on PLO headquarters in Tunis was basically aimed at striking a low blow against the proposed political initiatives, which have reached a new high point with the visit of President Husni Mubarak and King Husayn to the United States recently.

The relation between the death of three Israelis on a yacht in Cyprus and the Tunis raid is similar to the relation between the shots fired at the Israeli ambassador in London and the Israeli attack on Lebanon a few days later.

It is not the relation of a cause to its effect; rather, it is the relation of a pretext to an action prepared and ready for execution, lacking only the choice of time and justification.

Israel forms a plan to accomplish a certain objective. The plan has been studied for months or years and is ready down to the last detail. Israel, however, waits for a pretext to be used and for the timing that will accomplish several objectives at once before she releases the studied and calculated blow: such was the 1967 war, such was the attack on the Baghdad nuclear reactor (Begin's coup, which won in the elections), such was the attack on Lebanon, and such was the air raid on Tunis.

Fundamentally, Israel wants no negotiations. Whoever negotiates has to engage in a give and take, but Israel does not need to give anything and does not want any Palestinian in any delegation. If we offered her the names of 4 million Palestinians, she would find a reason to reject each of them, because merely to acknowledge "the Palestinian reality" shakes her presence in the occupied territories--even if she continually talks about peace and negotiations.

Israel found the pressure on her from the recent initiatives increasing. Secretary of State Shultz might have brought the names of a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation for discussion, and it seemed that America was on the

verge of moving toward some sort of de facto recognition of the PLO. It therefore became necessary to demolish the PLO, destroying the Palestinian body in Lebanon and the head in Tunis.

This strike was therefore necessary in order to rekindle the total war between Israel and the PLO, embarrassing America and Europe, and demonstrating that there are no "extremists" and "moderates" among the Palestinians, as no one will negotiate with Israel under a rain of bombs. Thus the initiative will be dealt a severe blow for a long time, and Peres will gain domestically in the bidding against the Likud bloc.

[6 Oct 85 p 14]

[Text] Had the Israeli planes reached Tunis 2 hours ahead of schedule, had they arrived at 8:10 instead of 10:10, they might have succeeded in killing Abu 'Ammar [Yasir 'Arafat], Abu Iyad [Salah Khalaf], and a large number of Fatah and PLO leaders.

The buildings that include the residences, offices, and headquarters of the PLO adjoin each other in one place, public and visible to the eye. Before such operations, Israel studied them carefully. The scene indicates that it knew the place yard by yard and inch by inch. In this case it was very easy. Israel, of course, has carried out exercises in the Mediterranean involving flying in this direction, refueling in flight, the movement and schedules of international air traffic, etc., using the most modern weapons and technology supplied to her by the United States.

At the same time, Israel is protesting the supplying of Jordan with defensive air weapons--when the skies lie open before her!

After the 1967 Israeli air strike against Egypt, General Tal, then commander of the [Israeli] Air Force, said that they had been studying the operation with the most precise information provided to them by all sources, from aerial photograph to ground reconnaissance, and had been training for it for 10 years, i.e., since their withdrawal from Egypt after the 1957 Tripartite Aggression.

Israel had been raising a din for weeks about possibilities for a strike against Jordan because of the existence of commando bases there. In fact, there are none. It appears that this din was to mislead, so that Tunis could be struck with ease.

In 1956, Israel massed troops on the borders of Jordan to mislead; then the attack fell on Egypt. In 1967, they massed troops on the Syrian border and talked about occupying Damascus; then they directed their blow against Egypt under the pretense that Egypt had begun the war, as their Communique No 10 said. When it became clear after the war that this had not been true, Dayan replied to journalists' questions by saying that the question of who had begun the fighting had become academic.

For at least a year there has been talk of an Israeli plan to strike PLO bases in Tunisia or South Yemen. As usual, the Arabs did not believe it.

Had they believed it, what would they have done until the blow actually fell on Tunis?

[7 Oct 85 p 13]

[Text] Abu 'Ammar [Yasir 'Arafat] said to me that Israel by itself is technically incapable of carrying out the operation of striking Tunis, because the refueling of eight aircraft in the air at least three times during the round trip requires "nurse" planes that Israel does not have in sufficient numbers. "Eight planes have to be protected by eight other planes. Would it be possible for an aerial refueling operation over the Mediterranean, filled as it is with observation and listening devices, not to be noticed by anyone? Could they be thought to be on a pleasure trip?"

Abu 'Ammar is known to have a sixth sense. He did not, however, sense the danger when he left his office, only to take a walk for exercise, half an hour before the office was blown up.

He had returned the previous night from Morocco and was exhausted after having stayed up all night at work.

When one visits the site of the bombing, one finds nothing but level ground. It is as if there had been no buildings there previously, so intense and concentrated was the destruction. It was known that Abu 'Ammar's office was in one of these buildings; it was not well known that he also lived in it.

Six small notebooks in which Abu 'Ammar had been writing and which he had fastened together before leaving the building were found blown about 2 km by the explosion from on top of the desk at which he had been sitting a short time before. Pieces of his clothing were found high in the trees some kilometers away.

"Such precise aerial photograph," says Abu 'Ammar, "can be done only by satellite, though I personally believe that espionage on the ground is still fundamental. The destruction took place with surgical precision, and then the planes dived and strafed the area with machine gun fire so that no one would escape."

The martyrs were buried in a communal grave in Tunis rather than being returned to their countries. The bombing had so mangled the flesh and blood remains that it became difficult to gather together the body of any single martyr.

[8 Oct 85 p 14]

[Text] Tunisia will pay dearly for the Israeli raid. This, though a side effect, deserves to be taken into account by Mr Ronald Reagan, who saw in the Israeli raid a legitimate response to terrorism.

Tunisia is a country that depends in its economy on effort, work, and intelligence, since sufficient natural resources are not available. For this

reason, tourism represents one of the most important sources of income for Tunisia.

When Tunisia accepted the move of the Arab League to it, people's feelings were divided. On the one hand, it would plunge into the pit of Arab events and conflicts a country that had lived bent on keeping its distance from this morass, and it might affect tourism, which wants a safe, emancipated, beautiful, and clean country. On the other hand, the League's presence with its activities, expenditures, and embassies would create brisk economic activity--also a rise in prices--easily perceived in little Tunis, which is not like Cairo with its 10 million.

Subsequently, the politicization of Tunisia in the eye of the tourist was increased by a number of factors unanticipated at the time of the Arab League's move to Tunis: the Israeli attack on Lebanon, the expulsion of the Palestinian resistance from Lebanon, and the PLO's choice (how narrow the options were!) to have its headquarters in Tunis. Israeli propaganda in European newspapers began to mix the name of Tunis with terrorism and the headquarters of terrorism. Tourism to Tunisia is basically European; the country is the Arab Riviera, across from the French Riviera, but much cheaper.

Then came al-Qadhdhafi's threats and booby-trapped packages to spread a further atmosphere of danger in Tunisia

Financiers and economists here now expect that the recent Israeli raid will have a great, even back-breaking effect on tourism, since it has made Tunisia, with the Arab League and PLO headquarters located in it, look as if it were a "confrontation state" and a potential battlefield.

The Tunisian people know all this. Reaction to the Israeli raid, however, was strange: spontaneous demonstrations went out cheering and welcoming the fact that Tunisia would become a confrontation state. The official government expressed complete sympathy with the PLO, and the feeling of the people overflowed for the Palestinians who are being pursued to the ends of the earth by injustice from Israel and from certain Arab states.

[9 Oct 85 p 18]

[Text] President Ronald Reagan's pronouncements have made a heavier impression on Tunisia than the bombs dropped by Israel.

Abu 'Ammar [Yasir 'Arafat] says: "The objective was to kill both the chairman of the PLO and the peace initiative. Perhaps they succeeded in the second objective." He notes that Reagan's pronouncement supporting the operation and expressing his pleasure at the expertise of Israeli intelligence came out 1 hour after the air attack.

Tunisian authorities note that President Bourguiba was visiting Ronald Reagan 2 months ago, and that with the development of a crisis between Libya and Tunisia, the Americans gave assurance of their support for Tunisia's independence and sovereignty a week before the Israeli attack. The American

fleet was off the Tunisian coast, and the commander of the fleet visited Tunis and presented its president with a sword. Is an attack on Tunisian sovereignty, as America sees the matter, not the right of Libya, while it is the right of Israel? What sort of friendship is this? What confidence can Tunisia feel toward the United States? The Israeli aggression received not a word of condemnation from America; instead, reaction from the White House itself was support for the aggression and praise for the efficiency of Israeli intelligence.

They did not even consider respecting the national feelings of the Tunisian people. The shock to President Bourguiba personally after he had trusted America for 30 years was extreme. His meeting with the American ambassador was very stormy and blunt. Never in the history of Tunisia's firm relationship with America had the Tunisian president been known to accuse America of what amounted to collusion. It was rumored that the ambassador carried a handwritten letter from Reagan denying America's knowledge of the attack.

Tunisia, which continues to have a crisis with Libya even after this grave aggression, with threats and expulsion of workers, is asking itself whether the Arab world will offer it the support it needs, especially money and weapons.

I have learned that the visit of a representative of King Hasan of Morocco to Tunisia was for the purpose of offering, on behalf of Libya, the convocation of a North African summit, to include Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco. Bourguiba, however, rejected the suggestion and rejected any cooperation with Libya.

Tunisian authorities say that Libya has done nothing after the raid to indicate that it has changed its intentions against Tunisia, and that they are not ready to be tolerant toward the Libyan interventions which led to Tunisia's decision to break off relations.

[10 Oct 85 p 20]

[Text] Dear Colonel [al-Qadhdhafi]:

The Israeli raid on Tunis has proved that all Arab countries have become "confrontation states." Before the invention of modern aviation, the confrontation states were Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt; the rest of the Arab states had the luxury of talking about "a fight to the death" without having anything demanded from them, secure in their geographical distance from Israel. It was therefore a truism that "states increase in extremism as their distance from the Israeli border increases."

Israel has now proved that war has other possible theaters than "the contiguous borders," and that it is possible to strike over a distance of thousands of kilometers at Tunis.

The distance from Banghazi, for example, to Israel is half the distance from Israel to al-Hammamat in Tunisia.

If published reports are true, you have a huge arsenal of the most modern aircraft and skilled pilots. It is you who are demanding that the Arabs fight to the death and sacrifice lives ceaselessly. You called on the PLO army and leadership to commit suicide during the siege of Beirut rather than leave Beirut. Why do you not try aiming an air strike of this sort at any target in Israel, no matter how insignificant? The psychological effect here would be important and fundamental. At least Israel would sense, to begin with, that the skies of the region are not an open field for her alone. Secondly, she would sense that it is possible to deliver an Arab bomb to Israel. This would be better than fighting in Chad and elsewhere.

It has been demonstrated that the matter is possible technically and militarily with the weapons that you have.

It does not matter what Israel's retaliatory reaction might be. This is war! This is a fight to the death!

Those who speak in your name and specialize in reviling honorable nationalists will say that the matter is not simple and that it requires that "things be taken into consideration."

I say to them: You are right. The matter is not easy and, to be sure, it requires that things be taken into consideration.

However, why does the colonel refuse to allow others to take things into consideration? Why does he refuse to allow their considerations to impede "the fight to the death?" Why does he accuse everyone who takes anything into consideration of treason?

Or is there a possibility that the colonel will surprise us with an operation against Israel, not against an Arab or African country, so that we can convince ourselves that he really believes the story of a fight to the death--in cases other than those in which only the death of other people is at stake!

12937/13046
CSO: 4504/50

EGYPT

SLP LEADER SHUKRI DISCUSSES POLICY ON ISRAEL

Nicosia FALASTIN AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 12 Oct 85 pp 42-44

[Interview with Ibrahim Shukri, head of the Socialist Labor Party, by Mujahid 'Ali Sharab in Cairo: "No Reason for Israeli Ambassador To Stay; Camp David Accords: One Frozen, the Other Dropped;" date not specified]

[Text] Egyptian [Socialist] Labor Party leader Ibrahim Shukri raised the slogan "A million Palestinian flags in Cairo for a single Israeli flag." The party rejects any Zionist presence on any Arab land, Egyptian and Arab alike.

[Question] How does Ibrahim Shukri personally assess Labor Party relations with the PLO?

[Answer] Our relations with the Palestinian question go back to the forties when Young Egypt Party leader Mr Ahmad Husayn was one of those who volunteered to defend Palestinian land. We always supported any effort aimed at raising the banner of the Palestinian cause and the voice of Palestinians everywhere. Then came the PLO with which we were intent on having contacts under all circumstances.

I come to this period which I consider extraordinary and abnormal in the history of Egypt. We must attach great importance to these contacts, and the Egyptian people and government must strive to preserve their relations with the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

We will not compromise on this principle, hence our presence at the Palestine National Council when it convened in Damascus, Algiers, and Amman. We are always eager to maintain contact with the true leaders of the cause and their representatives, for they know the best course which should be followed. We must support their judgment, hence our support for the PLO under all circumstances.

[Question] How do you view the credibility of American policy and do you think it is serious in seeking a "settlement" acceptable to all parties?

[Answer] The United States, as a superpower, has its own interests and thus arranges matters accordingly. I believe there will be no change in the

American attitude toward the Palestinian problem unless constant pressures are applied by the Arab countries.

[Question] What do you think about the outcome of Murphy's recent tour and about American conditions on the PLO and Jordan to recognize Israel in advance?

[Answer] Murphy's tour, as are other tours as well, is an American ruse aimed at giving the impression that the United States is doing something or making efforts while the true objective is to form an idea about what factors ought to be taken into consideration in order to safeguard its interests on the basis of new developments! But ultimately, Israel is still assured that American decisions always correspond to all its personal wishes.

[Question] Do you regard Thatcher's visit as a continuation of Murphy's tour or as a substitute for it?

[Answer] England knows what it can do. It is trying to preserve its interests, but its actions do not cross the boundaries generally set by the United States. I would like to point out that tangible progress has been made with regard to the British government following its agreement to receive a Palestinian-Jordanian delegation. I do not want to anticipate events, but I would like to say that we must watch any progress, no matter how small. I do not want to say that Thatcher's visit is a continuation of or a substitute for Murphy's efforts. I am just making this positive step a matter of record.

[Question] Is it the beginning of an actual British recognition of the PLO, notwithstanding Thatcher's reservations and her contention that the meeting does not mean recognition of the PLO?

[Answer] It is a step in keeping with future recognition. Recognition will come at the proper time. This is a step on the road.

[Question] What do you think of the possibility of holding an international peace conference, as suggested by the PLO, as a reply to the American call for direct negotiations?

[Answer] I support the idea of an international conference. Undoubtedly, such a conference will most likely have international guarantees within the scope of general rules based on the basic rights which must be guaranteed to all peoples. Moreover, the presence of several parties affords a greater opportunity to install parties who are not totally prejudiced in Israel's favor as arbiters.

It is clear that the United States has always rejected this idea, putting forth as an alternative "direct negotiations" or "direct contact." I believe, however, that there are some movement and some modest changes.

[Question] In the SLP, you raised the slogan "One million Palestinian flags in Cairo for a single Israeli flag" in counteracting the Egyptian-Israeli

treaty and normalization. How far has this treaty gone, in your opinion, and what kind of future does it have?

[Answer] I can say with certainty that the Egyptian people totally reject normalization with Israel, and Israel is well aware of that. There is no doubt that the Egyptian government very often comes under pressure and has to deal with certain situations. Therefore, it has had to do something to please Israel, as the agreements stipulate. But based on more than one position, we believe that the Egyptian government did not try in any way to impose normalization on the Egyptian people.

Israel, having realized the matter was not a question of an agreement it concluded one day with al-Sadat and with the Egyptian government, is reappraising its position now. I know that the United States, in its dealings with Egypt, always hints at improving relations with Israel. The United States has reiterated its wish to see the Egyptian ambassador return to Tel Aviv, but the Egyptian government's reply has been influenced by the Egyptian people's stand. The Taba question has not been resolved, nor has the treatment of Palestinians in the occupied territory changed. Hence, I say that the present situation is in a state of inaction. No matter how much Israel tries, reality says that unless actual progress is made in solving the problems of the Palestinian cause and of the other occupied territories, there will be no future for the kind of peace which is not built on just foundations or which does not guarantee the rights of the Palestinian people. Moreover, the Palestinian cause, even within the confines of the Camp David Accords [CDA], will not experience any progress, hence the state of inaction. Therefore, other methods and courses of action must be considered in order to find solutions. The CDA is as good as canceled, for as far as Egypt is concerned it has been put on ice and as far as the Palestinians are concerned it has been actually dropped.

[Question] Many events have emerged lately, the most recent of which was the assassination of the Israeli attache Atrakshi. These events were expected to bring an end to Egyptian-Israeli relations or to bury normalization alive. It is noted, however, that both governments, the Israeli side particularly, took in these events without counteracting them with the expected "reaction." What do you think of this situation, and is there any attempt to preserve that thin thread?

[Answer] The Israeli side cannot accuse the Egyptian government of not taking precautions. The Israeli embassy has a large number of security forces around it.

Israel wants to claim that the perpetrators were a small group which did not represent the real trend in Egypt. It is playing it cool. When Egypt withdrew its ambassador from Tel Aviv, Israel did not follow suit, although diplomatic practice requires such an action. Israel is determined to preserve appearances by saying that its ambassador is still in Egypt because the ambassador, in such a position, serves a specific purpose. Israel knows that the Arab countries are devoting all their attention to this matter, reiterating their refusal to maintain normal relations with Egypt while the Israeli ambassador is in Cairo.

[Question] Do you mean that Israel is keeping its ambassador in Egypt to obstruct Egypt's return to the Arab fold and impede the resumption of normal Arab-Egyptian relations?

[Answer] The ambassador's withdrawal will have an adverse effect on Israel's interests. Therefore, it has to bite the bullet and keep its ambassador there, even at the expense of diplomatic practice.

[Question] What about the Taba problem? The official Egyptian position insists on international arbitration while Israel is still searching for a compromise through negotiation or conciliation and rejects international arbitration as capitulation, thus leading the problem into new labyrinths. How do you perceive the required national solution?

[Answer] We consider the Egyptian government's acceptance of arbitration as a kind of capitulation because Taba belongs to Egypt by Israel's admission, since, during the 1956 withdrawal, Israel pulled out of Taba. If Taba were part of the Palestinian territory, would Israel have withdrawn from it? There are maps, Israeli maps, according to recent press reports in Israel itself which confirm that Taba is Egyptian. We must not even concede the principle of arbitration. I do not think that the Egyptian government will give in any further or will follow another course.

[Question] Do you mean like conciliation or negotiation, for instance?

[Answer] Conciliation is not possible. The land is Egyptian, and arbitration is the least that can be done as far as Egypt is concerned. When the Egyptian government says that we accept arbitration, it is because it is fully convinced that it has documents which can easily prove that Taba is Egyptian territory. I believe that the Egyptian government must adopt a firmer position.

[Question] What about Egypt's return to its Arab environment and the Camp David obstacle it is facing in this regard?

[Answer] If Camp David had any bad effects, it is the rift it caused between Egypt and the Arab world. This is the worst thing that can happen to the Arabs and the best thing that can happen to Israel. I would like to tell you, and I lived through this period, that never in the history of the world did two countries declare war against each other only to exchange embassies on the following day. Israel, aware of the way it can deal a blow to Egyptian-Arab relations, insisted on exchanging ambassadors the day the treaty was signed, before the evacuation of Sinai began. It again insisted on exchanging ambassadors when it evacuated the Ra's Muhammad-Sharm al-Shaykh line because when ambassadors are exchanged, the Israeli flag is hoisted before the evacuation of Sinai. It did, in fact, realize its objective with utmost success.

We have to go beyond this point. I support any efforts to improve relations between Egypt and the Arab countries. The situation now is far better than it was a few years ago.

[Question] What were your impressions following your participation in the parliamentary conference in Canada, and how was the failure to condemn Israel during the debate on the "elimination of colonialism" handled?

[Answer] Frankly, the Arab cause has regressed in international quarters, particularly with regard to the meetings of the International Parliamentary Federation, due to Arab conflicts, as well as other problems on the mind of world public opinion which have a regional impact, such as what we call the "Lebanese issue" and the Iran-Iraq war.

Hence, these new circumstances may have contributed to the fading interest in the Palestinian cause. Compare this attitude to what happened in the Rome conference when Abu 'Ammar attended the international parliamentary conference which convened in Rome in September 1982. The entire conference gave Abu 'Ammar a standing ovation, greeting him with applause for more than 10 minutes. I never, in my whole life, saw an international leader received this way in any international quarter.

Three years later, in Montreal, Canada, an attempt was made to ban presentation of the Palestinian issue for consideration and to obstruct any discussion of the Palestinian people's cause and right to self-determination. Some people alleged that the Palestinian people's cause did not meet the criteria of the principle of self-determination.

When I took the floor, I insisted, over the objections of the conference chairman, on raising the question of the Palestinian people's cause meeting the criteria for the right to self-determination. The Palestinian delegation and the Arab delegation thanked me. The Arabs must adopt a unified stand on their national causes.

[Question] While talking in your office as president of the Social Labor Party's parliamentary body, we are reminded of your position rejecting the law which prohibits Palestinians from owning land in Egypt. How, in your opinion, can this law be rescinded or re-amended, and how can the harm this law has brought upon the Palestinians, who own land and cultivated it as their sole source of livelihood, be remedied?

[Answer] I suggested to the president of the People's Assembly that the matter be postponed until the next session in order to have a better chance to discuss it.

The amendment introduced by the parliamentary committee was a bad one. It was better when the government submitted it because it did not apply to the present status, but only to cases of death. The committee introduced another amendment providing for disposal within 5 years or upon death, whichever comes first. That is why, after rejecting the law in principle, I asked that the law be amended to read "whichever comes later" instead of "whichever comes first." FALASTIN A-THAWRAH explained this point in Issue No 571 of 24 August 1985. The bill was presented as an urgent one and the session was crowded with bills, so it was passed. Therefore, it is logical to demand that it be amended because it did not receive its fair share of debate and is, in fact, amendable.

[Question] How does fighter Ibrahim Shukri view the future of the Palestinian revolution?

[Answer] The door of independent judgment is open on one condition: that we not lose this sacred torch in our hearts and that we must protect and defend our case and not lock up our weapons in drawers and warehouses. In defending our just and lawful rights, the PLO can never be called a "terrorist" organization. The Palestinian people must preserve this sacred torch and must always protect it. We must not lose our resolve in any way.

12502/13046
CSO: 4504/56

EGYPT

'ABD-AL-NASIR'S ERA RECALLED

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 28 Sep 85 p 7

[Editorial: "Abd-al-Nasir's Anniversary"]

[Text] Today is the 15th anniversary of the death of the departed leader Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir. Opinions of 'Abd-al-Nasir may differ but there is unanimous agreement that during his 18-year rule Egypt changed from a country subservient to foreign imperialism and to the domination of the half of 1 percent class into an independent country with dignity and stature in the Arab world, in Africa, and in the non-aligned movement.

The revolution led by 'Abd-al-Nasir the evening of 23 July 1952, was different from all others in the world in that it was a white revolution that avoided bloodshed, personal vendettas, and settling of accounts. It went on to accumulate dignity and honor for the homeland and its citizenry.

During 'Abd-al-Nasir's era, the farmer was liberated from feudalism domination and the worker from the dictatorship of the employer. Representatives of workers and farmers came to occupy at least 50 percent of all seats in legislative and people's assemblies. Universities opened their doors to the people free of charge so that higher education became equally available to all. Colleges and universities multiplied and Egypt became the center of educational and scientific enlightenment in the third world.

Egypt assumed its position as leader of the Arab world. Every Arab country saw in 'Abd-al-Nasir a symbol of liberation, of struggle, and of social justice. Egypt was also one of the three founding states of the non-aligned movement which now comprises more than half the nations of the world.

'Abd-al-Nasir played a distinguished historical role in calling for Asian-African solidarity since the early years of the revolution and in putting forward the charter of the Organization of African Unity in 1963.

'Abd-al-Nasir's memory will remain alive in Egypt's soul and in the heart of every citizen that lives on this good earth and in this homeland, which never forgets the favors of its sincere leaders who lived for Egypt and died in its service.

12945/12766
CSO: 4504/40

EGYPT

'NASIRISM' AFTER 'ABD-AL-NASIR DISCUSSED

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic 5-11 Oct 85 pp 59-60

[Article by Humidah Na'na': "Nasirism's Last Means of Influence: The Nasirists After 'Abd-al-Nasir."]

[Text] How can we define Nasirism after Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir? And then again, does Nasirism exist in Egypt? Why not create a Nasirist party on the pattern of other parties which have jointed the experiment of democratic multiplicity?

Was 'Abd-al-Nasir's leadership purely propaganda through the mass media, the microphone, and the TV camera, or was it more than that, a vision to develop backward societies and steer them on the way to progress?

Undoubtedly 'Abd-al-Nasir's leadership was based on issues which touched the Egyptian people's daily lives as well as the aspirations of the Arabs. Besides 'Abd-al-Nasir's leadership charisma, there was also the series of slogans he raised with regard to "unity," "socialism," and "freedom." There was the series of economic and social measures which reshaped the semifeudal society in prerevolutionary Egypt.

Add to that the "necessity," to quote Fathi Ghanim. The "necessity" sprang from the fact that 'Abd-al-Nasir emerged in a developing Third World country which, notwithstanding its civilizational wealth, suffered severe economic backwardness. It is an acknowledged fact in sociology that any people in the process of development need a leadership as the center of gravity that can draw them around it in order to reach the desired goal. To this day, Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir's personality still offers to students of history and revolutions a model of a leader who left his mark after his death.

After Egypt entered the phase of the multi-party system, it was difficult for Nasirism, under existing circumstances, to make a comeback as a political party. But preventing it from forming a party does not necessarily mean doing away with it. Several Nasirist leaders have joined the Social Labor Party [SLP] and the Grouping Party [NPUG], but their presence within these parties has not invalidated their role as independent forces nor has it thwarted their demand to form a party through which they can express themselves. The history of forming the party goes back to an attempt in 1976 by

Kamal Rif'at, when the first steps toward a multi-party system were taken within the Socialist Union, the sole organization at that time.

At the beginning of President Husni Mubarak's regime, and with the "relative relaxation" enjoyed by the political forces, a deputy from the city of Alexandria by the name of Kamal Ahmad submitted a request for permission to found a Nasirist Party. Meanwhile, Farid 'Abd-al-Karim was gathering around him many followers in an attempt to found a "Nasirist Arab Socialist Party." While some people thought that the Nasirists were at odds with each other and that each side was playing its own tune, Farid 'Abd-al-Karim assured AL-TADAMUN that the Nasirists have a united position and that their planned party would be a party for all of them. He also said that the Nasirists are the majority and if their party is destined to be formed, it will be one of the largest political parties in existence in the Egyptian political arena.

The New Nasirists

Who are these Nasirists about whom Farid 'Abd-al-Karim is talking?

According to their cadres, they are the people's productive forces, those who have an interest in correcting and erasing the traces of the 17 May 1970 apostasy. Their means to this end is their acceptance of the principle of "political multiplicity" so that they may form their own distinctive party to advocate their program and try, through democratic means, to restore Egypt to the Arab fold as a leader, an advocate of nationalism, and a unifier of the Arab street.

Farid 'Abd-al-Karim outlined for AL-TADAMUN the dimensions for creating a Nasirist Party, saying: "In view of the fact that a Nasirist current organized into a party is the nucleus of a united Arab movement, the objective is plainly and distinctly clear."

One perceives from reading such a statement that the new Egyptian Nasirists, unlike the other Nasirist organizations which have sprung up in Arab countries, have a nationalist organizational vision, even though they refuse at this time to answer any questions about this matter. Furthermore, they concentrate on espousing 'Abd-al-Nasir's slogans of "socialism, freedom, and unity" and believe that the march undertaken by the Free Officers Revolution of 23 July 1952 on the practical level up until 1970 is proof of the soundness of the principles they advocate.

The 15 May 1970 onslaught has made the Nasirists more willful and determined to adhere to the ideas and practices of Nasirism so as not to give the right, which led the campaign, a winning card for criticism and defamation, just as Nikita Krushchev did at the 20th conference of the Soviet Communist Party when he hung Josef Stalin's dirty linen in public, thus causing the world to forget Stalin's positive achievements and to concentrate on the "negative aspects of socialist movements."

Despite the determination of the bases not to engage in a critical reexamination, Nasirist leaders who met with AL-TADAMUN said that the experience will be reexamined. But how?

One must search for the post-'Abd-al-Nasir changes and keep one's eye on the casues and symptoms which must be studied and used for launching the tool prescribed in the "Nasirist program," namely the masses and not the organization. 'Abd-al-Nasir did not use anything else but this method which has fully proven its effectiveness!

The new Nasirists explain their program for returning to the Egyptian political arena.

Nasirists and the Law

The request the Nasirists submitted for founding their new party collided with the parties law which says in effect that "no party has the right to be formed unless it approved the Camp David Accords."

Of course, the Nasirists categorically reject this accord and strongly stress the need to struggle against it.

One of their lawyers, Farid 'Abd-al-Karim to be exact, filed an appeal against the parties law with the Supreme Council of State. Following arguments, debates, and a propaganda campaign which impregnated the press for more than a year, the Council of State ruled in favor of the Nasirists, who are now awaiting for their party to be established officially.

Young Leaders Criticize Nasirism

In the circles of the young Nasirist leaders, one can hear a language different from that used by those who shared first-hand Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir's ruling experience.

Although these individuals reaffirm the "charter's" principles and their actual application and exonerate the practices held against Nasirism, namely "autocracy and prisons," the young leaders believe that these practices were understandable and justifiable mistakes committed by the government but, nonetheless, must be condemned now. Hamdayn Sabahi, the preeminent leader of this group, tole AL-TADAMUN:

"Putting people into prison and torturing them on the sole grounds of a difference of opinion was a mistake committed by the revolution's security agencies, notwithstanding the extremely difficult local and international circumstances. Today, while contemplating the tremendous legacy of Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir, we must have the moral courage to condemn fully torture and abuse."

Position of Other Political Forces

What is the political forces' position on establishing a Nasirist party at this stage?

There are numerous positions and viewpoints.

Fathi Radwan, a former leader of the National Party before the revolution and a former minister of state in successive post-revolution governments, believes that establishing a Nasirist party today is not the problem. The problem lies in who is going to establish it. Nasirism has essentially lost its means of influence, and to revive this influence, its proponents must be a talented political force capable of furthering Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir's popularity and a propaganda revolution in the Arab world. If they make use of this popularity, the party will be something different.

Undoubtedly, observers of the Egyptian political scene raise many questions about the positions of the parties which will be hurt by establishing the Nasirist Party, such as the NPUG and the SLP, due to the fact that its creation is bound to weaken their bases, not to mention their leaderships. Nonetheless, the NPUG, in its belief in the necessity of democracy and a multi-party system and in giving all forces a chance to express themselves, reaffirmed through its secretary general, Khalid Muhyi-al-Din (who used to be a member of the RCC but withdrew due to differences with it), its support of "the right of all forces to set up their own independent political organizations. We who supported the Wafd's right to exist cannot oppose the Nasirists' right. We greet the Nasirist Party as a key ally and an asset, not as an adversary to the NPUG."

As for Ibrahim Shukri, People's Assembly member and SLP leader, he too supports what Khalid Muhyi-al-Din said in this regard and fully condemns the constitutional restrictions prescribed in the political parties law prohibiting political forces from setting up organizations to represent their positions.

Despite grave reservations about the concept of "Nasirism," that Nasirism is not viable as a political ideology, the Wafd, out of respect for democratic rights, believes, as party secretary general Ibrahim Faraj, put it, that "the general principle on which the Wafd Party was founded is respect for the freedom of others. Formation of a party means freedom to some people and its downfall is a matter to be decided by the people as well. The government does not have the right to seize this freedom."

Finally, there is the ruling National Party which considers itself in one way or another the representative of the 23 July legacy, even though its ranks include many cadres who view this legacy with some anguish and uneasiness. The National Party approves the principle of multiplicity, the principle of the right of individuals and forces to demand the establishment of organizations. But it believes that the political scene in Egypt cannot support another party because the existing parties represent groupings of various opinions, some of which include in their ranks the Nasirists. What is needed now, according to Hilmi al-Hariri, the present minister of health and former secretary general of the National Party, is "to give the party a chance to crystallize and mature before new parties, which in reality are a carbon copy of existing ones, are created."

Al-Hariri refused to acknowledge whether his opinion should be considered a ban on the establishment of a new party.

Finally, the establishment of the Nasirist Party is considered as the main challenge to and a test of the Egyptian scene today. It is a challenge whose shares are distributed among the Nasirists' political leadership, the government with its "National" Party, and the other opposition parties, some of which will lose important bases to the new party.

The Egyptian Council of State, the highest judicial body in the country, has acknowledged the Nasirists' right to create their own organizations and the only thing left to do is to announce it. I wonder how long "democracy" can hold out in an Arab country afflicted with hundreds of problems, both economic and social.

12502/12948

CSO: 4504/66

EGYPT

CAIRO BUDGET SET FOR 1986

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 26 Sep 85 p 8

[Article by 'Adil Ibrahim and 'Abd-al-Hadi Tamam: "New Cairo Budget at 319 Million Pounds. Electricity Consumption at Government Offices in Giza To Be Reduced by 25 Percent"]

[Text] The executive council of Cairo Governorate, headed by Governor Yusif Sabri Abu-Talib, approved the FY 1985/86 governorate budget at 319 million pounds, an increase of 43 million pounds over the previous year. The council also approved a proposal to change the character of a governorate-owned facility for asphalt-mixing, tile-manufacturing, and bulldozers. The complex would be turned into a road-paving facility, thus transforming it from a service project into an investment project.

The council also approved 21 million pounds for the Public Cleaning fund and zoned a plot of land on Hikestep road to house storage facilities for the Egyptian Company for Foodstuffs.

The council further approved opening of the road linking Tir'at al-Isma'iliyah Street with Abu-Bakr al-Sadig Street in al-Zawiyah al-Hamra'.

Deputy Governor Maj Gen 'Abd-al-Ra'uf 'Abd-al-Rahman stated that foreign grants totaled 66.5 million pounds of which 13.5 million pounds were in grants and the remainder in credits from the National Investment Bank.

Al-Gizah Governorate Executive Council, headed by Governor Dr 'Abd-al-Hamid Hasan, resolved to prepare temporary emergency measures to collect all real estate and local taxes overdue from the previous fiscal years. The council also discussed how to effect a 25 percent reduction in the use of electricity in government offices, rationalize consumption of fuel and motor oil in government cars, put stockpiled goods to the best use, reduce waste, and tighten controls at government warehouses.

Mr Tahir al-Asmar, assistant secretary-general of the governorate, said the council has also approved a self-help project to build 38 schools to absorb pupils of various levels during the upcoming school year. The schools are estimated to cost some 5 million pounds.

12945/12766
CSO: 4504/40

EGYPT

CONTROL OF IMPORTS DISCUSSED BY MINISTER, BUSINESSMEN

Beirut AL-IQTISAD WA AL-A'MAL in Arabic Sep 85 pp 42-43

[Article: The Government Will Control Imports and Businessmen Demand an End to the Committees]

[Text] Among the economic issues that have been concentrated on recently is the matter of controlling imports. Views have differed on the ideal method for control in light of the fall in the value of oil exports, a drop in the remittances from Egyptians working abroad as a result of the recession in the Gulf states, and the Iran-Iraq war. Under these circumstances, some demanded the adoption of a system of lists that define what imports are allowed or forbidden, and the use of protective and prohibitive customs duties at differing rates. Others support a system of quotas that define how much is needed. In these meetings, the minister of economy and trade, and Mr Ahmad al-Banna, first undersecretary of economy and foreign trade for affairs of rationalization and foreign currency, and Mr Muhammad Ghanim, member of the association of Egyptian businessmen, and Mr 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Shadhili, former minister of supply and president of the financial administration association, and Mr 'Izzat Ghaydan, president of the general union of chambers of commerce, evaluate this subject and present their points of view.

Dr Sultan Abu 'Ali, minister of economy and foreign trade, says: Last year's statistics show that total imports were 7,536,000,000 pounds. While the volume of exports did not exceed 2,198,000,000 pounds. Thus the deficit in the balance of trade is 5,338,000,000 pounds, and because of that it is necessary to control imports, though an increase in imports would not be serious if it were directed towards providing production requirements and raw materials that are needed by the factories. I believe that the process of development and its old problems force us to begin to implement a new phase in which we will work to cure the deficit in the balance of payments. Naturally, that will not be accomplished in one step, but rather through increasing the growth rate of exports over the growth rate of imports, especially under circumstances of local and international fluctuations whose effects are reflected on our sources of foreign currency.

Incorrect Conception

The Egyptian minister goes on: Some believe that our view of import rationalization means a reduction in the amount and value of what we import,

but that is an incorrect conception. The true concept of rationalization means achieving the furthest benefit for our national economy by determining what capital and intermediate goods we will import, how much we will import and from where, what world changes might be expected, and how we might meet local market needs for raw materials of the best quality so that we do not impose a low-quality product on the consumer, and so we will not be incapable of competing in world markets.

Dr Sultan Abu 'Ali said: In all cases there will not be a system that satisfies everybody, but the goal of those who lay down policy must be the public good, taking into consideration as well harmonization between public good and individual interest, and I believe that the appropriate method for rationalization would be customs duties.

Businessmen . . An Opinion

But how does the association of businessmen view this difficult balance to harmonize between providing imported raw materials and production requirements that are needed at a time when our sources of foreign currency are decreasing?

Muhammad Ghanim, a member of the association's board of directors, says yes to rationalization and no to the rationalization committees, because the committees are one of the greatest obstacles. The committees, composed of 10 undersecretaries and 5 directors, cannot look closely into every application on the republic level, or discuss it or make a decision in the absence of statistical reports. Also, such committees rely on the opinion of their technical member, who in many cases represents one of the public sector manufacturing firms which would have a stake in halting imports and monopolizing the market, so his opinion in some cases would be biased.

The association of businessmen believes that limiting imports and protecting local industry should be done through financial and not quantitative methods, by increasing customs tariffs for a limited period on goods that do not enjoy sufficient customs protection, and in order to do that, the association suggests:

A - With respect to food commodities that are customs-exempt, they should be imported through banks directly following the approval of the importer's invoice by a committee in the Ministry of Supply whose task would be to approve kind and price.

B - Regarding goods pertaining to production needs and raw materials, the association believes that after the removal of 112 commodities, 250 commodities that need to be reviewed will remain on the list, because 50 percent of them are production requirements. Also, the removal of all machines, spare parts, raw materials, production requirements and other commodities that are imported through special committees is necessary.

C - The importation of all other commodities will be allowed.

They Told the Minister

In a memo now under review by the Ministry of Economy, the association of businessmen proposes that a rationalization agreement be issued that would

allow the importation of an article as specified in the accompanying invoice or request, and would give the importer the right to change the supplier, country, or price. The memo also proposes that shipping of goods be allowed before the payment of currency insurance or the opening of documentary credit, as well as allow the purchase of goods from ships afloat. The businessmen asked for an end to the condition that the concerned parties approve the import of tractors, chemicals, engineering products, machines and fire-fighting equipment and material.

As for Mr 'Abd-al-Rahman, former minister of supply, he believes that it is necessary to lay down an import plan according to the plan's priorities, so that these priorities would be for raw materials, production needs, and essential food commodities, then non-essential consumer goods. They would be controlled either by customs duties or lists to limit their import.

Only Three Lists

'Izzat Ghaydan, president of the general union of chambers of commerce, says: The control committees, as they stand now, have caused many problems, and in fact, they stand in the way of providing the state with the goods that it needs. We are for rationalization but against rationalization committees, which are characterized by bureaucracy, and rationalization should be accomplished using only three lists.

- The first list would include the goods whose import is permitted.
- The second list would include prohibited goods.
- The third list would include goods similar to ones produced locally but not in sufficient quantities to meet needs.

He asked that when the new customs and import lists are prepared, Egypt's observance of the committees' agreement be taken into consideration, and that when the customs tariffs are prepared a social view be taken.

Commenting on the points of view and the proposals mentioned, the first undersecretary of economy. Mr Ahmad al-Banna, said that rationalization was absolutely necessary because of the deficit between income and expenditures, especially after the drop in oil prices and remittances from Egyptians, both of which were sources of revenue that the state depended on, and it should be known that rationalization is not a danger, but a harmonization between production and consumption.

He said: The lists that are being prepared now will be applied to everybody, with no distinction between the public sector and the private one. Businessmen and members of the chambers of commerce will be involved when these lists are prepared. Precise figures will be taken into account, and this process will last 6 months.

We have begun by removing 112 commodities from the rationalization lists, and an end has also been put to the certificate of origin, with the exception

of states to which Egypt is linked by detailed agreements. Factories have been given permission to import raw materials and spare parts up to 5,000 pounds without going before the rationalization committees, that being once per month. Finally, the tradesman has been allowed to import through the Egypt Foreign Trade Company, which will arrange foreign currency for him at rates taken from the black market.

It remains to wait for the committees to finish their work to find out what the new customs duties will be, and the details of the four lists which will designate what goods may be imported, those that are prohibited, those that currently enjoy low customs duties, and finally a list of high, prohibitive customs duties.

12547/7687

CSO: 4504/24

EGYPT

BOLD APPROACH TO ECONOMIC PROBLEMS NECESSARY

Editorial on Lobbies

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 20 Oct 85 p 18

[Editorial by Ahmad Baha'-al-Din in the "Diary" column]

[Text] Am I too late because of my necessary absence to address the "new government?"

In explaining the advent of the new government, it has been said that the aim is to correct the economic course, push forward implementation and lay the foundations of the next 5-year plan. In other words, the "economic issue" is the main consideration. Ever since its formation, the government has heard all viewpoints and ideas about getting out of the economic dilemma. The new prime minister is right at home in this arena. The press has delved into the past searching for statements or articles by him from the time he was minister of finance and chairman of the economic affairs committee in the ruling party in an effort to predict what he will do.

I think all this is beside the point. Viewpoints are well-known and are not, from the technical point of view, an object of controversy. However, the cornerstone of the economic problem is represented in two things:

The first is the lack of trust and clarity. Ministries and ministers change and the price of the dollar keeps jumping at every change. Neither the millionaires nor the poor know exactly what government policy is or what the next government decision will be. Every time a decision is issued, people want to see if the government will soon drop it or is determined to see it through to the end. The "market" will not move until credibility is restored to the government's economic decisions so that everyone can determine his course of action.

The second is that every economic decision is advantageous to one group and restrictive to another group. Egypt has become full of "lobbies" which can influence and sway government agencies and the market. We have the importers lobby, the local industry lobby, the currency business lobby and the bankers lobby. Politics is not skillful debate and the art of rule is not lecturing the people, but rather studying matters well and adopting decisions the

government deems best able to realize the higher interest, which is above all other interests. Furthermore, the government must have the will and determination to carry out the decisions it adopts and not to totter under pressure from various interests. This gives government decisions "credibility," which is essential for stability and tackling problems.

The examples of "interests" that figure into any decision are many. It is easy for us to choose any number of them.

Goal of Economic Independence

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 21 Oct 85 p 18

[Editorial by Ahmad Baha'-al-Din in the "Diary" column]

[Text] Yesterday I said that in economic policy the government did not lack ideas but rather a will and determination to carry out appropriate decisions. I also said that the issue is to stand in the face of "lobbies" and interests affected by any decision.

Everyone is aware of the heavy debt problem. Everyone is clamoring for a solution and attacking the government for not solving the problem. Even this has imposed a degree of public and private austerity. Nonetheless, some attack the growing debt while simultaneously attacking any decision to economize and save.

We all know that we import twice as much as we export and that the gap is vast and frightful. This in turn compounds the problem of debts and affects the price of the Egyptian pound and the dollar. It also weakens the government's position in all fields. However, if we demand a ceiling in imports, the importers lobby raises a fuss over the commodities that will disappear or over those that will become more expensive.

Everyone knows that building contractors and real estate owners openly violate the law by disregarding restrictions on the height of buildings, thus destroying public utilities and ruining the streets, but no one can fight the real estate lobby. Limiting the height reduces the value of land, and imposing necessary building codes, such as building adequate garages, raises the cost of housing units. Hence, codes are overlooked and left in the drawers.

Everyone knows that the government is poor, but the country is swimming in a sea of dollars which the government is sometimes forced to buy from the black market. There has not been a final decision in this matter, a decision which will prompt people, when they realize that it is a strategic and not a temporary measure, to bring out their dollars to the markets that deal in fixed prices rather than in this kind of volatility which afflicts the economic system with arteriosclerosis.

More opportunities may present themselves from time to time to give more specific examples. The important thing, however, is to prove the view I held

yesterday, that the fault is not in not knowing the solutions but in now having "the will to implement the decisions."

The issue of correcting the economic course has become the issue of achieving economic independence for the country. This is something which no one will give to us. We must do it ourselves.

12929/12502

CSO: 4504/48

EGYPT

LONG-RANGE VIEW OF WATER RESOURCES

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 17 Oct 85 p 3

[Article by Khamis al-Bakri: "So That the Nile Will Not Continue To Be the Sole Vital Artery in Egypt"]

[Text] The allegation that the al-Wadi al-Jadid project, started by the Desert Redevelopment Authority, was not based on careful scientific studies to estimate the groundwater reserves in the Western Desert is not true!

And it is not true that the drilling of deep wells to draw water to irrigate reclaimed land has dried up the small amounts of groundwater. This is notwithstanding the fact that some surface wells in al-Kharjah Oases, which, for geological considerations, are not considered a general gauge for the huge groundwater reserves, have dried up!

Furthermore, it is not completely true that the underground reservoir in the Western Desert was created through the accumulation of rainwater during the rainy ages thousands of years ago and therefore is liable to dry up quickly within 10 to 20 years because it is not being replenished with the new water flowing from the Nile's course or the Chad Plateau. This question will be settled by the studies the UN will conduct with the supervision of the Egyptian Ministry of Irrigation and the Sudanese government in the next few days to light the spark of development and land reclamation in hundreds of thousands of feddans east of al-'Uwaynat, proven by satellites to 6 million feddans of arable land, and in al-Farafirah Oases where a plan to develop 140,000 feddans is already underway.

All these inputs were confirmed in an interview AL-AHRAM conducted with one of the al-Wadi al-Jadid pioneers in the Western Desert and one of the very few world experts in groundwater studies in Egypt's Western Desert, the late geologist Dr Muhammad al-'Izzat.

The following is the gist of the experience of the man who has spent his life exploring the secrets of the Egyptian Western Desert depths from al-Qattarah Depression to al-'Uwaynat and from the Siwah Oasis to the banks of the Nile.

Whether from the standpoint of land reclamation operations or estimating groundwater reserves, careful in-depth studies have been conducted.

In order to determine the groundwater capabilities of al-Wadi al-Jadid, the only source of irrigation in the area, a painstaking scientific plan was drawn up to proceed with the study of this capability. These are complicated studies which depend on many intricate and interwoven factors and have been made more difficult by the scarcity of local expertise when, in 1959, the project got underway, and by the newness of this field in general at the international level. Therefore, the DRA has been intent since 1959 on basing the water source studies on firm scientific foundations. The total number of studies undertaken by local experts and foreign firms, in addition to UN participation, amounts to 20 detailed studies, the most important outcome of which was to determine the amounts of water that can be safely exploited in the Wadi al-Jadid region and the areas that can be cultivated in light of this capability. All this is illustrated in the table showing the amount of groundwater available in the Western Desert and the areas this water can irrigate. The table as a whole shows that the amount of available water is 2.5 million cubic meters a year and the areas which can be irrigated by groundwater total 500,000 feddans. The irrigated area in the 1980-81 season was estimated at 20,374 feddans only, or only 4 percent of the total area which can be irrigated by groundwater!

As for surveying arable land in al-Wadi al-Jadid, the DRA, since its creation in 1959, has surveyed the land and studied ways to cultivate, exploit and administer it. The survey showed that reclaimable land amounted to about 1,340,000 feddans. As of 1981, 45,700 feddans have been reclaimed, or only 3.4 percent of the total reclaimable land, keeping in mind that the cultivated area in the 1980-81 season, as already noted, was 20,474 feddans, or 45 percent of the total land already reclaimed. But here is what the late geologist, Dr Muhammad 'Ali 'Izzat, had to say about the amount of water stored in the underground basin in the Western Desert:

"Just as man builds dams on rivers to store flood water for use during the dry season, such as the High Dam with an estimated storage capacity of 173 by 910 cubic meters 182 meters above sea-level, God Almighty was ahead of us in creating an underground reservoir for collecting the rainwater which falls on the Arawi Mountains in Chad and the 'Aynidi Mountains in Sudan in the Nubian sandstone strata which are 2,000 meters thick in the oases of al-Majar-iyah and al-Farafirah. These underground reservoirs are not affected by seasonal rains like the surface ones, as was the case this year when the Nile River output dropped at a rate Sudan has not experienced in 100 years due to the draught in the Nile source areas."

3,000 Lakes Like Lake Nasir

A number of experts estimated the water reserves in the underground basin of the Nubian sandstone strata in the Western Desert on the basis of updated data about the underground basin's thickness and vertical and horizontal extensions. The most recent estimate of the ground water reserves in the Western Desert is 530 by 1,216 cubic meters, which is 3,000 times more than the High Dam lake storage capacity!

Based on the slow speed of groundwater in the Nubian sandstone strata (15-30 meters a year), the current groundwater reserves were formed during a period

of no less than 13,000 years ago. During this long period of time, a hydrological balance in the underground basin occurred in the sense that the amount of water flowing into the basin is equal to the amount flowing out of it through natural outlets. But is the underground basin the Western Desert naturally replenished, and by how much?

Studies conducted by the Ministry of Reconstruction, New Communities and Land Reclamation established that the Nubian sandstone reservoir was in a state of hydrological balance regionally. In other words, the annual amount of water feeding into it is equal to the amount flowing out of the natural depressions of the Western Desert.

Other results of a 1980 mathematical model of the Nubian sandstone reservoir showed that the total amount flowing into the Western Desert was around 610,164,000 cubic meters a year, out of which 148,756 cubic meters, or only 24 percent, are used for cultivation in all the depressions. The rest is lost through evaporation in the depressions where al-Qattarah Depression is the largest natural depression in the Western Desert. Therefore, the amount of groundwater flowing out of the Nubian sandstone and lost by evaporation in al-Qattarah depression is estimated at about 114.92 million cubic meters.

But is it possible to develop the water potential in the reservoir to prevent this loss?

Al-Qattarah Project: High Dam for Underground Reservoir

Dr 'Izzat said that Swedish expert Halstrum of the Royal Swedish Hydraulic Institute in Stockholm in 1940 beat us to this idea when he suggested raising the pressure in al-Dakhlah Oases, and consequently increasing well outflow, by building a vertical 18-km cement wall in the Tunaydah-Balat area along the groundwater course by drilling a row of deep wells and injecting them with cement at a high enough pressure to plug the pores of the Nubian sandstone, thus raising the pressure in al-Dakhlah Oases by 2-4 meters and doubling the outflow of the springs used by the inhabitants.

This idea may be applied at the present time through the construction of a 120-by-60-meter saltwater barrier via the completion of al-Qattarah Depression project where the lowest water level is 123 meters below sea level and the water level of the artificial saltwater lake would reach 50 meters below sea level if the project is completed. This would produce a saltwater pressure on the natural outlets of the Nubian sandstone waters in the depression and prevent the water loss currently sustained through these outlets at an annual rate of 115 million cubic meters, thus raising artesian pressures in the Nubian sandstone reservoir in nearby oases such as Siwah and al-Buhayrah and, consequently, increasing the outflow of wells flowing from the Nubian sandstone strata. The last words of the late geologist, Dr Muhammad 'Izzat, were: "I sincerely hope that al-Qattarah Depression project will be re-studied and its positive effects, such as its effect on raising the pressure of the underground reservoir of the Nubian sandstone strata, the creation of a vast mineral resource through seawater evaporation and the production of caustic soda, sodium sulfate and chlorine gas, will be evaluated."

Water, Not Just Electric Power

Geologist Dr 'Abduh 'Abduh al-Basyuni, director general of the side effects of al-Qattarah Depression project, talked about this same idea, pointing to scientific research conducted by Dr Muhammad 'Ali 'Izzat and experts from Upsala University in Sweden toward the end of 1983 when a special mathematical model was made to study the effects of al-Qattarah Depression project on the groundwater basin (the russet strata) and how this affected the Wadi al-Natrun basin and the North Delta area. Dr 'Abduh al-Basyuni said that the results of the model proved that the completion of al-Qattarah Depression project will raise groundwater pressure in al-Wadi al-Natrun by 1-2 meters and that this effect will occur 250 years from now when the lake's water level reaches 50 meters below sea level. In other words, part of the Nile water flowing to al-Qattarah Depression after this period will turn to al-Wadi al-Natrun in the form of greater well outflow, thus helping to realize agricultural expansion in the area.

As a result of al-Qattarah Depression project, groundwater pressures in the Nubian reservoir located south of the depression will rise. Dr 'Abduh al-Basyuni emphasized that al-Qattarah Depression project is a developmental project with goals that go beyond the generation of electric power. He also emphasized that it does not have harmful side effects in terms of saltwater leakage to the earthen strata in the Nile Valley because the level of the artificial lake produced by the project will be 50 meters below sea level, and therefore, the alleged danger to the fertile Delta lands is unfounded!

Hot Water Springs in Western Desert

He also pointed to the possibilities of fresh hot water springs in the Western Desert which can be used for irrigation as well as electric power generation, including the Kafar well north of al-Qattarah Depression where water flows from an underground depth of 1,170 meters under a pressure per square centimeter of 3 kg at a rate of 100,000 barrels a day and with a salinity level of 124 parts per million and a temperature of 65 degrees centigrade. This well was drilled by the General Petroleum Company in 1979 and can be used to supply fresh water to Matruh.

In al-Buhayrah Oases where artesian wells can be found, hot water flows up to the surface at a temperature of 41-42 degrees centigrade. In al-Dakhlah area, where artesian wells can be found, hot water flows to the surface at a temperature of 35-45 degrees centigrade.

12929/12502

CSO: 4504/51

EGYPT

LOCAL PROCESSING OF COTTON WASTE READIED

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 3 Oct 85 p 8

[Article by 'Abd-al-'Azim Darwish: "Production of Sterilized Cotton To Be Increased. Cotton Waste To Be Processed Instead of Exported"]

[Text] It has been resolved to increase production of sterilized cotton and to stop the export of Egyptian cotton waste now that a plant has been completed for processing all of it, according to Dr Sayyid Dahmush, chairman of the Public Sector Authority for Spinning and Weaving.

He said our current spinning capacity covers our demand at 2.7 million tons annually and that our cotton production will totally meet our demand until the year 2000.

The Supply Committee of the National [Democratic] Party met yesterday under the chairmanship of Mr Ahmad Nuh to discuss policy for the production and processing of Egyptian cottons. The meeting was attended by chairmen of the party committees for Economy, Industrialization, and Agriculture as well as by Dr Muhammad Da'ud, party secretary in Alexandria.

Dr Samir Tobar, chairman of the Economy Committee, called for a reduction in processed cotton wastage, now as high as 20 percent, and for the importation of modern technology to develop the export capacity of the cotton spinning and weaving industry.

He pointed out that cotton exports shrank to 3.3 million kantars over the past decade, compared to some 6 million kantars in the early '70s.

Engineer 'Adil 'Jzzi, chairman of the Egyptian Agricultural Authority, stated that our objective is to cultivate 1.035 million feddans next year and that the state subsidy to cotton processing plants is as high as 23 pounds per kantar.

12945/12766
CSO: 4504/40

EGYPT

BRIEFS

DESALINATION PLANS--The Economic Committee of the National [Democratic] Party emphasized that the next 5-year plan must achieve a geographically balanced population distribution and that the only way to accomplish that would be by sea water desalination, despite the high cost, in order to attract settlers to land reclaimed outside the valley, according to Committee Chairman Dr Samir Tobar. He added that the committee also underlined the need to develop the gross national product at a rate faster than the increase in population growth in order to create a balance between needs and the population. Spending, he said, is an increasing part of net income, reaching 95 percent, with savings at a scant 5 percent, making it imperative to seek foreign financing. The forthcoming plan must therefore encourage self-financing of projects. Dr Mahir Muhran, chairman of the party's Population Committee, stated that the increase in population affects all state services to the citizenry in various fields such as health, education, and transportation. The Economic Committee will compile all resolutions and suggestions by the various party committees in order to prepare a comprehensive visualization of the upcoming 5-year plan. [Text] [Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 2 Oct 85 p 8] 12945/12766

CSO: 4504/40

SUDAN

CP LEADER NUQUD VIEWS PRESENT SITUATION IN COUNTRY

Moscow WORLD MARXIST REVIEW in English No 9, Sep 85 pp 86-92

[Article by Mohammed Ibrahim Nugud]

[Text]

THE class and political struggle in the Sudan has entered a new stage. For sixteen long years our people sought an end to autocratic rule and the restoration of democratic freedoms and national sovereignty. The March uprising led to the fulfilment of the fundamental slogan of the period by bringing into being a broad front for democracy and national salvation. The tyranny fell and there began the dismantling of its political, legal and other institutions; the State Security Service, or the principal repressive agency of the regime, was disbanded. A number of its executives and other prominent men of the May regime¹ found themselves behind bars. The people regained freedom of speech and assembly and the right to form trade unions, political parties and other associations. Foreign policy, too, underwent changes, if partial ones.

The intensity of the struggle revealed the utter indefensibility of the views of petty-bourgeois elements, who questioned the feasibility of a mass action, tried to influence the popular movement according to their subjective estimations and notions and called for a wait-and-see attitude or even spread a mood of hopelessness. The victory won by the people provided objective conditions for bringing a wider range of social forces close to a national democratic revolution and winning their support for its programme. The popular movement made new advances and it is now important to prevent the slightest reversal.

However, it would be wrong to affirm that the uprising fully attained its aims. Many structures and institutions of the May regime are intact; the state apparatus was neither purged, nor reorganised. The repressive laws enacted under Nimeiri are still in force and so are agreements curtailing our independence and national sovereignty. Many other big problems await solution.

This is due to the weaknesses of the popular movement, above all the disunity of the opposition, which failed before the people acted to reach agreement on joint efforts and a common platform. Al-Umma, the Democratic Unionist Party and other right-wing parties have stubbornly refused to sign an agreement with the Communists although we worked steadfastly for the formation of a broad opposition front and for the overthrow of the regime through a mass action. The only explanation for these parties' stance is their reluctance to ally themselves with the CPS and recognise its right to exist as a legitimate political organisation after the removal of the dictatorship. Their aim was to get rid of Nimeiri without rousing the people to an action that would have entitled them to a fitting role under the new authority. What they banked on was salvation through either a military coup, or intervention by the USA, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, since these countries were reportedly looking for a man to replace the bankrupt dictator.

Another major weakness of the movement was that the working class, far from taking the initiative of organising a political strike, joined in it but belatedly as an organised force although numerous workers played an active part in demonstrations.

The Allied National Forces for National Salvation (ANFNS), which led the uprising, included no labour union. This was because the May regime, by suppressing trade union democracy and constantly persecuting all progressive, militant elements in the proletarian movement, had brought the trade union leadership under its control, dissociated it from the working people and integrated it into the bureaucratic power apparatus. A further negative factor was the weakened positions and reduced influence of the CPS among the workers, especially in the capital, due to the regime's repressive policy. Peasant associations, too, kept out of the struggle; under the dictatorial regime, their leadership was taken over by the rural rich and big merchants.

As a result, the uprising was led by petty-bourgeois members of the trade unions of white-collar workers, doctors, lawyers, teachers and engineers as well as by students. The ANFNS itself was formed on the initiative of the unions of Khartoum University students and teachers. Now as in the past, these people consider that it is for them to fulfil the mission of real leaders of the opposition because the traditional parties, including the CPS, are allegedly lagging behind the popular movement.

It was in these circumstances that the army appeared on the scene. The high command of the armed forces took power and set up a Transitional Military Council. This body comprises people holding diverse, mostly right conservative political views. Speaking generally, however, we regard it as a product of struggle, of the operation of many different factors in and outside the army.

The most facile approach would be to step out of the struggle and wash one's hands, saying that the army command carried out a palace coup with the blessing of the USA, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, which had decided to sacrifice Nimeiri in order to preserve the regime and bar radical popular forces from power. By claiming in this way that the uprising had failed, one could give in to bitterness and disappointment and proceed to merely watch developments.

Yet this would be a superficial approach ignoring the actual situation. The April events, which culminated in the emergence of a military administration, were not in the nature of a pre-arranged, preventive action. They cannot be compared to either the coup effected by General Ibrahim Abbud in 1958, or the May 1969 coup. On these occasions the people were not prepared to topple the regime and in both cases the military went ahead on their own. This time, however, there was a popular uprising and the armed forces command had no intention of either backing Nimeiri, or taking a stand against him. It was compelled to step in primarily under pressure from the rank and file, NCOs and junior officers.

This lower echelon played an important if not decisive role in the people's action. It did not revolt unlike the rest of the people. But it ensured that the troops assigned to guard strategic objectives were sent back to the barracks; it resisted the imposition of martial law, which would have implied entrusting the army with police functions, and emphatically condemned the security forces' savage treatment of demonstrators. Lastly, it demanded the removal of Nimeiri. The army command had to choose between taking over and stepping back with the dictator.

There is more than one reason for the fact that the role of the army lower echelon did not go any further. To begin with, the disunity of the political opposition and the lack of a common platform also affected the military. Second, sustained harassment and persecution, coupled with the activity of numerous agents of the State Security and Military Intelligence Services, weakened the organised and politically committed forces in the army. Third, most of the democratic and patriotic servicemen entertained the simplistic notion that their sole task was to prepare for and carry out a coup. They did not believe in a successful popular uprising and were not psychologically prepared to search for ways and means of supporting it. They were willing to take power provided the people backed them, which meant that they expected popular action to come after and not before a coup. As a consequence of this mood in favour of a coup, they missed a rare opportunity: when hundreds of thousands took to the streets in Khartoum, the military could have joined them, could have merged with the people to ensure that power passed directly into the hands of representatives of the popular movement.

Now we concern ourselves with weak spots and negative facts in terms of how they may affect the subsequent course of the struggle and what we must do to eliminate them. An analysis of shortcomings must not be reduced to barren complaints or a passive statement of facts, which is so typical of petty-bourgeois thinking.

For all its weaknesses, the March uprising was a major advance in the revolutionary process under way in the Sudan and exceeded the October 1964 revolution in scope and depth.² To minimise its significance would mean helping undo what has been achieved and making the movement dependent on the military authorities and the internal and external forces which are hostile to the cause of freedom, democracy and national sovereignty.

The democratisation process is threatened from many sides. Plotting inside the country are the parasitical bourgeoisie, who fear that they may lose their sources of enrichment; the Moslem Brothers, who are dead against the repeal of the 'Islamic legislation' of 1983 intended to serve the autocratic regime as both a prop and a cover; remnants of the May regime, above all the sadly notorious State Security Service.

That agency was 45,000 strong under Nimeiri, with 25,000 operating in Khartoum. They had the most up-to-date techniques and weapons at their disposal, such as even the armed forces did not boast. Everyday supervision of the activities of the agency as well as the Military Intelligence Service was exercised by the CIA, which had set up in the Sudan its regional centre in charge of operations in East and Central Africa. US agents were planted all over the country; there were camps training anti-governmental elements from Libya, Ethiopia and Democratic Yemen. Following the overthrow of the dictator and the decision to dissolve the State Security Service, the Americans took steps to rescue as many of their agents as possible. Thousands of these still possess arms and ample funds and pose a real threat to the process of change. They are perfectly equal to launching an action on instructions from their one-time chiefs or overseas masters.

The attention which the USA pays to the Sudan is not accidental. Our country holds a strategic position in the Arab world and on the African continent. Situated here are US naval and air bases and strong points for 'rapid deployment forces'; large-scale manoeuvres involving US troops have repeatedly been carried out. Washington also has very important economic interests here and is certainly not going to renounce them without further ado. Its agents wield considerable influence on the Sudanese army and police, on the entire state apparatus, the media, educational and cultural institutions, and even the trade union movement.

Operating in close contact with the CIA are the secret services of other NATO countries and Israel. They foment anti-communist sentiment and try to make people believe that the 'experiment in democratisation' has failed. They bribe political movements and parties, trade unions and newspapers. It may well be that the enemies of the Sudanese people will try by means of subversion to plunge the country into chaos in order to have a pretext for the imposition of a military dictatorship, the complete suppression of democratic freedoms and the abolition of the people's gains.

The grave financial and economic situation of the Sudan suits conspirators well. The Nimeiri regime reduced the economy to a state of complete dislocation. Burdened with a foreign debt exceeding 10 billion dollars, the country cannot service it. The current famine is a result of both drought and the disastrous policy of the previous regime. Encouraging agricultural production for export, the Nimeiri regime cut the area under food crops and disrupted food supply. One in every four Sudanese is starving.

This state of affairs is most dangerous for the popular movement. Economic dislocation, unbearable hardships and hunger may lead—even without intervention from outside—to a decline in the revolutionary energy of the people and exhaust their forces. Contrary to bourgeois and petty-bourgeois misinterpretations of Marxism, we consider that poverty and hunger cannot in themselves bring about revolutionary action. Starving people are not in the mood for politics and the March uprising furnished added evidence of this: those hit by undernourishment hardest of all stayed out of the uprising.

It must also be borne in mind that imperialist powers readily take advantage of food deliveries to exert pressure. The Sudanese know by experience how the USA goes about it. Under Nimeiri they demanded in exchange for grain military bases or assistance in the illegal transfer of Falashas.³ Nor is Saudi Arabian aid gratuitous.

Along with Egypt, these two states constitute the main external source of danger to the democratic development of the Sudan.

Even without minimising this danger in the least or shutting our eyes to the strength of the enemies of democracy, we look ahead with confidence and optimism. After all, there are many internal and external factors of a different, positive nature. First among them is the uprising itself; it gave the people new confidence in their strength, heightened their revolutionary elan and added to their experience of struggle.

Also worthy of note is the upturn in the mass democratic movement in the South. For the first time in the modern history of the Sudan, it is playing a positive part in the development of the Sudanese popular movement as a whole. Previously political forces in South Sudan showed no interest in what went on elsewhere in the country, and limited themselves to defending their local demands. Today the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and its military arm, the Sudanese People's Liberation Army, which did a very great deal to aggravate the crisis of the May regime and for its overthrow, advance a clear-cut programme under which they distance themselves from the separatist trends that predominated in the South earlier, stress the need for constructive participation in national affairs and urge all Sudanese to join more actively in the struggle for the democratisation of various aspects of national life.

A factor of great importance is the growing political commitment of patriotic members of the armed forces. They resist rightist trends within the high command and help extend the national democratic movement.

We may list as favourable external factors the activity of the Egyptian opposition, which resists those who are plotting against the Sudan on its northern border; the consolidation of the positions of the Ethiopian revolution, which has ended a monarchy that always supported the forces of stagnation and reaction in our country; the progress made by the distinctive revolutionary process in Democratic Yemen, which is highly important to the Arab world. The Sudanese people were strongly influenced by the victory of the Lebanese patriotic resistance, which took a stand against the Israeli aggressor in common with the democratic forces of the Palestinian revolution and with the support of Syria, a country showing staunchness and courage, and forced the US and NATO invaders into withdrawing ingloriously.

International solidarity has always been invaluable to our people's struggle. This struggle benefits from the activity of the communist, workers and revolutionary democratic parties of Arab and other countries and from the growing might of the socialist community countries, primarily the Soviet Union, a resolute champion of peace and national freedom.

In this situation it is particularly important to shape and implement a realistic policy based on an objective analysis of reality and ruling out all oversimplification. This kind of analysis was made at the extraordinary meeting of the CC CPS on April 20 last. The meeting stressed that the main thing today is 'popular action and the role of the alliance between popular forces and the army in preserving achievements and defending them against enemy attack'.⁴

This explains why we abide, in a new historical context, on a new level and from advanced positions, by our policy in favour of the broadest possible unity in order to defend and fully restore democracy and national sovereignty. To unite the people, it is essential to extend the composition of the ANFNS according to its Charter by bringing in the parties and trade unions which really took part in the political strike and popular uprising. On becoming more representative, the ANFNS will have to function as a political power organ of the people realising their will and prepared to use the weapon of political strike should the popular movement be threatened with new dangers. This would make it possible to end the situation arising from the fact that power has been assumed by the high command of the armed forces, so that all legislation finds itself in the hands of the Transitional Military Council, while the cabinet of ministers (formed later) has executive powers only and the prerogatives of the ANFNS have not been formalised in any way.

Our party hailed the statement of the high command that the army was not going to replace autocratic rule by a new military dictatorship and that the reins of power would be handed over to a civilian administration within a year. We are positively against the military staying in power after the one-year period of transition. The CPS is just as emphatically against any attempt to effect a coup either on pretexts typical of

the Right, such as 'the country is in a state of anarchy', 'the parties have demonstrated their incompetence' or 'resolute steps are needed to affirm the norms of Islam', or under cover of 'carry forward the uprising', 'save the revolution' and other leftist slogans.

During 22 years out of nearly three decades of independent existence, the Sudan has been under military rule. The result is economic dislocation, a fast-growing parasitical bourgeoisie, the suppression of democracy and the disruption of national sovereignty. There is no difference in this respect between the Abbud dictatorship, which adhered to a right-wing position, and the Nimeiri regime, which hypocritically advanced progressive, leftist slogans, while attempts to justify it were made by opportunists using a Marxist vocabulary (such as the splitters' group that had broken away from the CPS), narrowminded technocrats who like to talk about 'modernising society' and promoting 'universal development', and people gambling on religion.

What is needed is something more than the overthrow of the autocratic regime. To fully re-establish democracy, it is necessary to repeal all the laws curtailing it, including the 1973 Constitution (which has only been suspended), the 'Islamic legislation' of 1983 and the state security law. The demolition of the May regime, especially its State Security Service, has yet to be completed. This work must not be shackled by bureaucratic limitations, as is the case now. The people must be drawn into it, with the ANFNS, the Transitional Military Council and the judiciary guiding their action.

There is no destroying the despotic regime completely without reorganising the state apparatus, the army included, and re-instating the dismissed and former exiles. To prevent reorganisation from degenerating into a settlement of personal accounts and leading to the adoption of shortsighted decisions, it is necessary to help civil servants carry it out and to work out rigid standards which must be cleared with the trade unions and applied under their control. Persons guilty of repression, of persecuting people on political grounds, have no right to enjoy freedom. Our aim in saying so is to defend democracy against the dictator's underlings and not to suppress it.

The problem of eliminating the legacy of the May regime is also very acute in the economic sphere. Measures must be adopted without delay to stop its decline. It is essential to cut excessive spending on the state apparatus and use the funds released as a result for extending relief to the starving and for improving the people's condition. The first part of this task has been fulfilled to a degree by abolishing the apparatus of the presidential palace, the State Security Service, the Sudanese Socialist Union, which was the only political organisation authorised under Nimeiri, the legislative and executive bodies of the past in the capital and the provinces. However, the second part of the task, the positive one so to speak, has yet to be carried out.

Early action is needed to expand the area under grain crops and raise productivity in order to improve the food situation, deliver people from hunger and lessen dependence on foreign aid. This aid cannot be dispensed with yet but it must be so distributed as not to provide the top bureaucracy with a source of enrichment at the cost of the disinherited.

To evolve ways of ending the crisis situation, we propose holding a national economic conference of not only scientists and experts but spokesmen of the political parties, trade unions and other public organisations. One of the main items on the conference agenda should be how to resist IMF pressure and blackmail. The CPS rejects the recommendations and rules dictated by the IMF. We are convinced that the thirteenth devaluation of the Sudanese pound, effected in February, should be the last. The IMF demand for a further reduction of jobs as a means of cutting government expenditures can be countered by referring to the fact that the president of the republic and his camarilla have forfeited their posts and that this has saved the Treasury an appreciable amount of money.

We Communists appeal to all patriots to take a common stand on this issue so as to ensure that the struggle does not involve the top level alone but assumes a mass character. The alternative to dependence on international financial institutions controlled by imperialists is joint action with other Third World countries hit by the policy of diktat (the Sudan could assume the role of initiator in this matter); it is also reliance on the socialist community countries, with which relations were kept at freezing-point for a decade and a half.

The Sudan should proceed as an independent, sovereign and non-aligned state. It should reject whatever is at variance with this policy. This applies primarily to the establishment of US military bases on our soil. Nimeiri made the relevant decision personally, without submitting the matter to the cabinet, the National Assembly or any other body. Such deals are not binding on the people or the state. Our country has no quarrel with its neighbours and needs no foreign bases. Washington would do well to remember that the Sudan is not Texas.

For historical reasons, Egypt holds a special place in the Sudan's foreign relations. The CPS has always been in favour of the close bonds between the Sudanese and Egyptian peoples forged in a joint struggle. No danger threatens or will ever threaten Egypt from the south. But this circumstance does not in the least run counter to our national duty to seek a rectification or the removal of what we consider wrong and harmful in relations between our countries. Taking advantage of the weakness and isolation of the Nimeiri regime, Cairo concluded with it agreements on economic integration and joint defence. And now Egypt has granted exile to the overthrown ruler and is putting pressure on our country in an effort to prevent it from normalising its relations with Libya and Ethiopia.

That is a dangerous and harmful policy. Prompted by the interests of both nations, we demand an end to it and the abrogation of the unequal agreements. We are certain that the future of Sudanese-Egyptian relations will depend on Cairo's renunciation of its claim to the role of guardian of the Sudan and on its consent to treat it as an equal.

The struggle is only just gaining momentum. Countless battles lie ahead. In carrying them on, we will be inspired by the memory of our dead comrades, of all who gave their lives in fighting for democracy and national independence. We derive revolutionary energy from the glorious experience of Communists, which is full of examples of staunchness and self-sacrifice in repulsing enemy attacks, maintaining the purity of the ideology of the working class and defending the unity and cohesion of party ranks.

¹ The regime under Gaafar Nimeiri seized power through a coup in May 1969. — *Ed.*

² The action launched by the people in October 1964 resulted in overthrowing the Abbud dictatorship. — *Ed.*

³ Meaning the transfer of Ethiopian Jews to Israel by Israeli Secret Services through the Sudan. — *Ed.*

⁴ *Extraordinary Plenum of the CC of the Communist Party of the Sudan, April 20, 1985, p. 8 (in Arabic)*

TUNISIA

GROWING FUNDAMENTALIST TREND VIEWED

Paris LE FIGARO in French 24 Oct 85 p 2

[Article by FIGARO correspondent Francois Hauter]

[Text] Some ascribe the unrest to the economic distress the region complains of. Others see the breach of relations with Libya as an aggravating factor.

The Israeli attack on Tunis on 1 October, followed by Washington's approval of that raid, opened a lot of eyes: today, 7 million Tunisians are seriously wondering if it was really necessary to bet so heavily on the west for 30 years. Of course, nobody is really eager to give up the delights of the consumer society. And yet, in startled response to the spectacular upsurge in fundamentalism, Tunisia now is going public with its longing for a more Arab identity.

This trend is most clearly apparent in the southern half of the country, because the country's economic difficulties are felt there more keenly than in the north; the southern Tunisians, who for centuries have maintained close ties with Libya, are demanding, right now louder than ever, a "new Tunisia." This is where Bourguiba's designated successor -- Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali -- will win or lose his wager on a transition that is already hard to take for granted.

Gafsa, before the mosque, last Friday at the hour for the sermon: from outside on the street, you can hear the hum of prayers rising. As in every mosque in Tunisia, worshippers are packed solid. More and more, the congregations consists of high-school and college students. The 1 October Israeli attack on the outskirts of Tunis -- and especially the official United States approval of that raid -- have heightened the fervor of a broad swathe of young Tunisians, who find in the celebration of Islam an impregnable focal point for all their discontent.

So it is with 30-year-old Gabes-born attorney Mohammed Hedi. He is one of the activist leaders of the Pro-Islamic Faction (MTI),

in what is referred to as "moderate" Tunisian fundamentalism (Tunisians adore that particular adjective). Mohammed Hedi's pale face is fringed with a short beard he has worn since it first appeared. His hands are folded over his grey-blue "ihram," the traditional garb of pious Muslims. He speaks softly as he firmly states the will of Allah: "Yes! We want Islam to prevail, to reign everywhere! No more western laws! We want Koranic law! Shariyah, not the Napoleonic code! The western, liberal society we have now is human degradation. It is the duty of all women to wear the veil. We want them all to go veiled, including those who are lawyers and physicians... We must sever relations with the United States, and destroy their interests here. America and Israel are heads and tails of the same coin! Our government's attitude toward the United States is a humiliation, a slap in the face of the Tunisian people! Democracy? It is the Muslim people who govern themselves with Islam. That is a divine duty."

Driven out, hunted down as in Morocco, in Algeria, and in Libya, fundamentalism in Tunisia is lifting a corner of the veil. Mohammed Hedi, sentenced in 1980 to 4 years in prison with the other MTI leaders, was just returning, when I met him, from the Tunis court where he had defended some members of the Islamic Liberation Party (PLI), the violence-prone wing of Tunisian fundamentalism. "It is my Islamic duty to defend them," Mohammed Hedi says. "It is a mere formality that they belong to a different party. We all share the same faith, the same goal."

The centuries-old faith of Tunisians in general affords the Islamic leaders fertile ground for mobilization. Their political marketing is rooted in unshakable ideological support. The prime postulate: Who can bring low all the oppression, the injustice, and the devil himself, if not God Himself? Second postulate: Who will stand up and defend His sacred word in danger, but us, the fundamentalists? Lastly: Who persecutes us, who attacks God by persecuting us, if not the government in Tunis? The prevailing ambiguity in Islam -- which preaches tolerance but glorifies those who die for God's cause -- leaves the door wide open for all the demagogic slogans.

A Closely Watched Underground Force

Confronted by this force that demands power and which it is too late now for anybody to stifle, the Tunisian political parties and labor organizations temporize. Prime Minister Mohammed Mzali for the first time (that was 2 weeks ago) received the president of MTI, Rached Ghannouchi, offering him a kind of de-facto official recognition of his party. Elsewhere, all electoral platforms contain exhortations to focus Tunisia again on its "Arabness."

The fact is that nobody has precisely measured the strength of the fundamentalists, who still constitute a closely watched underground force. When that happens, there is fear in the salons of Tunis: "They're already the biggest party in the country!" says one attorney. The optimists, like this physician, respond: "When you look at our customs and our civilization, fundamentalism poses no danger. Tunisia is the land of moderation. It has successfully absorbed all its conquerors, and it will defend itself against this danger. Besides, our women are not masochists, they won't allow anybody to shut them up like that!"

More frequently, an utterly gratuitous remark is heard in the capital: "Fundamentalism is something coming out of the southern part of the country!" Tunisians in Tunis are eagerly replacing the demons of their faith with an arrogant regionalism.

South of the line between Gafsa and Sfax, Tunisians are a fairly homogenous group. There, in every town in the south, fundamentalism is advancing very swiftly indeed. After all the successive waves of collectivist and ultra-liberal experiments Tunisia has gone through, fundamentalism is now clearly perceived as a third way. A Gafsa professor explains: "Fundamentalism strikes hardest where there are many disaffected and under-privileged. For example, I teach five classes at the high school, three of which are made up of seniors. More than half my students are fundamentalists. In 4 years, the growth in their ranks is frightening. And my colleagues -- even the French teachers -- are 80-percent in sympathy with them!"

Right in the middle of Gafsa is a big cafe. The town's jobless men congregate there every day, beginning at 0700 for day-labor jobs. The ones who were passed over -- on the day I was there, they filled the cafe -- listening to Oum Khalsoum bellowing over huge radio loudspeakers until 1000 hours. Between songs, a young worker, to the approval of his peers, said to me: "The foreigner, he attacks the Arab world through Islam!" And then this current sentiment: "Fundamentalism is a good way to find our individuality again." A union man from Gabes puts in: "Our identity is Arab-Muslim. We must not keep on parroting the west. Our economy must no longer be run by the Americans or the French."

Wherever you go in the south -- to Sfax, Gabes, Medenine, Zarsis, Talaouine, Remada, Kebili, Tozeur, and Gafsa -- the Tunisians feel like their government's stepchildren. "In southern Tunisia, natural conditions have always been harsh," says a Zarsis businessman. "We know that ours is a poor region. But our wealth, the oil, the phosphates, have made Tunisia rich. And what has been done here where we live is so very little! We are not given equal treatment with the North."

The trip across the south gives the lie to this impression so keenly felt by the people who live here. Granted, unemployment is endemic

here (15 percent of the labor pool, which matches that of Great Britain). However, emigration to Libya or France -- 80,000 and 100,000 workers from this region work in one of these two countries, respectively -- serves as a safety-valve. Southern Tunisians will readily admit: "Down here, we manage all right. We are not really poor. But if you go a little farther south, it's not the same..." And farther on, indeed, with the exception of Tataouine, you find some signs of prosperity, fragile, of course, but built on solid ground. What constitutes wealth? A little land (olive-groves in the East, date-palms in the West), private industry (Sfax) or public enterprise (in Gabes and Gafsa), tourist trade (in Djerba, Zarsis, Kebili, Douz, and Tozeur), remittance from workers abroad (especially in Tataouine and Kebili). Taxes are very low. The southeastern coast of Tunisia looks like a gigantic construction-site. The southwest has a repopulation colony along the Algerian border.

Does Monastir Get Special Privileges?

The contrast between lives of southern Tunisians and the way they feel about it is striking. In Tozeur Governorate alone (70,000 souls), 2,000 hectares of date-palms have been planted in addition to the 4,500 growing there in 1980. The new governorate has created a thousand new jobs, and 28 percent of the population attends school regularly. Money for roads, water supplies, mass transit, hospitals and school is all taken for granted by southern Tunisians. And yet, ever since the memorable Libyan commando raid on Gafsa in 1980 (to raise the South first, then take over the entire country), Tunis has made massive investments in the South. And Mr Mzali, during a quick trip to Medenine, cited projects under way in the region of 6.0 billion francs.

It made no difference. The distrust of the southern Tunisians is deeply rooted. "It is a pity that the supreme, the father of the country (Bourguiba) plays favorites!" one native sums it up.

Even more than the rest of the country, southern Tunisia dreads the day when Bourguiba dies. Everybody I talked to confirmed it in Sfax, in Gabes, in Gafsa, everywhere: when the supreme leader was hospitalized for a few days last November, the whole region was frightened. In other words, what will come "post-Bourguiba" is worrisome, down here.

With the exception of Gafsa, no southern town is represented on Mr Mzali's team. "We have no chance of succeeding in politics! There is no minister or secretary of state from here in Tunis. And even if there were one, he would be pushed out!"

The example of Mansour Moalla, an "Ecoles Nationale" graduate, born in Sfax and former minister of finance and planning, is often put forward. Mr Moalla had lost his post in 1979 for daring to call a plan to build an elevated rapid transit system at Monastir "piracy" in front of the president's historian, Mr Saya. The metro was built in the president's birthplace, despite Mr Moalla's austerity plan.

The concentration of all important government posts (in Gabes, citizens complain that they do not even have a single home-town CEO), because, it would appear, all the jobs go first to Tunisians from Monastir, Sousse, and the Sahel Zone, has given rise to some harsh words in the south. "Mzali," they will tell you, "combines the posts of prime minister and interior minister. His wife holds the portfolio on the condition of women. One of his cousins is director of the civil service, and another is secretary of state for the interior. The presidential chief of bureau is a relative. So are the chiefs of police and commander of the National Guard. Is there no reliable citizen to be found anywhere in all Tunisia outside Monastir? Who is afraid of Tunisians?" My comments on the consistency of Mr Mazli's centralizing ploy, betrayed last year by his interior minister during the "bread riots," came within an ace of costing him his job, have been swept away: So long as Bourguiba was powerful, the Monastir leadership was not so flagrant! Besides, if we had sacrosanct institutions in this country that were not Monastirian, there would be no danger."

Danger? "The region is ready to go to any risky lengths," says one corporate director, "because the people have a right to more consideration than the people who govern them are willing to show!"

Consideration, respect: it is all happening in South Tunisia, as if, lacking representation in Tunis, the people were losing their normal sense of moderation, in this part of the country. Aside from the summit of the administration, nobody here even tries to understand the gradual, difficult, and subtle game being played by Bourguiba's successor as prime minister. Mr Mzali, who enjoys scant popularity in the south, is paying dearly for neglecting to stroke the local politicians, who might have been useful as loud-speakers to get across his government's goals in the region.

Apparently, Mazli has surrendered the political missionary-work in the region to Habib Achour's great organized labor machine, the UGTT, with which he had crossed swords during the last Tunisian-Libyan crisis. A number of the UGTT's leaders are southerners, and they are powerful. Besides, Mazli has just put a tight rein on the advantages the UGTT had enjoyed for 20 years, accusing Achour of purposeful complicity with the Libyan adversary.

Shabby business: "The fellow who wants to drown his dog will say it has rabies," says the UGTT secretary-general in Gabes. "Since the government has opted for a confrontational line, we shall field our own list of candidates in the 1987 general election. We'll see who loses..." It will not necessarily be Mr Mzali: the UGTT, like any army that wins no victories, loses strength. And after having compromised a lot with the government, it is now thoroughly infiltrated by members who are government informants. The cost is minimal: merely some nice little arrangements, the kind you see in Italian neo-realist movies...

Southerners pass summary judgment on this war between Tunisians: "The prime minister," says one notable who voices the general view,

"is preparing for the succession by coming to grips with some really serious problems. He wants to eliminate some potential competitors who might challenge him again, Habib Achour for one..."

Southern Tunisians delight in this kind of debate. Politics, the country's future, the storms that may hit tomorrow, are the topics of endless discussion in all circles. What is striking wherever you look is the quality of its conclusions, the determination to make Tunisia better. In short, this is powerful nationalism, remarkable for its intelligence. In southern Tunisia, al-Qadhdhafi scares people far less than he does in Tunis.

"Libya Will Always Be Libya!"

Since Tunisia broke off diplomatic relations with al-Qadhdhafi (a month ago, in response to the expulsion of 31,000 Tunisians) Libyan customers have disappeared from the town markets in the South. A Sfax tinsmith moans: "Over there, you could sell whole truckloads of camp-stoves. It's all over!" The slipper-sellers, and the garment-sellers in the souk are complaining, too. Henna -- a major source of income to Sfax and Gabes -- used to sell for export at 7 dinar (70 francs) per kilo in Libya. The price has slumped: today, it brings 2 dinar. This time, even petty border-smuggling has become difficult. A quarter of Tunisian olive oil exports used to go to Libya. The break with Libya will add 500 million francs to Tunisia's trade deficit.

Paradoxically, the Tunisian south, which is hardest-hit by this abrupt loss, can still afford to be philosophical: "You know, we are always arguing with the Libyans. So we're used to it, and we accept it," says one merchant.

Even so: the breach is disturbing: "Libya? We're the ones that asked for it! Look at the way Tunis is snuggling up to the United States! It's no wonder al-Qadhdhafi told us to get lost!" says one. Another disagrees: "Our history is inseparable from Libya's. We share so many affinities, we have so many things in common! The Libyans didn't suddenly turn into a pack of werewolves when al-Qadhdhafi came in. We are the only people here in the south who know the Libyans. They are very fine people, correct, moral." An old gardener: "It's al-Qadhdhafi who gives me bread. My two sons are working over there."

In Tozeur, a physician commented: "In our country, the little people are more readily swayed, they think that al-Qadhdhafi is right, and that the Americans are really the Arabs' great enemy. If it comes to a real problem, though, they are Tunisians, first of all. We management types are not a bit fond of al-Qadhdhafi. If we tune our TVs every day to the Libyan channel, it is because our official news broadcasts are so poorly done." He concluded: "Southern Tunisians react toward Libya with dignity. We are Tunisians, and al-Qadhdhafi has wronged us. But Libya will always be Libya."

TUNISIA

LABOR UNION LEADERSHIP CRITICIZED

Tunis LE TEMPS in French 31 Oct 85 p 2

[Article by Neji Khammari]

[Text] Telegrams from the rank-and-file of the UGTT unions are still rolling in. These messages were sent at the conclusion of meetings called to assess the state of organized labor within the UGTT with a view to "making the decisions needed to put an end to abuses and to defend and preserve the true union principles for which Farhat Hachad struggled."

A telegram to that effect was addressed by rank-and-file members of the selected seed and plant cooperative in the Chbika delegation whose signatures "reaffirm their total support for the enlightened government of the Supreme Warrior headed by Mohamed Mzali." They vigorously denounce "the anti-patriotic positions of certain UGTT leaders," and demand an extraordinary congress of the union's central committee. They also announce "withdrawal of their confidence in the members of the UGTT executive bureau" on grounds of their "deviation from genuine organized labor action."

A similar telegram comes from the rank and file at the "Entreprise des Grandes Usines du Nord" and from all their union's members. They "lash out at the positions contrary to the nation's interests adopted by certain labor leaders in the UGTT at a time when the country was facing Zionist and Libyan aggression, denounce the poor financial management of UGTT agencies and demand convention of an extraordinary congress of the union so as to put an end to the abuses and practices of what they call 'the Achour Mafia.'"

UGTT members of the rank-and-file union at the industrial and technical corporation sent a telegram in which they "vigorously denounce positions clearly counter to the national interest taken by certain UGTT leaders, call for an extraordinary congress of the union to shift it back onto the genuinely nationalist track for which Farhat Hached gave his life, and for whose victory all true union members strive."

Telegrams of such tenor have come from the local unions at the Poulina cooperative at Ez-zahara and from the Animal Feed Corporation (SNA), employed at the same company, from workers and employees of the municipality of Ez-sahra, from the wholesale market at Bir Kassaa, from the brickyard at Fouchana, from the office-workers, technicians, and equipment officials at Zaghuan, and from the Institute of Ophthalmology in Tunis, from members of the union local of "Couronna Lim" in Ezzaha, from the dock-workers' federation and from the union local at the Metro-Leger Company in the city of Tunis.

Similar messages have come from the union office of the Habib Thamear Hospital, from employees of the National Railroad Depot (SNT), from the Essada Foods Corporation at (La Goulette-Kram), from the Ain Zaghuan ceramics factory, from the National Maintenance and Lighterage Federation, from the municipalities of La Goulette, Marsa, and Sidi Bousaid, from the rental-car union, from the confectionery plant, from the Heli Agili construction company, and from the (El Habibi) general millwork plants at El Ouardia.

Communique from the Gaafour Committee

The ad-hoc Committee of the union local of Gaafour, a member of the UGTT, has issued a communique in which it reaffirms its unconditional support for the Supreme Warrior's government.

The union local energetically denounces "the anti-patriotic positions taken by the UGTT leaders, their inept management of the union organization's finances, and the immoral practices of the Achour gang."

The ad-hoc committee has also sent out a call to all true union workers to bring union action back onto "its true track" and to intensify its efforts to prepare for the extraordinary congress of the UGTT.

Kairouan: Constitution of a New Ad-Hoc Regional URT Bureau

A meeting was called yesterday by the union membership at the Kairouan Cultural Center and was attended by a thousand or so union members representing every delegation in the governorate.

In his remarks, Hedi Bouraoui, an activist and a union man, spoke of "deviationism on the part of certain UGTT leaders and their bungling management," calling on union members to come back to the true principles of unionism and to the values taught them by the late lamented Farhat Hached.

He then read the following recommendations adopted by all present:

- Convocation of an extraordinary congress of the UGTT;
- Dissolution of the UGTT Regional Bureau;
- Constitution of an ad-hoc bureau made up of 11 members, most of whom have experience in handling union business:
- Hedi Bouraoui
- M'Barek Toumi
- Abderrazak Hattab
- Abdelmajid Allani
- Amor Fatnassi
- Abdeljader Rebai
- Mohamed Hamdi
- Mohamed Talbi
- Salem Njima
- Said Ben Mohamed Ben Amara
- Hamda Ben Khelifa

This bureau, Mr Bouaoui added, would be called upon to defend the interests of the union's rank and file and the rights and achievements of the nation.

Welcoming the members of the new ad-hoc bureau, Mr Khaled Guizmir, governor of the region, voiced his pride at seeing union men standing up for the principles of the UGTT headed by activist Farhat Hachad, citing the support of Destourien militants for the unions during the struggle for national liberation, and adding that President Bourguiba was the spiritual father of the present organized labor central to replace the old CGT.

6182
CSO: 4519/18

BRIEFS

PRIOR WARNING ON PLO BOMBING--Is it true that the United States officially warned Tunisia of the dangers of Israel undertaking a military operation against PLO headquarters on Tunisian soil? Three weeks before Israel launched its attack on the PLO base, the Reagan administration informed some Arab parties that Tunisian officials received such a warning in early September and that an American military official carried out the task [of informing the Tunisians]. However, an informed Tunisian source denies this information and insists that the Tunisian authorities did not receive any type of specific official warning and that American officials recently hinted that the Israelis are "indignant" about the increase in Palestinian feda'i operations against them. The Tunisian source said that "Israel's security," in any case, is not an Arab responsibility and that the Reagan administration's position on this matter unequivocally confirms the existence of American-Israeli coordination prior to the Israeli raid on the PLO site in the Hammam al-Shatt region on 1 October. [Text] [London AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 9 Nov 85 p 9] /9365

CSO: 4500/32

IRAQ

MILITARY FIGURE DISCUSSES KHARG ISLAND OPERATIONS

Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 1, 2 Oct 85

[Article by Staff Maj Gen 'Abd-al-Karim Taha al-Ahmad: "The Strategic Dimensions of the Destruction of Kharg Island"]

[1 Oct 85 p 3]

[Excerpts] 1. Introduction

The Iraqi-Iranian war entered its sixth year on 4 September 1985 but Iran has not responded to all the appeals for peace which the president and commander, Saddam Husayn, has declared since his historic speech on 28 September 1980 and it has paid no attention to international, Arab and Islamic appeals for peace, asserting its insistence on aggression and expansion against Iraq and the countries of the Arab Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula.

2. One distinctive feature of the Iraqi-Iranian war is its extension over a long period, in which it has lasted longer than all the wars which have occurred since World War Two, as well as coming close to the period that war took, although no conspicuous signs of its end are appearing on the horizon, because of the Iranian regime's insistence on extending its duration.

3. It has been reaffirmed in a manner which will not admit of doubt that one of the main reasons for the prolongation of the duration of the war and the continuation by Khomeyni's group of its unjust war against Iraq has been, and its source still remains, the oil revenues the Iranian regime receives from Kharg Island. These give it the opportunity to invest these revenues in purchasing arms and military equipment and materiel. Therefore, the decision to destroy Kharg is to be considered an important, decisive step in the context of the strategy for ending the difficult state of war and creating peaceful circumstances appropriate for a permanent state of stability in the Arab Gulf region.

4. The purpose of this research work is to discuss the strategic dimensions of the destruction of Kharg Island as an important step along the road to ending the Iraqi-Iranian war and establishing the state of permanent peace in the region. The outline of the research work will include the following:

A. A geographic description of Kharg Island.

- B. The strategic importance of the island.
- C. Iranian means for defending the island.
- D. The stages of destruction of Kharg Island.
- E. The reasons for postponing the destruction of Kharg.
- F. Why did the official White House spokesman fall prey to error?
- G. The reasons for the Iranian blackout about the destruction of Kharg.
- H. Why the Western and Zionist media blackout?
- I. The political dimensions of the destruction of Kharg.
- J. The military dimensions.
- K. The economic dimensions.
- L. The psychological dimensions.
- M. Facts and Deductions.

The Strategic Importance of the Island

Kharg Island is considered in effect the main nerve of the Iranian economy. Its strategic importance is obvious from the following:

A. It is the main port for the export of Iranian oil to the countries of the world. Ninety percent of Iranian oil is exported through this island, since its export capacity comes to 7 million barrels a day; the island's average oil exports in the middle of 1978 came to about 5 million barrels a day, during a period in which OPEC's share of world output came to 30 million barrels a day.

After the blockade was imposed on it by the Iraqi air and naval forces, export capacity fluctuated between 1.5 and 1.8 million barrels a day. There is at present no other Iranian outlet for exporting oil except Sirri Island, which is about 900 kilometers from the Iraqi coastline. Iran is trying to turn this island into an alternative to Kharg at the present time; however, its water is shallow and it cannot accommodate oil tankers of a capacity greater than 30,000 deadweight tons. It has no value for exports, because its maximum export capacity comes to 200,000 barrels a day. Iraq also has technical capabilities which enable it to destroy Sirri at the right time. On that basis, Kharg is to be considered the backbone of the Iranian economy.

B. Adding to the island's importance in terms of supporting the Iranian economy with hard currency, there is, in addition to the oil, a chemical complex on Kharg which relies on the oil installations present there; this is operated by the Iranian Oil Company and the American firm Amoco. The

complex produces sulphur and other materials such as propane and butane, which Iran exports.

C. A group of important Iranian offshore oilfields surrounds the island, including the Darius, Cyrus and Esfandiar fields, increasing its economic importance.

D. In view of its deep water, the island is also used to provide numerous facilities for importing most of Iran's foodstuff and military equipment requirements, since there are 18 piers to accommodate commercial vessels and unload their cargo.

E. The island is considered an important naval military base for the Iranian navy in defense of its other ports, because of the depth of its marine approaches and the presence of a concentrated telecommunications system used for military purposes.

F. The presence of a domestic airport to serve light domestic airplanes; it was possible to develop this into a military airport.

Iranian Means for Defending the Island

In view of the strategic and economic importance the island possesses, Iran has sought to carry out a number of military activities and measures to defend it, which have included the following:

A. The deployment of Hawk and Rapier missile systems, the SAM-9 missile systems it obtained from Libya and anti-aircraft artillery of various calibers and ranges.

B. The mobilization of low-altitude single-, dual- and four-cannon anti-aircraft machine guns.

C. The construction of radar stations for early warning purposes on the Iranian coast and in Iranian naval vessels.

D. The deployment of a visual observation system on and outside the island, in nearby ports and in launches, along with telecommunications for notifying aircraft approaching the island.

E. The establishment of air bases near the island, such as the Bushehr base, guaranteeing the island air cover through continuous flights over the island by American F-14 and Tomcat airplanes using radar with a maximum range of 300 kilometers. This is in effect an early warning AWACS.

F. The construction of high walls around many important installations on the island to guarantee internal protection against air raids.

I have hereby sought to describe the difficulty of mounting a sudden raid on Kharg Island unobserved from the Iranian coast or airplanes or naval vessels. However, as the president and commander Saddam Husayn has said, God "blinded their vision and blinded their hearts."

The stages of Destruction of Kharg Island

One can break the stages of the destruction of Kharg Island down into the following:

A. The warning stage:

This period was spelled out 3 years ago, on 15 August 1982, the day the president and commander Saddam Husayn declared, "Kharg Island and its oil installations at which they dock or from which they transport oil, whatever their nationality might be, will be an Iraqi air target." On 6 January 1984, the president and commander Saddam Husayn warned Iran a second time, when he said, "We must assert our natural right to defend our interests and direct suitable blows at the interests of the Iranian regime, wherever they might be, with all the means that are at our disposal. Iraq will choose the proper circumstances for exercising this natural right." However, the tyrannical clique did not respond to the warning call and continued to export from 1.5 to 2 million barrels a day, while Iraq was prevented from exporting its oil via the Arab Gulf during this period because the Syrian regime prohibited Iraqi oil from passing over its territory. The purpose of this warning period was for the Iranian regime to reassess its position by giving it an adequate opportunity to review its position and return to the right path. However, it was obstinate in its aggressive positions, benefiting from the revenues derived from the oil revenues from Kharg Island, which gave it the opportunity to invest these revenues in the purchase of weapons and military equipment and materiel.

B. The stage of naval blockade:

After the Iranian regime had rejected the Iraqi threats on Kharg, Iraq escalated the situation on 27 February 1984 to the stage of "imposing a naval blockade" on ships entering and leaving the port of Kharg. The Iraqi naval blockade of Kharg conformed to all conditions of law based on principles which international law had previously set out in accordance with the Paris declaration after the Crimean war (1856) and other laws set out in accordance with the London declaration (1909) and The Hague agreement (1917), stipulating that a naval blockade must be declared officially and must not go beyond the coasts and harbors belonging to the enemy, that other countries must know about this blockade, in order to prevent their ships from approaching, and that the blockade must be in effect in practice and imposed on all ships which try to enter the area on which the blockade is imposed alike, regardless of their nationality.

Thus Iraq proved the day an official spokesman announced, on 27 February 1984, that Kharg and the ports surrounding it were a military operations zone which it was forbidden to enter and leave, and the precision of its handling of the laws of war and international agreements was proved. Iraq's goal in the naval and air blockade was to realize vital political objectives aimed at preventing the extension of the duration of the war and ending it as soon as possible by reducing Iranian oil exports and preventing the nations of the world from dealing economically, politically and militarily with Iran's aggressive regime. Though Iran's oil exports dropped to about

700,000 barrels a day, the Iranian regime continued its aggressive course; Iraq showed high feelings of international, Arab and regional responsibility and for a long period exercised a policy of self-control and exerted the impossible for the sake of ending the war and stopping the human and economic bloodletting. However, the Iranian regime interpreted these positions as weakness and as an inability on Iraq's part to destroy Iran's oil installations at Kharg. During the period of the naval blockade, the Iranians used all negative means of deception at their command to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of the Iraqi naval blockade of the island and to reduce the effectiveness of the air force on ships approaching the island. Among the methods the Iranian regime used was the imposition of a radio blackout on ships approaching the island. They also established false sea islands and used darkness for purposes of loading. They also used large floating piers drawn by tugs which circled the island so that it would appear on radar screens that they were large naval targets, although they were false targets. In addition to that, the tankers headed for the island were provided with systems for releasing metal objects and heat flares to divert missiles directed at the tankers. Old ships were also put around the island to function as false targets and attract missiles. However, all of these Iranian measures, as we will see, were well known and had no effect in face of the Iraqi naval and air blockade and the destructive strike on the island.

C. The Stage of Destruction

At 1515 hours on 15 August 1985, after 3 years had elapsed since the Iraqi warning, Iraq took its historic decision to destroy Kharg Island, embodied by the decree of the president and commander, Saddam Husayn. His excellency said, "When the command saw that the time and circumstances were suitable, we put our trust in God. The men of Iraq in the heroic air force were the spearhead in directing the lethal blow at this accursed aggressive artery."

A number of squadrons of our brave air force leveled a surprise destructive blow at Kharg which lasted more than half an hour and turned it into rubble and straw blown away by the wind.

The decision to carry out the destruction was the greatest military achievement realized on the strategic level in the 5 years of the war, since it led to the paralysis and destruction of Iranian military, economic, political and psychological powers, led to the ultimate decisive conclusion of the war in Iraq's favor in strategic terms and opened wide the avenues to peace to end the war and establish Arab, regional and international security in the region. The operation of the destruction of Kharg was not haphazard; rather, it was the culmination of a series of successive carefully studied operations each one of which had a specific mission and clear role that helped advance the stage following it one step farther toward a final decisive conclusion of the war.

Thus the decision the president and commander Saddam Husayn took to destroy Kharg was a brave, bold political one and a brilliant, wise strategic option which the commander took at the right circumstance and time, because any destruction inflicted on Kharg Island is to be considered a political, economic, military and social catastrophe for Iran. This island is considered

the major Iranian oil export terminal, and the magnitude of the annual oil revenues from it come to \$12 to \$15 billion, the essential amount which Iran uses to keep the machine of war going and continue its aggression against Iraq and the Arab nation.

The decision to carry out the destruction expressed unique political and military genius on the part of the president and commander Saddam Husayn, since "international, Arab, regional and domestic circumstances" had ripened and had become ready to accept the notion of the decision. It was taken in the right circumstances, and thus the adoption of the decision expressed creative, innovative power on the part of the strategic thinking of the president and commander, Saddam Husayn, to adjust and act in concord and harmony within four areas -- the domestic, national, regional and international. The bold decision also expressed exceptional precision in the calculations of proficient planning of the phases of strategy in order to arrive at the ultimate goal, which was to end the war, taking into account the consideration of the abilities and resources available for execution, the correspondence of goals with these resources and calculation of the time element to be added in developing our armed forces' combat capabilities and the other factors influencing the development of arms procurement, equipment and training.

The decision to carry out the destruction expresses the high power of the strategic thinking of the president and commander, Saddam Husayn, regarding the art of war management on the general strategy level, which comprised use of all political, military, economic, social and psychological powers to achieve the goal of policy, which is to end the war and establish a permanent, honorable peace in the region.

The Reasons for Postponing the Destruction of Kharg

A group of political and non-political factors, as the president and commander, Saddam Husayn, defined them, played a basic role in postponing the destruction of Kharg Island, including the following:

A. Provision of an opportunity for the Iranian regime to review its calculations regarding the war, so that it would be able to restore its economic affairs to their previous state and build up what the war had destroyed. President Saddam Husayn said "We had hoped not to deprive our enemy of everything, so that he would lose everything and would have nothing of importance left to help him take steps toward peace."

B. The interconnection of international interests and the presence of good international relations between Iraq and some entities which buy Iranian oil from Kharg.

C. Iraq's concern that there be no likelihood that an oil shortage would occur and oil prices would rise to an unstable level, proceeding from the position of preserving equilibrium in the international oil market.

D. Iraq's high feeling of historic responsibility toward the OPEC organization and preservation of its unity, since Iran is one of its members, Iran's attempt to fragment its unity notwithstanding.

E. Iraq did not hasten to strike at the first moment since neither international public opinion nor Iranian public opinion had coalesced to accept the destructive strike at the outset. Once world, Arab, regional and local public opinion did coalesce, the decision to carry out the destruction was taken at the suitable time.

F. The aggressive Iranian regime's continued insistence on keeping Iraq from exporting its oil from Arab Gulf ports.

G. The presence of an absolute conviction on the part of our political leadership that the Iranian enemy, as President Saddam Husayn said, "Does not attach any weight to Iran's possessions and resources, because it basically does not attach any weight to the blood of the Iranian people."

H. The timely improvement of the Iraqi economic situation and the flow of oil to Yanbu' on the Red Sea, while the Iranian economy is declining toward collapse. The president and commander, Saddam Husayn, said "We are rising here with the unity of our people, which is the basis for improving our economic situation, and we are rising and raising our international reputation, our Arab status and our relations with our Arab brothers and all the countries of the region, while they, conversely, are deteriorating. They are deteriorating with respect to the economy and politics, they are declining in terms of the Iranian peoples' position regarding their aggressive acts, and they are deteriorating in terms of armed forces in general." Thus the destructive strike against Kharg has taken place in total conformity with the deterioration of all the conditions in Iran and the rise in the pride and glory of all the elements of strategic power in Iraq's benefit.

[2 Oct 85 p 3]

[Text] Why the Western and Zionist Media Blackout?

The operation of the destruction of Kharg by our potent air force is considered one of the greatest operations to have taken place since World War Two in terms of precision, proficiency, training, planning, execution and timing and it has expressed advanced, developed strategic thinking. However, from the day it carried out the destruction on 15 August 1985 it has been exposed, and still is exposed, to a deliberate Western and Zionist media blackout. One can enumerate the reasons in the following:

A. It has been possible to consider it one of the greatest and most precise operations in the context of policy and military strategy, and the planning for it was done by genuine Iraqi thinking, without seeking the aid of any foreign expertise at all. For this reason, the Zionist and Western media are trying to belittle the destructive strike with the goal of shaking the Arab fighting man's confidence in creative, innovative Iraqi military thinking.

B. Kharg Island, which was built by the Shah with Western and Zionist advice at the beginning of the sixties and was developed at the beginning of the seventies, was built for economic and military purposes to prevent the Soviets from reaching Iranian oil sources and guarantee the continued flow of oil to the United States of America, Western Europe, Japan and the Zionist

entity, and for the sake of supplying the Seventh Fleet operating in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean area with fuel far from the reach of Soviet naval forces. Therefore, planning for the island's defense was done in the Shah's era, with American, Western and Zionist military thinking, to confront any possible Soviet aggression against the island. The position of every missile and every defensive artillery piece was established and when the Iranian war broke out, Khomeyni's regime carried out this plan, which had been drawn up previously.

Therefore, it is not reasonable or possible, from the viewpoint of the West or the Zionist entity, for the heroic Iraqi air force to be able to penetrate these strong defenses and destroy the island.

The operation of the destruction of the island is to be considered a strategic and tactical strike against Western and Zionist military thinking. Therefore, these forces are performing a media blackout which has the objective of obliterating the facts concerning Iraqi military power of thinking, planning and execution.

C. The Western media, which are prey to Zionist dominance, try to belittle the stature of the operation, in response to the guidelines of the Zionist entity, which is afraid of Iraqi air power for the future of its air facilities.

D. The system of missiles and anti-aircraft weapons which have been mobilized to defend the island are Western. Therefore, it is not reasonable for the Western media agencies to belittle the status of their weapons and military equipment.

E. A number of European companies are carrying out a number of economic projects in Iran, and since the destructive Iraqi raid on Kharg makes it easy to destroy any vital target within the Iranian hinterland, emphasizing this operation in the media will therefore result in the departure of many Western experts from the worksites, causing these companies material losses.

F. The Western media blackout concerning the destruction of Kharg also has the objective of preventing a rise in the prices of Gulf oil; these have been subjected to a concentrated Western price-breaking campaign and an attempt gradually to bring the per-barrel price back to its pre-1972 level.

The Political Dimensions of the Destruction of Kharg

The decision to destroy Kharg was "a political decision issued by the political command, embodied in the president and commander Saddam Husayn," and its goal was to impose peace and reject the option of war and its extended duration. Therefore, one can define the political dimensions of the operation to carry out the destruction as follows:

A. Making the Iranian regime relinquish its expansionist goals and aggressive intentions against Iraq and the Arab nation and seek recourse to a just, honorable peace. Iran has no other option besides that: either peace or destruction.

B. The other political fact which the regime of Tehran, the Iranian people and the whole world must realize is that Iraq, with its revolutionary regime, under the leadership of the president and commander, Saddam Husayn, is the victor in the war, and that it is their defeated regime which has failed in the course of 5 years of the war to realize any of its aggressive goals.

C. Iraq, through its destruction of Kharg Island, has directed all the elements of general strategy for the sake of ending the war in the shortest period possible. It has also prepared all objective circumstances for the sake of advancing the peace process.

D. This annihilating blow will make the international powers which influence the course of the struggle in the region face their responsibility directly so that they may make serious movement in the direction of putting an end to this struggle. The war was forgotten as far as these powers were concerned for 5 years; therefore, this strike will make these powers, especially those with a direct interest in the oil of the region, think about what the situation could come to if the state of war continued with its present severity or became further intensified.

E. The destructive blow at Kharg will also be reflected in an increased severity in domestic struggles among the forces of the regime that are struggling over power. There is the national resistance, which will witness an increase in activity because of the regime's suspicious insistence on continuing the aggression and increasing the number of unemployed, which now stands at 5 million. This figure will increase in the future because of the deterioration of economic conditions after the destructive strike on Kharg, and this will increase the escalation of the people's resentment of Khomeyni's regime.

There also is another element which will increase its activity against Khomeyni's regime, and that is the opposition religious figures who consider war with Iraq repugnant and demand peace. The other element, which will experience severe fragmentation, is the government element of major figures in the regime; it is basically internally fragmented because of the continuation of war and poor economic conditions. Since the coming months will witness more deteriorated economic conditions which will threaten the regime with collapse, these struggles within the ruling group will increase in the future, and that will result in the outburst of an explosion of the people within Iran which will lead to the ultimate collapse of the regime.

The Military Dimensions

Although the decision to carry out the destruction was a political one taken by the president and commander, Saddam Husayn, it is his brilliant, distinguished military mind that planned and designed the destructive struggle in full, through his excellency's directives to our striking air forces. One can sum up the military dimensions of this operation in the following:

A. The destructive lightning air attack on Kharg has demonstrated high military capability on the part of our air force and the development of aspects of its training, outfitting, fighting and exceptional ability to penetrate

the most modern air defense systems, with their early warning systems, and destroy any target within the Iranian hinterland, no matter how intensely concentrated its defenses might be.

Iraq, which is strong and potent under its unique leader, the president and commander Saddam Husayn, and its highly motivated, advanced, growing military forces, are able to inflict the most severe blows on all other Iranian economic installations and turn them to burning chaff if the period of war continues to be prolonged, and the successive blows against the staggering regime will be more violent and intense.

C. The destruction of Kharg, in its strategic dimensions, is to be considered part of Iraq's new strategy of compelling the aggressors to respond to the will for peace, now that all other means of making a just, honorable peace prevail in this vital region of the world have failed.

D. The destructive strike against Kharg has affirmed that the strategic initiative is still in Iraq's hands.

E. The strike will lead to the suspension and abrogation of many arms supply contracts which Iran has signed with certain European and Asian countries and certain arms merchants on the basis of bartered oil or the sale of oil at a low price, as a result of which a great crisis will occur in arms procurement and equipment, which will make Khomeyni's army and guard incapable of persevering in the face of the destructive Iraqi blows.

F. The Iranian army's inability to carry out any future expansion in its military organizations, which will lead to a reduction in the status of its military power and a reduction and contraction in its combat capability.

G. A deterioration will arise from that in administrative affairs in the context of food supplies and equipment, and a reduction in soldiers' salaries, which will lead to a drop in morale and an increase in the rate of desertions within the Iranian armed forces, which has already reached a high level because of non-payment of wages, the spread of incidents of disease, the absence of Iranian military personnel's faith in the feasibility of continuing the war and the regime's inability to achieve any victory, even a tactical, "minor" one.

The Economic Dimensions

Kharg Island is considered the artery of the Iranian economy, financing it with the enormous sums to keep the machine of war going, since total Iran exports from this island are about 1.8 million barrels a day, providing it with financial resources ranging from \$14 to \$16 billion a year.

If we calculate the future of the Iranian economy after the strike, we will see that Iran's economy has started to face a dangerous situation which will lead to its collapse. Total Iranian arms procurement contracts now come to about \$9 billion annually. The annual rate of spending on the war is \$24 billion. The volume of foreign exports is \$4 billion, according to 1983 statistics. Employees' salaries come to \$6 billion a year, and the volume Iran

requires to keep its annual budget activities operating come to a minimum of \$53 billion a year, not to speak of the losses which have been inflicted on Iran as a result of previous battles and the blockade imposed on it before the strike, which came to \$36 billion, and increased ship insurance rates, which have risen from 25 to 370 percent. A rise in insurance rates in a manner which will encumber the Iranian economy and add new burdens to it will arise from the state of destruction.

Most of Iran's oil export capacity has been paralyzed and destroyed. Since Iran had an export capacity of 1.8 million barrels, its remaining export capacity will be 200,000 barrels a day, which it exports from Sirri Island. Therefore, Iran, in the best of cases, will not be able to obtain more than \$1 billion a year in addition to \$4 billion in annual income which is the price of the gas it sells each year. Therefore, its annual exports will be no more than \$5 billion, and since the volume of its budget requirements comes to \$43 billion, its deficit will be \$38 billion. This is in addition to the decline in development planning in the Iranian economy and the deterioration in the share of work in agriculture from 42 to 5 percent because of internal circumstances. The industrial sector has declined and contracted, and the government has ventured to sell a large number of its factories because of its financial deficit and its inability to pay employees' salaries. Another group of economic matters will arise from this, including:

- A. A decline in the size of foreign currency reserves, since the deterioration of its economic conditions will lead to the withdrawal of its entire balance and its declaration of bankruptcy.
- B. An increase in inflation, since the regime will print large amounts of currency for circulation although it has no reserves, and this will lead to a rise in the prices of foodstuffs and other administrative services and a lack of confidence in the official currency among the people.
- C. A reduction in imports to a minimum level, from which will result a large shortage in the foodstuffs it has imported for bartered oil. This may perhaps lead to the possibility of the occurrence of drought in Iran.
- D. An increase in the number of unemployed, whose total before the strike came to 5 million.
- E. Iran's recourse to the system of exorbitant loans from some countries in exchange for bartered oil at paltry prices after the end of the war; this will burden it with debts.
- F. Iran will seek recourse to the continued sale of government companies, factories and plants to certain profitting Iranian merchants or their sale at international auction because of its inability to provide their operating requirements.
- G. Iran will resort to reducing the wages of Iranian government employees and soldiers and imposing exorbitant taxes on citizens and other services, in the hope of improving its economic situation. However, that will be of no use, because it will not provide it with hard currency and will lead to the

creation of ferocious resentment among the people and perhaps a revolution against the regime.

The Psychological Dimensions

Throughout all the 5 successive years of the war, the Iranian regime ran its battles deliberately on false psychological war, deceiving and misleading the peoples of Iran regarding its ability to realize a specific victory in the front each time, thereby using all means of fraud, deception and delusion to prevent any current that advocated peace with Iraq from becoming prominent on the Iranian stage. The February 1984 battles, the battles of Sayf Sa'd of 1984 and the battle of Taj al-Ma'arik in mid-March 1985 witnessed the collapse of these false arguments, and the Iranian peoples were thus finally liberated from the illusions of "inevitable victory" against Iraq and became convinced that the continuation of the war would lead Iran to true destruction and the dismemberment of its territories.

The rulers of Tehran tried to delude their peoples and the whole world over the power of the Kharg air defenses to persevere against Iraqi attacks and claim that they were in an impregnable fortress and that Iraq could not destroy them. However, the destructive blow at the island proceeded to convince the Iranian peoples that their regime was incapable of realizing any defense for the Iranian hinterland, and that all vital Iranian targets, no matter how far in the hinterland they might be, would be within the reach of the effective, potent Iraqi air force. Thus, from the psychological standpoint, there came to be a total and absolute conviction among the Iranian peoples as a result of the strike that the Iranian regime, which was surrounded by all the elements of military defeat and the collapse of morale, had become exposed to collapse and that the Iranian people had to play an important, effective role in bringing the Iranian regime down and putting an end to the war, which had gone on without justification.

The destruction of Kharg, the abyss of the aggression against Iraq, did its part in weakening the Iranians' will to fight and obliterating every hope they had of attempting to realize any victory, if only at the tactical level. Their feelings of frustration, dejection and inability to continue with the war became aggravated, and the road to peace was the option which the regime ought to pursue to create a permanent state of security and stability in the region.

Facts and Conclusions

Through our above review of the operation of the destruction of Kharg, one can arrive at important facts and conclusions, which we can sum up as follows:

A. The adoption of the brave political and strategic decision to destroy the island is to be considered part of the unique political military genius of the president and commander, Saddam Husayn, in managing the war politically, militarily and economically at the general strategy level, and the strategic calculations in his management of the war are founded on a firm, cogent objective analysis, taking into consideration all basic factors influencing

the balance of the struggle. When the domestic, regional, Arab and international circumstances for the destruction of the island had ripened, Iraq carried out his strategic decision to destroy it, and thus the decision conformed to and was simultaneous and totally harmonious with all the circumstances I have mentioned. This is the peak of strategic innovation the president and commander Saddam Husayn took after the decision to reply to Iranian aggression on 22 September 1980.

B. The serious strategic decision to destroy the island had the objective of moving the Iranian masses opposed to Khomeyni's regime and mobilizing their forces to help put an end to the war, which had entered its sixth year. Its rotten regime was still insisting on the continuation of the war; therefore, the destruction of the island would be the fruit of the ripening of political and psychological circumstances inside Iran and in the region and the world, leading to a consolidation of the chances for a peaceful solution and an end to the war.

C. The operation of the destruction of Kharg Island expressed high military power on the part of our air forces in terms of planning, training, arms procurement and execution by following new advanced combat methods expressive of a comprehensive state of resurgence in the armed forces, as the president and commander, Saddam Husayn, has pointed out.

D. Iraq, by taking the decision to destroy Kharg, has outlined an obvious end to the war on the level of strategy.

E. There is another fact which the operation of the destruction of Kharg has underlined, which is that it is strong, potent Iraq which holds the reins of strategic initiative on land and sea and in the air, as it holds the reins of the operational and tactical initiative, and that it is now out of the question for the defeated Iranian regime to change the balance of strategy, operations and tactics on its behalf in any operations sector.

F. There is another important fact which our destructive strike on Kharg has underlined, which is that the Iranian military units and the Iranian people in general no longer trust the regime of mullahs and its political and military competence and ability, and the combination of factors has started to influence and exert its effect psychologically, intellectually and politically.

G. The annihilating strike on Kharg has affirmed the fact that it is the deceitful clique in Tehran which will bear the responsibility for the infliction of destruction which has befallen Iran and will inflict the most grievous effect on it in the future from the political, economic, military and social angle, that the regime's continuation of its aggressive course against Iraq and the Arab nation and its insistence on war will lead to the fragmentation of the Iranian peoples, and that they must confront this evil by themselves because they, that is, the Iranian peoples, are also their suspicious regime's target.

H. There is another important fact which the destructive strike on Kharg has affirmed, which is that the Iranian regime's prolongation of the duration of the war and the launching of a war of attrition against Iraq are folly and

an attempt to deceive the Iranian peoples. Iran has started to bleed in human, economic and moral terms, and can only yield to the will of peace.

Conclusion

The destruction of Kharg Island, which for a long time kept awaiting the decision of its wise leadership, is a bold, wise political and strategic decision and a distinctive, historic military act which the Arab nation had not previously pursued with such a progressive mentality, causing the band of Khomeyni, imperialism and Zionism and its allies of Arab nationality to suffer intense anxiety as a result of this destructive blow.

The destruction plan was set out under guidance by the directives and leadership of the president and commander, Saddam Husayn, and was carried out precisely and firmly by our air force. It realized brilliant, amazing results, and the strike was realized "beyond the expectations of the planners and perhaps the people carrying it out."

The main goal of the destructive strike has been, and remains, the attainment of suitable circumstances and climate for promoting peace between the two countries to achieve an end to the war and cause security, peace and stability to reign in the region.

The pursuit of the peace option, rather than the war option, remains Iraq's goal, and if Iran insists on continuing with aggression and pursuing devious methods with the goal of extending the duration of the war, strong potent Iraq, under the leadership of the president and commander, Saddam Husayn, has the arms and increasing, advanced, destructive military capabilities to bring all vital economic and other projects within the reach of the agonizing, destructive Iraqi strike, so that Iran will bow down to the will of the truth and peace.

The destruction of Kharg has put Iran on the brink of political, economic and military collapse; it is strategically the first step along the road to ending the war. If Iran insists on aggression, that will be followed by other destructive steps which will make the collapse of the tyrannical clique an inevitability from which there will be no escape.

Sources of the Research Work

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ISRAEL

TREATING IDF'S DESERTION PROBLEM

Tel Aviv BAMAHAHE in Hebrew 16 Oct 85 pp 9-11, 52

[Article by Barukh Ron: Special Survey: "The Deserters"]

[Text] As Eli's draft date approached, the fear in his heart grew. He and the IDF, he mused, would not get along well. To sacrifice 3 years of his life, off in some far-off hole, where at the maximum he would be a cook or a driver, or perhaps clean toilets. Suddenly to have to abandon the old neighborhood and the guys, and the crazy life of doing nothing and having pleasures.

The day before he was drafted, his good friend Moshe, who had escaped from the army, had a word with him. "Believe me," he said to him in a voice of authority and experience, "the army is not for you, you have nothing to look for there. Hell, forget this nonsense. Look at me, I ran away - and they do not even care. Come on, we will get some girls and go to have a good time in Elat."

The temptation was great. To leave everything behind. The crying, the screaming of the seven other brothers and sisters, the fights, the headaches, and the army looming in the doorway. Hell, why did the army have to come up now. And yet, Eli declined. He decided to report the next day at the appointed time at the draft office.

On the second day of basic training the trouble started. He felt he could not take the fast pace of the training, that the officers were making it hard for him and that in everything he did he was degrading himself. In addition he was homesick for his home, for the neighborhood, for the gang, even for the street corners on which they hung out. The decision to escape finalized within him.

Thus, on his 10th day in the Army, Eli disappeared from his basic training base. A.W.O.L. His officers phoned his house and then actually went out to search for him, but he could not be found. Exactly 2 weeks from the time of his disappearance he entered a new, more serious category: that of deserter.

Desertion, according to the Army's definition, is any soldier absent from service without permission beyond 14 days (previous to 1979 - 21 days).

The number of deserters, regular and reserves in the IDF, comes to several thousand. Several hundred of these are still in regular service. The IDF is now starting a widespread operation to bring them back. In this article we will concentrate on the deserters from the regular army. According to statistics of the Military Police, desertion among regular army soldiers is characterized by: many desertions, each time for a short time. About half of the deserters desert more than one time and there are cases of more than five desertions in a year. On an average there are about 100 desertions per week, about 15 per day. More than 75 percent of the residents of the military jails today are there on charges of A.W.O.L. and desertion. Last year, 60 percent of the military trials dealt with this matter alone.

This sad situation is not new to the IDF. The matter has been analyzed and placed on the table many times in the past, and repeated efforts have been and are being made to reduce the plague. Among other things, the treatment centers for advancement of special populations were set up and huge operations carried out to return deserters. About a year ago, the head of Personnel at the General Staff, General 'Amos Yaron, set up a special committee to investigate the matter and to find possible solutions. Participating on the committee were the president of the Military Appeals Court, General David Maymon (Chairman); the past Military Adjutant Officer (Military Advocate General), Brig Gen Aharon Ofir; chief of the Center for Advancement of Special Populations at the staff of the Chief Education Officer; three colonels - from the Draft Administration, from Military Police, and from the Military Advocate General's office; and another experienced professional from the Department of Behavioral Science at the Manpower Branch. This forum after carrying out meetings and conversations with officers, senior officers, and professionals, about 2 months ago presented its recommendation to the chief of the Manpower Branch. A few weeks ago the topic was also presented to the chief of staff.

Therefore in order to prepare this survey we went to all these sources. We talked with the branch chief in the Adjutancy General (the branch which deals with matters pertaining to desertion), Lieutenant Colonel Yoni, aide to the chief military police officer, Colonel P., chief of the Center for Advancement of Special Populations, Colonel Shemu'el Golan, former chief military police officer, Brig Gen (Res) Me'ir Gev', Brig Gen (Res) Bention Farhi, and president of the Military Appeals Court, Maj Gen David Maymon. Only after these conversations did it become clear how sensitive and complex these matters are, with many aspects and implications, which sometimes are not one-sided. Everyone said that there is no miracle cure. It requires strong, even painful, effort on the part of the IDF, and basic, in-depth treatment which will bear fruit, it is hoped, over time. The committee accepted the decisions in this spirit.

The first part of the survey will deal with an examination of the problem of desertion and its causes - procedures, characteristics, reasons. The second part will focus on possible solutions as seen by the Maymon committee - the conclusions and the recommendations.

From the moment that a soldier ceases to appear in his unit, a procedure regarding him is put into effect which includes messages, approvals, and checks in which the Adjutancy General is involved, along with the Military Police and the Advocate General. For the first week of absence the matter is dealt with by the unit officer alone. By the 8th day, the unit must send to the home of the A.W.O.L. soldier "a searching soldier" who is obligated to return him, should he find him. Most of the time the "searcher" returns empty handed. During the next 6 days, the unit sends a letter to the parents of the soldier and at the close of the 2-week period from the date of his disappearance informs the Department of Desertion in the Adjutancy and the Military Police--and the deserter is dropped from the list of his unit. After receiving permission from the Adjutancy to imprison the deserter the "Deserter Capturers" enter the action.

Colonel P., aide to the chief military police officer: "The description is sent to the Military Police base in the region in which the deserter lives, to be dealt with by a group of deserter capturers there. The chief of the team checks out and verifies all the details, including with the Interior Ministry and the border police, and also informs the Israeli Police and dozens of "informers" spread around the country."

"Members of the team, four or five in number, move in civilian clothing and in civilian cars and use varied investigative techniques. If the deserter is found he is immediately taken to detainment and the next day is jailed. If he is not found, the visits of the group become regular disturbances including thorough searching and interrogation of the members of the family. Usually, this succeeds. Most of the deserters return or are returned, within a limited amount of time. Only the minority that take more than a year are the exception."

After the arrest, the file is transferred to the Military Advocate and he decides if the deserter will be judged and how - in a "discipline judgment," by a senior legal officer, or in a military court, by three judges, with the deserter represented by an attorney. The difference is quite significant, a legal officer (generally a lieutenant colonel) can rule up to 28 days in jail and the military court can decide on longer periods, up to a maximum of 3 years in extreme cases. Since most of the desertions are of a month up to 3 months, the punishments meted out in military courts are of 3 to 9 months imprisonment.

Research carried out by Dr Dan Shenit on the efficiency of the judgment and punishment of deserters reached the conclusion that putting the deserter on trial in a military court in the end brings about the expulsion of the soldier from the IDF. The study recommended that in cases of first

desertion, more cases should be referred to judgment by an officer and that the referrals to military court be reduced. According to the Military Advocate General, Brig Gen Ben-Tzion Farchi, the following recommendations have been adopted and will be effected: "Generally, legal officers will receive first time deserters and/or those who have reported of their own free will, in accordance with the situation, and the military courts will get the more serious cases."

One of the worrisome phenomena in the desertion problem is repeated desertions. Studies by the Division of Behavioral Sciences show that this is a characteristic behavior pattern. Deserters with psychological problems who were arrested despite their problems are identified in jail and sent to psychiatric treatment in the mental health clinic. Reduction of sentence is only given in exceptional circumstances, and immediate discharge from the IDF (with profile lowered to "21") is even rarer.

So much for procedures. Immediate questions arise upon reading these words, as to the nature and background of the deserters, and most importantly, as to the reasons which cause them to desert.

Let's return for a moment to the story of Eli, which was presented at the beginning of this article. This story, or at least the basic lines, is characteristic of a considerable portion of the desertion from the regular army service. However, none of those with whom we talked were willing to dare to build a model of the "typical deserter."

The data shows that more than 60 percent of the deserters from regular service have a low "Quality Group" score, and the remaining 40 percent have high Quality Group scores. However, all of the 60 percent group almost always come from the same background. Most of them come from deprived neighborhoods, especially from places where there are many with criminal records.

What, therefore, are the reasons for desertion? Why does it occur? Here all the sources agree. The IDF knows exactly, and knew in the past, what the causes of desertion are. What it does not know is the way to deal most effectively with them.

A team of psychologists from the Department of Behavioral Sciences in the Manpower branch made a study about a year ago, in which 100 imprisoned deserters were studied, a representative sample of the population of deserters in the IDF. The team spoke at length with the deserters, in order to try to uncover the reasons and forces behind their action and it produced three central determinants: the individual factors, the system factors, and the situational factors.

"Individual factors" are the nature of the soldier, his characteristics and the load with which he arrives at the IDF. In our case we are referring to a problematic population, which brings along a "dowry" of heavy personal

and social problems with it. These, as is natural, immediately show up and are expressed in his attitude toward service, quality and length of service, etc. Out of the 100 deserters surveyed, 28 were found to be lacking basic suitability to serve; 17 others could not stand the conditions of the military framework and its demands, and 3 more did not want to serve in the IDF at all. The chief reason for desertion of about half of those questioned (48 out of the 100) lay in themselves, in their nature, their weakness, their limitations and their difficulties in dealing with the pressures of the army.

"System factors" are exactly what they sound like - they stem from the nature of the military system, its implications and influences. Here, eight of the deserters stressed insensitivity and inflexibility of the army; 5, conflicts with the officer; and 3, lack of satisfaction with their job position. In the opinion of the psychologists who made the study, the system was responsible for these desertions.

"These soldiers escaped as a means of defending themselves against the arbitrariness and rigidity of the system, and it is possible and reasonable to assume that had they had different commanding officers, they would have succeeded in fitting in, and their service would have been alright." The Maymon committee also determined that "the involvement of the direct commanding officer and the degree to which he deals with the problems of the individual has without a doubt great influence on preventing the phenomenon of absence from service. A soldier who finds that his officer listens, and learns that his problems are suitably dealt with, even if he does not receive what he requests, will think twice before taking the law into his hands and escaping from the service."

"Situational factors" are circumstantial factors, stemming from special situations which soldiers run into. Problems at home or an attempt to improve the conditions of service. In these cases the desertion is not demanded by reality but rather serves as a tool to achieve certain ends. Twenty-five of the deserters - exactly one fourth of them - admitted that they deserted in order to achieve a desired change in their conditions of service. Six emphasized that they had been under pressure and found it difficult to function as a result of problems in the family. Here the psychologists are of the opinion that both sides, both the deserters and the system, view the desertion as a means of communication by which the soldier expresses his negative opinion of the conditions of service and/or as a result of a response to a request of his which in his opinion did not suffice.

It would be worthwhile here to note two additional important points. One - the norms of the environment. The personal environment of the deserter and its behavioral norms can encourage positive motivation to service or a negative reaction to the army, such as in the case of Eli. In some societies, say the psychologists of the Behavioral Science Division, the phenomenon of desertion is backed and even openly encouraged, and sometimes

becomes an accepted norm. Previous research performed by the Department of Behavioral Sciences revealed that about half of the deserters who were interviewed had a brother or friend who had deserted previously.

The second point is that of the psychological profile. Most of the deserters with psychological problems are unable to serve in the army: out of the hundred respondents, it was found that 17 had been classified as psychologically handicapped, 11 of whom were found to be lacking basic suitability to serve and another 3 of whom were unable to stand the conditions of the framework.

Concludes Lieutenant Yoni from the Adjutant General: "The decisive majority of deserters desert during their first half year in the service (in '81-'82 - 85 percent of the deserters!). This refers to people who are very much influenced by the environment in their thoughts and behavior, people with a history of difficulty in dealing with frameworks (such as at school or at their place of employment). Even if they free themselves of the accepted norm of their neighborhood, which supports not serving (and it is enough that there be two or three there who "tricked" the army without getting caught), they will still have to deal with a rigid system which forces discipline upon them, and different concepts from those which they have been accustomed to in civilian life. What will this same soldier think of the reaction of his friends, after the macho, aggressive, rude, mocking image suddenly bursts to smithereens in the demands of basic training, or while washing dishes?

"Some of the soldiers come to terms with the situation or try to "get an easy job," perhaps something which will give them a feeling of succeeding in 'screwing the system'; but the majority can not take it - and escape. And today this is a national, general problem of society."

Many of the problematic soldiers - those with low Quality Group scores - upon being drafted are sent to the Center for Advancement of Special Populations. This center, established in 1978 by the former chief of staff, Rafael Eitan, is supposed to be the "hand that takes care of" and "ear that listens to" these soldiers. At the center the soldiers are classified and assigned, and after they report to their units - generally service and administration units - they remain under the supervision of the center and are helped by it for their various needs.

According to the center chief, Colonel Shemuel Golan, the center succeeds in imbuing these soldiers with motivation to serve, and in reducing potential desertions by taking the desires of the soldier into account when making his assignment and by giving the commanders of units specific instructions on how to treat these soldiers and how to remain open to their problems and requests.

There are also problematic women, of course, and female deserters. Despite the definite male "hegemony" in this area, there is a small, small,

percentage of women registered as deserters. According to the statistics of the military police, there are today approximately 30 women deserters from regular service.

There are several reasons to explain the low number: there are less women than men in the IDF; the problematic ones among them are absorbed in aid units and cared for there (thus most of the desertions are from there as well); and most importantly - most of the women soldiers serve in offices in relatively comfortable conditions. Those who do not are those of high quality profiles, without problems adapting.

The Military Advocate General, Brig Gen Ben Tzion Farhi, shows sensitivity and great care about the issue of desertion. He is much less hard on deserters whose situation at home is difficult (of course after this has been verified by the IDF) and often is touched. "Many among us, including those dealing with the matter, tend to hurry to judge the motivations of the deserter as excuses, without knowing what really happened. If only we heard everything, the shocking, touching stories, which are revealed almost daily in the military courts, their opinion would change. We do not even have the capability to understand, to sense what happened and continues to happen to these 'Les Miserables.'"

The Military Police have to deal with the desertion problem daily. Today this matter has been given top priority. It is a regular part of the day of the chief of Military Police. There were and remain two objective problems which make catching deserters difficult: the high occupancy of the military jails and the lack of personnel.

Brig Gen (Res) Me'ir Gev', who served until recently as chief of Military Police, stated in an interview with BAMAHAHE upon completion of his term (vol 47, 14 Aug 1985) that "sometimes we are forced to cease detention of deserters due to lack of space in the jails, however this is just for a few weeks."

On the other hand, this branch of the military has always suffered from a lack of personnel. The problem is likely to become more serious as a result of the recent budget cuts. "Daily we deal with capturing deserters and dealing with them. We have dozens of military police throughout the country," says Gev'. "If it were not for the deserters, we could put those police on the road to save lives."

"Those who capture deserters are not performing a technical function. These are intelligent, healthy men, carefully chosen for the job. They must know how to behave with people, how to be aggressive or gentle and careful, as is necessary, how to find enough physical and mental strength to cope with all the difficulties of the job. And of course - they must also know how to use force, and many times they have been injured in violent attacks by deserters whom they were attempting to arrest."

Colonel P., aide to the chief of Military Police: "This year greater resources have been allocated to the capture teams. They have received new vehicles, new communications equipment and sophisticated electronic equipment. Today we are also emphasizing training of younger deserter-capturers, and they are without a doubt more professional. At the same time, the deserters are also becoming more sophisticated and developing sophisticated systems to disappear and hide their tracks."

According to Gev', those deserters who report of their own free will do this as a result of "softening" and convincing by the capturers. Psychologists explain that a soldier is haunted from the the moment he deserts by questions of when and how he will be captured, if they will succeed - and feels like a chased animal, slowly being closed in upon. Some walk the streets imagining that they are being followed. They turn themselves in to achieve some peace of mind and to stop the nightmares of being chased and the sleeping in the streets, the snatched meals, and so forth. Sometimes the parents pressure them to stop the madness. They, too, suffer greatly from the matter.

Turning oneself in automatically lightens the punishment which the deserters receive. The Military Advocate General: "Voluntarily reporting, after a short period of desertion, generally means a disciplinary sentence, and a portion of the maximum sentence. Therefore it is preferable that the deserter turn himself in as quickly as possible, as each additional day works against him."

Eli, whom we discussed at the beginning of this article, managed to hide for 55 days, but was finally captured in the bomb shelter of a friend's house after someone tipped off the military police. He was sentenced to 3 months incarceration and to 2 months probation; at a training base of the Military Police he completed his basic training while serving this sentence. He recently completed serving his sentence and shortly will be beginning a driver training course in the Maintenance Corps.

"No, I did not request driving," he says, "but that is what there is and I accept it. It was all a nightmare for me. Believe me, I did not know what I was getting into. After half a year in the army, I am just really getting started now."

The best minds in the army that deal with personnel have been put to the task of participating in the operation to bring the deserting soldiers back. The matter is being dealt with more thoroughly and more seriously out of two considerations:

- A. To prevent the phenomenon from becoming an accepted social norm.
- B. To prevent, as much as possible, deserters being hurt, by preventing it from occurring while it is only a threat.

Wide possibilities are being given to deserters to return by themselves to serve with significant reductions in punishment. On the other hand, anyone not turning himself in will be dealt with accordingly.

ISRAEL

CHIEF OF ARTILLERY CORPS INTERVIEWED

Tel Aviv BAMAHAHE in Hebrew 4 Sep 85 p 58

[Interview with Brig Gen Oded Tira, Artillery Corps Chief, by 'Aran Shenkar and Baruth Ron: "The Best Artillery Corps in the World"; date and place not specified]

[Question] Is our artillery still a threat deep within Lebanese and Syrian territory?

[Answer] Our guns are a threat 30 kilometers in depth.

[Question] What is happening today in Syria's artillery corps?

[Answer] The Syrians have, over the last few years, made significant, quantitative improvements in the number of mobile artillery guns, which are better than the ones towed by their mobile tactical force, in terms of staying power and firing time. It is possible that there has also been a change in the types of guns they have. Even so, most of the guns are towed, in keeping with the Soviet style: an emphasis on quantity not quality.

[Question] What about them? What is the situation in the rest of the Arab countries?

[Answer] The Egyptians and Jordanians work with western concepts. Both countries receive supplies from the United States and their guns, therefore, are much like ours. Egypt even purchases guns from the same factories as Israel... As for the rest of the countries, Saudi Arabia is the one we should be concerned with. The Saudia have easy access to all the western countries, and therefore have at their disposal today the newest French G.C.T. guns with firing capacity of 3 shots in 15 seconds, in other words, 12 shots a minute! The Iraqis, too, have western-made, long-range guns. In any event, in all the Arab countries, the speed of fire power has increased and range has not changed.

[Question] From a realistic point of view, which is the best artillery corps in the Middle East today?

[Answer] Ours, because it is extremely mobile and based on 155-175 millimeter guns. These are optimal diameters in terms on the ratio of fire power to distance.

[Question] As this chapter in the war comes to a close, do you feel that in your corps today, the soldiers need to get Lebanon out of their systems?

[Answer] Most, if not all, of our soldiers were in Lebanon. It was for us a mission like any mission, and we managed to adapt ourselves to its conditions extremely well. During our stay in Lebanon, I personally, and with me my field officers, tended to be in the field for long periods of time, often nights and week-ends. We opened discussions with the soldiers, conducted tours and participated in artillery missions. We wanted to show that an army is supposed to carry out missions, even if it has not been trained for them ahead of time, in the best way possible.

On the other hand, the war had an influence on the ability to build the force and on the daily routine. It should be emphasized that the war did not harm our operational ability. Were we beaten down? Yes, to a degree. From now on, we can go back to organized maneuvers, regular training, and to our efforts to improve our battle skills. At the same time, our operational readiness will be preserved.

[Question] Do you fire less shots during maneuvers now?

[Answer] Yes, and we use simulation a lot more. The simulators are good at all levels, and they are particularly important at the basic level. We have not affected the overall framework of maneuvers. We made every effort to avoid the creation of situation wherein certain groups within the system did not train at all. As a result, there are levels of training that receive more emphasis today than in the past, like the crew.

[Question] What cutbacks will be made in your corps?

[Answer] We are trying to cut only reversible items, those which can be reinstated in a short or reasonable time frame. Any factor without which we would likely find ourselves handicapped in the future, if we were to give it up today, cannot be cut. I have every hope that all our departments will be continued. At the moment, there are still issues under consideration. Manpower has not been cut back. I would like at the point to quote the chief of staff, who often says: "Before we light a bonfire with a single match, we must prepare the twigs, the paper and the gasoline, to ensure a good blaze."

[Question] Today, more than a year since the establishment of the field corps command, your umbrella organization, how does its performance impress you? Was it necessary?

[Answer] Definitely. The field corps command today is an important reality. It understands the needs of the attack force well. The field corps command is preparing a battle statement, establishing priorities in the areas of equipment and development, building units in correct proportions, with a multi-corps perspective, and training and preparing them according to the IDF's needs. The establishment of the command also contributed to increased multi-corps maneuvers and training. The field corps command's commander emphasizes that every first officer in the corps is capable of doing things on his own.

[Question] Is there collective pride in the corps?

[Answer] And how. We always go to great lengths to emphasize the importance of the unit to the soldiers. When President Hertzog visited the corps he said that if the entire IDF was at the level of the artillery corps, he could sleep peacefully. The artillery corps, in the context of all land forces, reminded him of the air force and its role in the entire IDF. I agree with the comparison. The artillery network is far more complicated than tanks or personal weapons.

I do not believe in classroom lectures on the heritage of war. That is artificial. In my opinion, we must create a family atmosphere that will contribute to zeal and belonging. Therefore, for example every officer in the corps undergoes certain training before being placed in a unit, so that his placement is optimal. Also, I know all the officers personally.

[Question] Are there any motivational problems?

[Answer] Almost half the soldiers in the artillery corps today requested to be in the corps. The others ranked us as their second or third choice. Very few were forced into the corps and those that were acclimated very quickly after undergoing an artillery course. During my 2 years as head of the corps, only 10 soldiers have requested transfers--the majority to attack forces. I only allowed two to transfer.

[Question] Are career officers extending their tours of duty?

[Answer] After much effort, and long conversations we have succeeded in convincing most of those who were interested in leaving to stay. All the officer positions are filled. Today, I am working even with the United Kibbutz Movement and the National Kibbutz Movement to enlist additional career officers.

[Question] Last week you revealed that the number of colonels in the corps has been reduced. Why?

[Answer] When I said reduced, I meant that new officers had not been acquired to replace those who had left.

9811/13045
CSO: 4423/3

ISRAEL

IDF CHIEF OF STAFF MOSHE LEVI INTERVIEWED

Tel Aviv BAMAHAHE in Hebrew 4 Sep 85 pp 8-9, 54-55

[Interview with Chief of Staff Moshe Levi "Terrorism is Contemptible--The War on Terrorism is Complex, Methodological and Varied"; by Lt Col Avi Lavski and BAMAHAHE Deputy Editor Yosef Ergman: during early August]

[Text] [Question] Chief of Staff, there is a feeling in Israel that even in the privacy of their homes, people are not safe. There are murderers on the highways who endanger the lives of hitchhikers and hurt children. What does the army say about this? What should be done?

[Answer] First of all, I take exception to the veracity of the feeling you've described. I think we are very far from a situation wherein we cannot feel safe here. Of course, in the world in which we live, there are dangers, including life-threatening dangers, but there are very few instances where they appear to be beyond our level of tolerance. It is true that terrorist activities take place, and terrorist activity is part of our life. Often, they have tried to link terrorism with what Israel does or does not do, as if we were the cause of terrorism, or, as if terrorism is only our problem. Today, it is already clear to many peoples and countries throughout the world that terrorism is an international problem, part of the reality of life in this era. We need to live with it, and at the same time, struggle with it continuously. All in all, I believe that this is what we are doing.

[Question] In this regard and vis-a-vis the return of the terrorists in exchange for the three prisoners, are you for or against the death penalty for terrorists?

[Answer] There are two perspectives on the death penalty. One perspective is that of punishment: a man performed a premeditated, brutal act. Generally, the issue involves the death of another person, and the perpetrator deserves to be punished. The second perspective is more general, and to a certain degree may be considered the more material perspective: When the death penalty is imposed, does carrying it out become a deterrent. Can you say: We cut down a man's life, but by so doing, we have perhaps saved other lives. As I understand the statistics, from other countries, albeit under different circumstances, the death penalty has not been a real deterrent. The balance of crime did not change following the imposition--or revocation--of the death penalty. When punishing terrorists, the deterrent perspective must also be taken into consideration.

At this time, I do not want to get into the detailed benefits and limitations, nor into an evaluation of the regime and society in which we live, nor considerations about the personality and values of various terrorists. But it does appear to me that the disadvantages outweigh the benefits, and therefore, from the point of view of combatting terrorism, we do not need more than we can do today in the framework of the law. Even today, we can, according to existing laws, demand the death penalty. The person who makes the final decision is, of course, the court. I do not think anyone believes that the death penalty should be compulsory--for this or any other issue--without leaving the decision on sentencing to the consideration of the courts.

[Question] Are you in favor of expelling inciters?

[Answer] I think the point should be emphasized: We often say that we need to combat terrorism, whenever and wherever it occurs, but when it does come time to wage this war at one stage or another, often we hold back. When do we wake up again? After an incident or a series of more serious incidents. Then, everyone immediately decides to make every effort to root out the offender. Only a short time passes and you see that the decision was on paper only. Aggressive statements were made following the hijacking of the TWA plane. As soon as the problem was resolved, once again other considerations were voiced--"It is not good to take revenge, we have too much to lose, etc." And suddenly, the hard line softens, I'm sorry to say, until the next incident. They must understand that when a decision is made to combat terrorism, it must be an all out war--and because terrorism is contemptible and does not follow the rules of any fair, acceptable game, the war against it must be very complex, methodological and varied. There is no simple route, no one step, that can end terrorism. Getting back to your question--the steps we take must be first geared toward preventing terrorism. The best achievement in the war against terrorism is not that after a blow we strike back with a blow that is 10 times heavier. The achievement lies in successfully preventing the blow. This is accomplished through preventative, deterrent measures. On both those levels, if you take someone who has committed a terrorist act and influenced others to do the same, and you send him away, thereby calming the atmosphere, you have the basis of prevention. Because those who do live here--even those who lend their hand in terrorist activities--want to continue living here. When you tell someone who is involved in terrorism that he will not be able to live here anymore--that is a deterrent, and it falls into place with the two factors I mentioned earlier--prevention and deterrence. There is no moral problem in this approach. To the contrary, it is perfectly moral to say to someone--if you want to live here with us, do not hurt us. Do not put bombs in the streets.

[Question] Can you outline more concretely what, in your opinion, are the steps that should be taken in the war against terrorism?

[Answer] We must talk less and act more. We are taking all the necessary steps, from attacks on terrorist centers to steps for preventing weapons from being brought into the country. In this vein, I should note the activity of the Navy, which, despite the length of our coastal border and the difficulties inherent in sealing it, has succeeded in catching terrorist ships from the west, and from the north. We can only hypothesize what might have happened if the people on those boats, who blatantly declared themselves terrorists, had reached their

destinations. The fact that we successfully deterred them is an achievement in the war against terrorism. It is a pity, however, that there are countries like Algeria where people openly declare their affiliation with terrorist organizations and receive support and backing instead of being thrown in jail.

[Question] Chief of Staff, we are in the midst of a period of cutbacks. What, in your opinion, will the IDF look like when the planned cutbacks are implemented? What kind of army will we have?

[Answer] The question about the army's appearance is not just related to cutbacks. An army should always appear to be ready to act as it must in the next war. Two components should be integrated here: the operational aspect and technological ability. It is no simple matter to define the future battlefield. The army is a function of new developments, and the changes in this field occur very quickly, sometimes even drastically. An evaluation of the situation, from a military perspective and according to other perspectives which also influence it, must be dynamic. A long-term evaluation is problematic. Only after we establish the parameters of the battlefield with which we will have to deal in the future can we backtrack and ask ourselves how we can contend with it. Here, we encounter two problems--one, that we are not dealing with academic questions. In other words, if you build some kind of model, it would take 5 or 6 years before you could put it into action. There is also the problem of constant readiness. The enemy harasses you constantly and does not allow you time out to reorganize at your leisure, with an eye toward the future. He is training all the time, waiting for an opportunity to strike at you--and you cannot give him that opportunity. The second problem is to what degree you have in your power the ability to implement that which you have set out to do, to fulfill the scenario you sketched. And if you cannot, you have to decide what to relinquish. And if you relinquish something, you must do it carefully, so that the overall goal you wanted to achieve will remain intact.

Perhaps the most important thing that can be said about the future battlefield is the need to ensure maximum tactical ability. Our problem is to find technological answers and operations that will allow us this tactical ability. To ensure maximum tactical ability, you have to worry about the overall integration of all the different branches and divisions. Each body--on land, in the air, at sea--has its advantages and shortcomings. We must create a situation wherein all the advantages can be concentrated in order to exploit them in a given situation. Sometimes, it is our air power that will solve the problem; at other times, it will be a land operation that facilitates the air strategy; and naval operations can also have various implications. I do not want to expand further, but that is the principle. Therefore, and I return to the question of cutbacks, the problem is how to give something up today without harming, in the end, the plan we hope to achieve in the future.

[Question] Chief of Staff, how many career officers were let go in the last year? How many more will be let go, and in which sectors?

[Answer] The numbers, to my mind, have no significance. Every man we needed and wanted in service, to whom we had to say, "Excuse me, go home"--each means the world to us. We will reach a number of between 2,000 and 3,000 men, and I want to say, with full authority, that we need the majority of them. But, if

we continue to hold on to them and maintain the scope of the force as it is today, the situation may be better now, but all of our futures will be endangered because of the economic situation we have fallen into in Israel, from which we must extract ourselves even at the cost of painful amputations. Of course it is difficult. The difficulty is personal and communal. You run a division and suddenly, due to circumstances, you are asked to run it with a different scope of staff, which the rest of the experts have determined is the right scope. How do you explain this to people? The explanation you offer is that the goals and missions of the IDF must come before the personal difficulties involved.

[Question] In which sectors will people be let go?

[Answer] There are many sectors. First of all, there will be cutbacks in the overall scope of things. In other words what you do today you will do with fewer people tomorrow. We are also eliminating entire functions, which we cannot allow ourselves today. All in all, there is no area that will not be touched. We are even cutting back in places that will arouse astonishment. For example, if I must decide how many pilots I can support, I must take into consideration not only the largest possible number of people that I can use, but also that these pilots must be at a very high level. I cannot compromise on a level that is anything less than very good. Then, in order to train them, I have to put them in flight, and flight time costs money, and my money is limited. Therefore, I will also cut the number of pilots, ensuring that those who remain will be at a level appropriate for our needs.

[Question] There have recently been rumors about a new policy for appointing very senior officers, for example, at the brigadier general level. Is there any truth in these rumors?

[Answer] There is no new policy. The number of people carrying senior rank is a function of the jobs they fill. One must decide if there is room for this function or not. If we want to return to the scope of the army as it was in 1948, we would implement the scope of functions that existed at that time. In the last 2 years, for example, we debated how to sustain, within the military network, people with first class technological ability. I convened what was called a "Debate of Academic Tracks." We cannot say, "Technology is in our soul," and then go to sleep. If indeed technology is in our soul, then we need people who know how to develop, support and extrapolate what is required from the technological systems. These are people like everyone else, and if they are offered a lot on the outside, then I need to ask myself what would make them stay in the army. And the answer in my opinion is, first of all, that these people must feel that they are part of a network the goal of which is to ensure the survival of the State of Israel. It is the feeling of mission, without quotation marks. We give them responsibility, the freedom to work and the feeling that we recognize the importance of the job they are performing. One way of expressing our recognition of the importance of a function in the army is rank. I really dislike all this talk about how many officers there are at this rank and that rank today and how many there were in the past. I can say with authority that there are far more people today in senior positions that leave the service than before, and some of them I regret, because they are not

leaving due to the fact that they are not needed, but rather because we have to make cutbacks in the overall size of the regular army.

[Question] Since you have mentioned the officers who have recently left the army, there are stories about large number of senior officers, colonels and brigadier generals, who today are having difficulty finding work. Are these facts known to day and, if so, what is the army doing to ensure an honorable discharge from the service?

[Answer] The stories, I am sorry to say, are known to me. And I cannot even say that this is happening because the situation today in Israel is more difficult than in the past. I think there is a different reason, which is that there is less esteem today then in the past for those who gave the best years of their lives to serve in the IDF.

We are working on the problem. I do not think we are doing enough. We are preparing these people for their departure into another lifestyle, but it is not entirely dependent on us. There are some things that must be done, even if it is by fiat. It cannot be that in government office, advancement will not be granted career army people. The opposite is true today. In many places, the "first right of refusal" is reserved for former army officers. This involves not only personal implications, vis-a-vis the person who is being hurt, but broader implications as well. We want to attract the best people into the army. But people can ask themselves--why should I tie my future up with them if this is the way society treats people who remain in the army for a long time?

[Question] How do you explain the "right of refusal?" Has the army suffered a lost of prestige in the eyes of the public?

[Answer] Today, there is, more than ever before, a certain contempt of army people. Part of this contempt is our fault, but most of it comes from an incomprehensible brainwashing. The army now, and in the past, implied certain expectations about its behavior as a body. And these perceptions were such that one might have reached a conclusion that perhaps there was something reprehensible. But this was true in only a few cases. The ability to distinguish between one group of people and another, as opposed to negating the whole, is lacking. Therefore, criticism--which I welcome--leveled against certain people and phenomena in the the army, led to the feeling of contempt toward the entire army. There is also, therefore, a situation today where in the battle being waged to heal the Israeli economy, the military's requirements--which are truly great, but are certainly necessary for survival--are being presented as a stumbling block in the path to a healthy economy. I feel that it is no mere coincidence that such claims are never voiced by workers or labor organizations, i.e. by those who suffer the most from the steps being taken today. These people have a healthy enough perspective to understand that there is no point in losing security, even if this means lowering their salaries by a few points.

[Question] In light of what you are saying, does the army perhaps feel the need to do something to improve its image in the public eye?

[Answer] The army can do the only thing in its power to improve its image--and that is to be all right. I think if the army is all right, if it succeeds in its missions, if it behaves itself, the rest will fall into place. In the final analysis, we are acting appropriately. But we must reach a situation wherein we will be able to say with confidence that each time we spend a single shekel, or each time a man is called into service today, it will be based on careful consideration and real need. We do not need to do anything in order to look good. We simply have to correct that which requires correction within our ranks--and that is what to correct. Then, those areas where we are all right will rise to the surface and be as strong as a solid rock.

[Question] Lebanon is behind us...

[Answer] Lebanon is to our north, not behind us.

[Question] The Peace for Galilee War is behind us. What are the lessons we learned from it?

[Answer] I repeat what I just said, because that is indeed the answer: Lebanon is to our north. Lebanon will remain there and we have not cut ourselves off from it. Terrorism is still threatening us from within Lebanon. Despite the lull, for which I am thankful, I would not say there we have solved the problem. The problem does not depend on us. It depends on Lebanon, on the atmosphere there, on the type of government, on internal conflicts, on Syria, which might attack through Lebanon. We must therefore continue to protect our northern border from terrorism, unless we want to be cut off from Lebanon by completely withdrawing from that sector.

[Question] Can you give us details on the IDF's policy for entering the security strip?

[Answer] I do not know what you call the "security strip." The correct expression is "security area." Strip sounds like something narrow and defined, with a homogeneous character, which is not so in our case. In Lebanon, we need a security area, because there is no real government in Lebanon. We do not need a security area in the Golan Heights. There are plans for demilitarization because there is no terrorism there and there is a government controlling the territory. In other words, wherever there is a proper government that can react responsibly to that which is happening within its borders--we don't need a security area. In Lebanon, there is none. There is no central government, no local government. Lebanon is still to our north. We have settlements and people living on the border now, and we must give them security. According to our evaluations, there are two elements: I mentioned flexibility before. The second basic element is to establish a buffer zone of sorts, not necessarily a desolate area, but, to the contrary, a living area with a population that resides there in peace, an area in which, like everywhere in Lebanon, there are local military forces that concern themselves with and worry about peace. If they worry about their own peace, we can assume that we will have peace, too, and that we will not have to activate a military force. These local forces rely on the IDF and what the media call "IDF backing."

If we do have advance knowledge about a group planning to enter Metula, I do not think it would be smart to sit with our arms crossed and not see to it that there was something planned to prevent the action. This means that you do not wait in Metula, and when the group presents itself at the local council offices, you begin to deal with the issue. We must be prepared ahead of time, and this may mean overseeing the group's movements, even preventing its arrival. If there is no Lebanese intervention, there must be IDF intervention. The best situation would be that the local force would be strong enough to perform these activities on its own, but it must have some support, because all of the other forces in Lebanon have such support, from external, central sources. You cannot leave only the local forces without any backing.

[Question] This brings us to the question: At what pace is the Southern Lebanese Army building up its forces?

[Answer] We do not want to bring the Southern Lebanese Army to the same level as our Golani or Giv'ati units. The Lebanese force should be at an appropriate level given the situations they face. If in some village civil watch forces rise up and say: "Friends, we live here and we want to continue to live here in peace," and they understand that if there is no peace, they will be the first to be hurt, and they are willing therefore to guard the peace themselves--for me, that is enough. I always use al-Khiyam as an example: a village of 10,000 people that had become a ghost town because of all the military activity within its limits. The people just could not go on living there. Today, al-Khiyam is alive and full of people. The town has no problems with us and we have no problems with them. If in al-Khiyam there are three people who know how to make sure that no strangers arrive in or around town who might try to harm us--for me, that is enough. If there are 1,000 people there who cannot perform this function, then these 10,000 are worth nothing to me. The objective is not scope or size, but the establishment of ties with the places in which they live and the establishment of a situation wherein they can live in peace.

Thus, the issue is not just the Southern Lebanese Army, but in general the local forces which ensure peace, with, of course, an appropriate intelligence network and other methods, because we want to get away from stereotypes. As for the Southern Lebanese Army, obviously if there were two units, it would be stronger than with only one unit.

[Question] Are you pleased with the prevailing situation today on our northern border?

[Answer] I think the situation today is good. To a certain degree, it is better than the expectations we had previous to the reevaluation. But, it is still not a stable situation, because the foundations in Lebanon are not stable. For us, it is an ongoing test, with over-changing conditions. Also, the situation is not the same in all sectors of the security area or the entire depth of the security area. It will continue to be this way, fluid and subject to change, as long as it is not dependent only on what we and the Southern Lebanese Army do, but on all kinds of other factors.

[Question] Chief of Staff, in summation, what prayer would you say for the IDF soldiers?

[Answer] My prayer is first for a good year. It is a very old prayer but very appropriate. What is good in the coming year will be determined individually by each man according to his desires. For all of us, I pray that this will be the year that we learn to understand more about the basis of our existence in Israel, that which threatens our existence and wiser, better ways on which to base our existence and make it work, so that we might become a source of strength not only for those living in Israel but for world Jewry.

9811/13045

CSO: 4423/3

ISRAEL

INTERVIEW WITH PLO OFFICIAL SABRI JIRYIS

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 16 Aug 85 Weekend Magazine pp 6-8, 32, 43

[Article by Ofra Yeshu'a Leit: "The PLO: Flesh and Blood"]

[Text] He is a sworn opponent of terror and every act of violence and is therefore considered a traitor by the rejection front. Sabri Jiryis, a native of the village of Fassuta in the Galilee, a graduate of the Hebrew University and a former lawyer in Haifa, and today director in Cyprus of the PLO Institute for Palestinian studies, is disappointed with Arab policy and is working for treaties of mutual recognition, peace and cooperation with Israel. In an interview with MA'ARIV's correspondent in Bonn, he agreed to give frank answers to all questions and claims about his organization that are of concern to many Israelis. He says: "Don't be suspicious. Keeping the peace is also in our interest and for our good."

I met him near Bonn after a meeting with Israeli Knesset members and on the eve of a seminar on European-Palestinian relations. He was in the company of Israeli Arabs and West Bank residents, a speaker of Hebrew, and I asked him if he was by any chance from Ramallah. "I am PLO," he answered with a mixture of victory and bitterness, waiting contemptuously to see if I would jump for cover. The man does not smile readily. Sabri Jiryis, in fact, came to talk with Israelis--and undoubtedly that is part of his mission as a senior member of the special staff established in the upper echelons of his organization for such contacts--but that does not mean that he devotes himself to it easily.

The essence of his work at the head of the "Institute for Palestinian Studies"--formerly in Beirut, now in Cyprus--he defines as "research and publication of material that is not straight information or propaganda, but a bit heavier." Officially he is the PLO director on the island, very close to the top, but, by personal choice, does not hold any official position in the leadership. What he says are his own personal positions, he emphasizes. In his organization he is also known as the "little Abu Musa" (to distinguish him from the "big" leader of the rejection front). A few years ago he published a courageous article calling on the Palestinians to recognize Israel, to reconcile themselves to her existence and to assure themselves a state in a part of the Land of Israel.

In Israel the importance of his institute is appreciated. In September 1982, during the course of the IDF's 10-day rule of West Beirut, the institute's archives were confiscated, with all its books and equipment, and taken to Israel. This was described in Israeli newspapers as "an important intelligence coup." The entire collection--32 tons of documents and 20,000 books--were given back to Jiryis a year later as part of the package deal exchanging Israeli prisoners for the detainees in the Ansar camp. "Not a single page was missing," he assures me and adds proudly, "I told them not to worry about sending me the office equipment, we have enough money to buy everything new."

A few weeks after the capture of his institute Jiryis also suffered a heavy personal blow. In March 1983 a booby-trapped car destroyed an entire wing in the building where they were trying to rebuild the empty institute. "Nothing at all happened to me, I was on the other side. But my wife was there and was killed on the spot. I ran over there and saw her crushed. My secretary lost a leg," he says quietly.

He is outwardly strong. The bombers were, in his words: "The same wing of the Phalange that always worked with the Israelis. They were the ones also responsible for Sabra and Shatila." Since then he has been raising his motherless children alone, Fayha, today a 12-year old girl, and Musa, a boy of 8. The grandmother from the village in the Galilee also comes occasionally to Cyprus to see her grandchildren and take care of them.

When some of the ice was broken during the course of conversations that we held over a period of 3 days, he allowed himself to say a few words about his dead wife Hani, about the void that was left behind. He spoke about sadness, about yearning, about dreams, but immediately reconsidered and added forcefully that "these personal matters are not intended for the paper." He did not forget to stress that again when we separated the next day.

Sabri Jiryis was born in Fassuta in the Galilee in 1938 and was the first in his Arab-Christian village to go for academic studies, at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, of course. His future wife was also the first girl in the village to take the bold step of university training. "Our village elders said: This boy and this girl have to get married so that there won't be trouble. In the end, that's what happened."

He studied law and was one of the heads of the "Land" movement. When the Ministry of the Interior refused to grant the movement the status of an official club, he appealed to the Hight Court of Justice. The high court rejected the appeal in a landmark decision that held, among other things, that "no administration can be asked, on the grounds of freedom of assembly, to put its stamp of approval on the establishment of a fifth column within the country's borders." After detentions "here and there," exiles and prohibitions against leaving his village, he found a respectable, comfortable position as a certified attorney in the office of a friend of the family in Haifa. "I know you Israelis," he says at a certain point. "I know your psychological hang-ups. After all, I am one of your products."

In 1970 he traveled to Europe with his wife on an Israeli passport and never came back. "I left of my own free will. No one caused me difficulty and no one chased me out. I got fed up with seeing Israelis. I was pleased at how the Palestinian movement rose again after 1967, and I thought it was shameful for them to be working and I not be with them." He had no trouble getting to Beirut: "At that time the world was still full of terrorists".

He was accepted into the PLO with open arms. His articles and publications had made him famous. At that point he began to switch passports on an assembly line basis--a Yemeni passport, a Libyan, a Lebanese, a Cypriot. The only one he did not want was a Jordanian passport: "The Jordanians only give passports to those who ask for citizenship. I don't want Jordanian citizenship. I want citizenship in my own country, Palestine."

The dark glasses that he never takes off, the solid brown suit with the matching tie--everything fits the hostile image of a man at the top of an organization considered to be the number one enemy of the Jewish state. Sabri Jiryis did not even try to be pleasant in our first meeting. He does not see the need that several of his PLO friends do when meeting for the first time with Israelis--of showering us with smiles and good will. He is as suspicious of our declared intentions of peace as we are of him and his organization.

He stresses that he holds no political position whatever in the PLO's large and conflict-ridden organization. His senior mission is operational. The man is considered an authority on Israel: Israeli newspapers land on his desk the day after they are published. When necessary he will lift up the telephone and call Tel Aviv or Jerusalem to clarify the precise state of affairs. "I speak only for myself as a private individual. But remember that I belong to the mainstream of the PLO that supports Arafat's line and that I never belonged to the opposition." That definition takes on particular significance when we consider the bitter fate of his good friend 'Isam Sartawi.

He speaks openly, as if neither he nor his organization has anything to lose. He is unequivocal (in fluent Hebrew, of course) and caustic in his statements.

I say that in my eyes he is a terrorist and will be presented as such to the readers. He is not insulted: "As far as I am concerned, call me a terrorist. Among our people when we need a term of contempt for a very bad person, we say 'Zionist.' That is the biggest curse we have. But what importance do words have? I define myself as a Palestinian Arab working for his people."

[Question] When that activity includes murder of innocent citizens, of women and children, and other other violent acts...

[Answer] "I don't know why not. You can call it violence, I won't get angry. In this modern world it is a very established concept. I see no difference between the use of violence and force on the part of the IDF and our use of force. The difference is that you have planes and marines and we don't. That is, we have some planes, but they don't operate the way they should."

[Question] Did you yourself ever participate in a terrorist act?

[Answer] In 1976 I asked to be drafted in the course of the war against the Lebanese, but they didn't want me. We have a large surplus of young men. It is a real demographic problem. Anyone over 30 isn't needed."

[Answer] Aren't you very active in assisting various terrorist organizations in Europe and throughout the world...

[Answer] Yes, there are those among us who believe in world revolution. Most of them today are in the rejection front. I never believed in that kind of revolution. Even while I was in "The Land" we had arguments with the Communists. In the PLO today we have a heterogeneous mix of opinions--perhaps like in the Indian Congress Party. But under 'Arafat's leadership today, the line is moderate and for political activity".

[Question] But you actually admit that terror in the Middle East and throughout the world has done you no good. Do your friends also recognize today that the violence was superfluous?

[Answer] That is an unfair, leading question. Go back 20 years: the Palestinians had begun to disappear as a people. The state was swallowed up, divided between Israel and Jordan. The Palestinian question had even begun to disappear from UN documents, which at least in the fifties still bothered to deal with the 'refugee question.". The founders of the Fatah organization in 1964 understood that there was no way to get back on the agenda other than through the use of force".

[Question] But you only used that force against Israel, and you never dreamed of asking for independence for the West Bank while it was still under Jordanian rule...

[Answer] That is the impertinent thesis that Israelis are always putting forward. It isn't true! Dozens of small, ephemeral Palestinian organizations were active in Jordan. They were suppressed with an iron fist. The greatest stroke of good fortune ever to befall us was the 1967 war when 'Abd-al-Nasir got caught up in it by mistake and dragged Husayn in along with him. For us, the Palestinians, the Israeli conquest was salvation, a gift from heaven. It was also Israel's greatest historical mistake because at one fell swoop the Palestinians were back on the map. For my part, you can make more wars like that, like in Lebanon, for example. Good luck with them! After June 1967, all the Arabs suddenly supported us. They were beaten, felt deeply insulted and wanted to avenge their honor. We, the Palestinians, were the "spearhead" of the Arab world. From an underground movement that barely kept its head above water in Jordan, Fatah, after the war, became an open movement of national liberation. Organizations sprang up like mushrooms. Now there is no turning back.

At first we made good use of the support of the Arab countries, but afterwards we became embroiled in controversies with them, one by one. At first it was 'Abd-al-Nasir, then Husayn, then the Lebanese, today the Syrians. All of that happened because there is a basic conflict of interests between us and

them. They want things that we have no interest in. For them war with Israel is connected to their internal need for stability of their regimes.

Only leaders of vision can see over the long range and understand that if the Palestinians can solve their problems, it would benefit them, too, in the final analysis. Egypt, for instance, truly wants that kind of solution today. Mubarak has a clear view of the need to solve the Palestinian problem."

[Question] Suddenly Egypt is OK? Have you forgotten how you fought Sadat when he first wanted to break the cycle of violence in the region?

[Answer] Sadat was an ass! I don't have words to express my scorn for Sadat. The day he traveled to Jerusalem was the blackest day of my life. He simply tossed us aside, left us alone to take care of his own concerns. He thought that he was a little pharaoh and stabbed Arab interests in the back."

[Question] You isolated him. Why didn't you join him?

[Answer] He didn't want us to! He didn't even ask. Your smart people who negotiated with him told him: We are prepared to give you everything, but we don't want the Palestinians or the others. Then he thought that he was real smart, too, when, in fact, he was a big fool and fell in the trap you laid for him. We were raving mad. We were very happy when they did away with him. To this day the Egyptians are paying for the fact that Sadat thought he could act like an emperor. The Arab boycott has left its mark. Look at poor Mubarak who has to go to Washington on his knees to beg for handouts--what is he, an Israeli? The Arab world has plenty of money. They can buy a quantity of America. He could get billions from the Arab countries..."

[Question] Countries that didn't help Egypt when she was in desperate straits after the Yom Kippur War...

[Answer] It was all because Sadat was so corrupt. He got billions and squandered them. Had he only waited a little after the October war, he could have started a peace initiative with the entire Arab world behind him."

[Answer] How can you talk of a peace initiative when you swear by the Palestinian pact that calls for the destruction of Israel?

[Answer] That is not true. I have a score to settle with Professor Yehoshafat Harkavi on the matter of the Palestinian pact. He is entirely wrong about it and is misleading all of you."

[Question] Harkavi visited here recently and said that with all his good will as a man from the peace camp, he does not see in you any change or deviation from the pact.

[Answer] The pact has undergone many important amendments. The first amendment was as early as 1964 and was the draft that the Israelis didn't like because it spoke of a 'secular democratic state.' But you have to understand that that was a very important breakthrough after the draft calling for the removal of all the Jews or of all those who arrived after a certain year.

Then, for the first time, we actually recognized the right of the Jews to live in Palestine."

[Question] Thank you very much...

[Answer] That was only the first step. After October 1974 a 10-point interim program was prepared. It called for the establishment of a national Palestinian authority over any part that Israel evacuated. What does that mean: the beginning of recognition of the principle of partition which we had never before recognized."".

[Answer] To us it seems more like a decision to set up a bridgehead from which you would scramble to annihilate the State of Israel, your basic desire...

[Question] As early as 1977 we mention an independent state in Palestine. We established and officially recognized the principle of partition--though, of course, in our own way. That was a decision of the Palestinian national council. We went so far in the way of concessions that we agreed to the peace program drafted by the Arab states in Fes, calling for recognition of Israel without mentioning her by name--i.e., for peace with 'all the states of the region.' Recently we even broke the last 'taboo' that forbids us to sit and talk with the Jews by signing an agreement with the king (Husayn) that permits him to hold discussions with Israel.

All of these amendments are important, serious amendments of the pact. We have broken down a very considerable portion of the one-sided thinking upon which the pact was based. Half of the paragraphs of the pact have lost their force because of decisions of the Palestinian national council, which is the deciding body. We have yet to publish the decision of the council in public."

[Question] It would be more persuasive if you would really change and update the pact. The fact that you don't do that, and the original pact calling for the annihilation of Israel is still in force...

[Answer] According to the legislation there has to be a special session to make such amendments, and there has to be a two-thirds majority. So instead of bringing them all together to debate and shout, we chose a more roundabout, practical way. It is very difficult to pass these things. But so what, have Herut and the Likud expunged all their statements about the 'whole Land of Israel'? Or about the other bank of the Jordan?"

[Question] Why aren't your leaders willing to publicly announce their renunciation of the pact; what are all of your beautiful explanations worth?

[Answer] All of our leadership today is moderate--from 'Arafat through Abu-'Iyad and Abu-Sa'id, who is Khalid Abu Hasan whom you saw here yourself. Abu Nidal, the little murderer who serves the Syrians, has claimed since 1974 that the Palestinain national movement is 'rotten,' that it became too moderate."

[Question] You really do have a problem with your leadership. What can be done about the fact that 'Arafat is not the kind of person who inspires trust?

[Answer] I can understand that. For the time being we don't have any other leader. He had to make a lot of zigzags in the Arab world, not because he liked to, but because he had to. There are 18 Arab countries and each one wants something else from the Palestinians. The turnabouts in the Palestinian national movement are expressed in his personality more than in any other person. On the other hand, 'Arafat is the man who brought this movement from a position of chronic rejection to the point where today he wants an agreement and a national solution to the Palestinian problem and to live alongside Israel."

[Answer] Then let him say so! Who is stopping him from recognizing Israel if he wants to so badly?

[Answer] How can he? If 'Arafat were to come out tomorrow with a declaration that he recognizes Israel, you would kick him and say: Very nice, you have finally grasped that we have a country here, now you can go to hell. What do you want? Should we say we love you? How impertinent you are to ask that we jump in alone and recognize the Zionist movement without your recognizing our national movement! How can you dare to ask that when you are not even prepared to talk to us and see if we can come to an agreement? We will recognize you if you recognize us. Recognition is like marriage, like love. It has to come at the end. We ask that you talk with us, that is all. Direct negotiation without preconditions--that has always been your line, hasn't it?

We want to solve the Palestinian question. Today Egypt and Jordan seem to us to be the countries offering the best option for a settlement. If time passes and we don't succeed with them, we will change positions again. We suggest that you enter negotiations with Husayn. What else? If again we don't succeed, what do you want us to do? Do you want us to cry? We will find a new way. Maybe we will go back to the Syrians, not out of love for the Syrians or out of a desire to distance ourselves from Husayn, but from purely political considerations that take our goals into account.

The problem is that you have no one with whom to talk. There is absolutely no one who is ready to deal with this matter: Shamir doesn't want to, Peres doesn't dare. It is very nice that Ora Namir met with Eimat Shaqur. But, to paraphrase Stalin, 'how many divisions does Namir have in Mapai?' First of all we'll see if she can even hold on to her party post after that meeting. Peres may want peace, but he is a big coward. Rabin was always a big enemy of Palestinian independence.

You want to talk to the Jordanians? Go ahead. You want a Jordanian delegation without PLO members? That you can get, too. But you don't want to talk at all, you don't want anything. And your big friends, the Americans, the biggest fools of this century, continue to help you. Continue that way with your stupid lobby in Washington. For my part, you will alienate Egypt completely from the peace process, and she will ultimately break relations with Israel. I will be very happy. Continue with what you are doing."

[Question] Don't you think you made a mistake when you vetoed the autonomy plan?

[nswer] I can't tell the residents of the territories how to settle their affairs with Israel, when I am not there. OK, one of these days we may have to give up our hope of returning to Haifa and Jaffa. But I still want to go to Shechem and Hebron one day. How can I agree to an arrangement made in my absence that may even close the West Bank to me?"

[Question] Even Israelis who are prepared to give up the territories on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip would not do so if they cannot be assured, with guarantees, that that would not be the beginning of a new Arab attempt to destroy Israel, and that the acts of terror would not be renewed by a wave of the hand from whoever would rule those strategic positions.

[Answer] What guarantees do you want to get before you start to talk? Of course an independent Palestinian state would also have international obligations. You could demand of such a state, which by our agreement would be a federated union with Jordan, what you have demanded at various times from Jordan and Lebanon--and it had better know how to stand by its agreements. In the final analysis, you would not be without salvation.

But why do you immediately think the worst? Maybe those agreements between us would bring about mutual cooperation and involvement in our daily lives and economy, and it would be in our interest to maintain the peace, for the benefit of our country?"

[Answer] You really know how to use pretty words. But it seems to me--and you may not want to admit it--that if there has been any change at all in your approach, it is only a result of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the expulsion of the Palestinians from Beirut...

[Answer] I myself have already written that in an article for the weekly FILASTIN. They were mad at me, but I explained in a very long article that without that war, we would not have gotten here. Not now. But I was writing years ago things similar to what the PLO is saying now, even though I was never in the opposition. I thought then that my friends were wrong about a lot of things. I called for more realism, for taking a realistic line. The people whom I was close to thought it was too early. The rejection people called me 'traitor.' Meanwhile things changed. What in the past was barely tolerable is today the official line. Today we are all traitors in the eyes of the rejection front--not just Sabri. We really did split from them, we helped them break off. We did not ask them to stay with us, and we were not prepared to give up the political approach. We dismantled our organization so that we would be able to talk to you. What more do you want?

I was 'Isam Sartawi's very good friend. But I opposed his private peace initiatives. In my opinion, he went too far, too soon. He spoiled the Israelis whom he met too much--Avneri, Peled, Arnon--and they did not deserve to be spoiled. Occasionally he came out with explosive declarations because they advised him that that was good for the public in Israel. But he should also have taken into account our public. Our public was unable to accept it. Today 'Arafat himself meets with the people who spoke then with Sartawi. 'Isam acted even then with Arafat's knowledge and approval. The general opinion in Fatah was: Let him try. We shall see what will be. But he was

influenced by Sadat, and thought that he himself could be a little Sadat and spoke very strongly about peace when that was not accepted in the Palestinian camp. In the end, Abu Nidal was incited by Syrian intelligence to kill him. It is interesting how many lines in your policy are exactly like the Syrian policy.

We did not take revenge on Abu Nidal for that murder, just as we did not react to the murder of Fahd Qawasimah. But they were our friends, and in my opinion we should have reacted. Our organization is beginning to be too moderate. Everybody talks about that terrible PLO, and it is so absorbed with politics that it doesn't even try to carry out actions in the field."

[Question] In Israele several horrible acts of murder were committed against young children recently, and the general opinion is that they were carried out by your people or those who want a membership card in the PLO.

[Answer] There are crazies everywhere. You have them, too. It is true that nowadays it is hard to join us, but that is not the way."

[Question] But isn't it a fact that you do not deny or denounce acts of murder, so why shouldn't we believe that they were done at your instance?

[Answer] What do you want, for us to denounce every act of murder or plunder committed against you? There were instances where we disassociated ourselves or said that it wasn't us. For instance in the case of the Israeli ambassador in London. But murders in the groves of Carmel? How are we to know what sick persons do these things? It is not our affair. True, we once had a policy of strikes. But our movement has matured meanwhile and gotten international recognition. We would not risk that. Meanwhile others do our work and we enjoy it. You have no idea how happy we are for you at what happened to you in Lebanon. We know all too well that terrible muddy swamp called Lebanon, which no one can get out of clean. You paid there a part of the price for what you did to us. I think about my wife, and then I see in the news what happened to you and feel a little better because there is justice in the world. What do you think, that the Shi'ites are so smart and act alone, by themselves? We trained them, we gave them weapons, even when they were still going to point them at us. Two years after that wise guy of yours Sharon said that the PLO infrastructure in Lebanon was destroyed, that infrastructure is flowering again among another people. In the Shi'ite resistance there is an important Palestinian element. Some of the actions--ambushes, attacks, etc--are done by Palestinians. These Palestinian actions will continue. Even if suicide car bombings are not really our style.

Now that you have already gotten yours in Lebanon, I am waiting for the moment in which our other big enemy, the Syrians, begin to suffer. The day will come when they come in to "establish order" in northern Lebanon and finally get a taste of what that cursed country is. The Christians are already causing problems, just help them a little and the second half of our sweet revenge will begin.

A good thing happened to us: We exchanged jobs with you in the Middle East. We finally learned the wisdom of those old bright Israelis who knew how to sit

tight and enjoy the mistakes of others. Look at our people: Wwe are investing enormous resources in education--like the Jews. There is no university in the world without Palestinian students. From Tokyo to Sao Paolo. Our academics, our businessmen, our free professionals manage the entire economy of the Middle East. We will have a problem when we have a state: Wwhat to do with all these intellectuals? A large portion of them, of course, will remain in the diaspora. But at least they will have a passport and an identity.

In the meantime, you, the Jews, have caught it from us. You have become illogical rejectionists. You have caught our rejectionism. You learned to say 'no' without thinking. That will hurt you just as it hurt us."

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CSO:4423/13

ISRAEL

MK EHUD OLMERT INTERVIEWED ON FUTURE OF HERUT

Tel Aviv KOTERET RASHIT in Hebrew 4 Sep 85 pp 10, 39

[Interview with MK Ehud Olmert by Nahum Barne'a: "Olmert Returns to Herut: Like New"; date not specified]

[Text] After 18 and a half years, the political exile of MK Ehud Olmert, age 40, ends. His faction, La'am, has been accepted into the Herut movement. It will not be long before he goes after the position of minister or mayor of Jerusalem. The internal politics of Herut will pull Olmert to the right, towards Tehiya and Kahana. His family and friends will pull him towards the center.

This political upheaval will not take up many pages in history books. As part of the process of gradually absorbing all the Likud components into Herut, Herut agreed this week, not very enthusiastically, to swallow La'am, and it is not yet known if La'am will join. The only significance of this action lies, apparently, in the door that it opens for MK Ehud Olmert to check out a possible position in a future branch of Herut. Olmert is completing a circle. At the age of 22, when he attacked Begin personally at a Herut meeting, the leader nicknamed him 'rug-biter.' Olmert went over to the free center of Shemu'el Tamir and to the assortment of short-lived groups within Likud. Now he is 40 and he prefers to cover himself with rugs rather than biting them. His participation in Herut strengthens the second generation Herut people who will support Arens in the struggle over Herut's future leadership.

[Question] What does Herut mean to you?

[Answer] For me Herut represents childhood memories. Jabotinski's legacy and Beytar where I came from and was educated: Sabbath gatherings at 11 in the morning where Ha'im Landau and Ya'qov Meridor would come to report on the state of the nation; my father, who was a Herut MK for two terms; the people whom I met at my house.

Herut is an emotional experience which made a great impression on me as a boy. Now I am more grown up in relation to it.

The Herut of today is not the Herut which I left 18 and a half years ago. It is completely different. To a great extent, it is a national movement. It reflects more accurately the demographic makeup of Israeli society. It is a movement whose positions on foreign policy issues are less ideological than they were and more in the realm of mottos although their content is the same.

[Question] In 1966 you stood up in a Herut convention and attacked Begin. This budding rebellion was crushed quickly.

[Answer] From a political perspective, I was what is called a realistic hawk. I agree with all the basic ideological assumptions of Herut, but I am more pragmatic in applying them than the more extremist factions there. I was not swept up by the slogan of the Free Center, 'a liberated territory must not be returned,' and I was also not swept up by Shemu'el Tamir when he supported territorial compromises within the framework of DASH. I am prepared for a compromise like that of unilateral autonomy.

[Question] Do you regret the problems you caused Menahem Begin in your younger years?

[Answer] If there is anything I truly regret, it is that I did not persist in bringing the matter of Gandi (Rehav'am Ze'evi) and me to court. I let him off the hook. It is true that I did not take back what I said about him. In essence, he capitulated. He put forth a legal claim and then withdrew it. I felt that I had made it public enough and that a court battle lasting 2 more years would be a waste of time. Now I believe I made a mistake. I should have fought harder in the area of demoralization. Later discoveries in this area taught me that I made a mistake.

Not To Move to the Right

[Question] Herut is really a leader's party. What happened to it after Begin went home?

[Answer] In my opinion, the waves made by Begin's retirement have not yet settled into a clear pattern. Everything that is happening now in Herut stems from the transition from the Begin era to a new one. I think that Herut is still a movement which longs for a strong and organized leadership, but it also needs an emotional consensus. At one time, it was completely embodied in the personality of one man. This is no longer the case. Inasmuch as we are moving farther away from Begin's period and insofar as the demographic composition of Herut is changing, a different political culture is rising. And since Begin has no replacement, there is a certain danger in the existence of this culture with respect to Herut's capacity to preserve its unity and its ability to function.

[Question] Do you still see Likud's 7 year tenure as a success story?

[Answer] In the area of foreign policy, yes. In Judaea and Samaria, yes. In another realm which is extremely important--the popularization of Israeli politics--yes.

[Question] Even in the Lebanon war? In the economy? In the culture of the government?

[Answer] From the point of view of its goals and its military logic, I still consider the war in Lebanon to be justified. Its tragedy lies in its contribution to the worsening of the split within the nation. It spread a wound within Israeli society.

[Question] You directed the celebration for Lisa Peretz.

[Answer] Lisa Peretz? As far as I know, that was legitimate. If I had to do it again, I would do the same thing. Perhaps you are referring to her mother.

[Question] What about her mother?

[Answer] When we presented her on television, we believed sincerely that her story was true. This case is one of those that the Chinese proverb applies to. Even if the story is not true, it is true. And this is so even if in this particular case, it turned out that she used her imagination to elaborate reality. Cases like these (of injustice to people because of their political views) exist, and in the majority of cases, they are on the part of the Alignment. Still, if I knew before the interview with Lisa's mother what I learned later, I would choose a more honest case.

I also remember the 1981 elections. With cunning and skill the Labor Party created the impression that some of its branches were attacked by grenades in attacks organized from above. I do not accept the argument that the split was created by one side alone. Whoever walked around with signs saying, "Begin is a murderer" and "Arik is a murderer" cannot deny all guilt.

[Question] The struggle over the leadership of Herut is going on between Sharon, Levy and Arens. Do you belong to one of those camps?

[Answer] I do have an inclination, but I have no intention of revealing it at this stage. It would be too early for one who just crossed the threshold into the Herut movement.

[Question] The group who are the children of the old Herutniks are mainly in Shamir's camp or in the Arens branch of the Shamir camp. Will you go with Dan Meridor, Uzi Landau and their friends?

[Answer] I have been friends with them for many years, but they are not the only friends I have in Herut. I have friends in other camps. In terms of my relationship to them, I feel comfortable in all the groups.

[Question] It is generally assumed that Herut is moving to the right. Its support comes mainly from the right, and this influences it to get closer to the extremist views of Tehiya and Kahana. How does this sit with you?

[Answer] In contrast to all the theories I have read recently in the papers, Herut's objective is not to move to the right but, rather, to strengthen its hold on the center and the moderate right. In the course of the next 10 years, the leadership of the country will be determined in the center. Kahana

or Tehiya will influence the division of positions of power within the right, but they will not determine its magnitude.

[Question] In other words, the Herut leader whom you will support will have to attract the center.

[Answer] At the moment, I do not want to deal with a personal question. But Herut has to attract that part of the population which will give it a firm base for governing. Begin understood that in order to get into power, he needed the merchants of ordinary Zionists. He was prepared to grant them amazing concessions in the area of representation, and this was politically very wise. Nowadays the liberals do not attract votes. But whoever wants to chase them out of Likud is making a big mistake. It is not good that Yitzhak Berman and Menahem Savidor and their group are no longer in Likud. Without them Likud will not retain power. Today we are barely in power because they left us.

[Question] Perhaps in order to be in power Herut needs the center, but in order to succeed within Herut, one has to play up to the right. Will you play up to the right or the center?

[Answer] During these recent months which were critical ones from the point of view of negotiations to enter Herut, I adopted clear stands on issues that are sensitive to Likud. I spoke out against clemency for the Jewish underground who are imprisoned, and I was the first in the Knesset to demand an investigation concerning the bus incident. It is hard for me to see myself as changing my mind. I have a problem. They are always saying about the MKs in the NRP that every Sabbath they meet in the synagogue with their constituents, and their constituents tell them what to do. I meet with my wife, my children, my friends, and they all pull me.

[Question] In which direction do they pull you?

[Answer] In the direction where I truly am.

9348/9312

CSO: 4423/5

ISRAEL

COMPUTER GRADUATES IN THE TERRITORIES UNEMPLOYED

Tel Aviv KOTERET RASHIT in Hebrew 21 Aug 85 pp 28-29

[Article by Ehud Shur]

[Text] Hundreds of youths trained in computers are not finding work in their field despite the great demand in Israel and the rest of the world. It is happening here--5 minutes from Kfar Saba.

Computers on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip

The slowdown in business activity in the economy influences all business sectors, but it would seem that the computer sector would be less affected. New companies are continuing to flourish, and computer operators are in demand even in companies whose main business is in another area but which use computers. The picture is different on the other side of the green line.

In Judea and Samaria (which Yuval Ne'eman, former science minister, called the 'Silicon Valley' of Israel) there are hundreds of people who are graduates of the computer sciences from the university or who have a diploma with some level of programming expertise who do not have work in their field. This is not a new situation. Even during the great boom in computers, when computer stores were sprouting like mushrooms after a rain in the green line area, and when companies were stealing programmers from each other, there were hundreds of Arabic-speaking programmers who were forced to work as waiters instead of in front of a computer. Perhaps this situation was not known by the companies who were looking for programmers, and maybe there is another reason, but by now the number of university graduates in the computer sciences has grown in Judaea, Samaria and in Gaza and there is no practical solution on the horizon.

The problem began when the Jordanian government legislated compulsory conscription, including among others every youth under the age of 26 who came to Jordan from Gaza. In the past it was customary for high school graduates to travel in droves to the Arab countries for the summer, either to complete their studies at universities or to find work in one of the Gulf states. The new law brought a halt at once to this phenomenon and posed a problem for talented youths who wanted to continue their studies and who were now prevented from doing so. The children of wealthy families could go to Europe

and to the United States, but the others had to remain here. In order to solve this problem at least in part, several universities were established in Judaea and Samaria and one in Gaza. Aside from the Islamic college in Hebron, which is actually an Islamic religious institution, there are six other post-high school institutions: al-Najah University in Nablus (supported by the al-Masri family), Bir Zayt University (supported by the Nasr family), the College of Science and Technology in Jerusalem which is actually in Abu-Dis, a new college in Bitonia (near Ramallah), Bayt Lahm University (supported and financed by the Vatican), and the Islamic College in Gaza (a religious university patterned after Bar-Ilan).

From a study carried out by the council for higher education in Ramallah, it appears that there are not enough places in existing institutions to meet the demand. We are talking about the needs of a population of about a million and a half people. Despite the fact that each institution is small compared to the institutions of higher learning in the green line areas, no one is talking about expanding. Every financier worries about losing his influence on the institution. And so there is no talk of combining departments in order to strengthen them, and the university administrations do not have the wherewithal to stand behind plans for expansion even if there are such plans. And the political situation has an effect. Apart from the internal political struggles which go on in the student unions of every university, there is an attempt to disperse the political danger. Thus, even when al-Najah University closes, studies at Abu-Dis go on as usual. This creates a situation whereby all the institutions are actually academic degree factories, and research goes by the wayside. A brilliant graduate in computer sciences in Jerusalem or at the Technion can go on to study for higher degrees or join the research staff of the department. In Judaea and Samaria, he is dumped immediately into the pool of those seeking work, and his chances of finding work in his field are virtually nil. This year there were 85 computer science graduates from the polytechnion at Abu-Dis. Perhaps 5 of them will find work in their field.

This may be a unique situation in the entire world: a substantial surplus of programmers and computer operators with no work whereas everywhere else they are crying out for programmers and there are none. The reasons for this are many and they are interesting in and of themselves. First of all, on the West Bank as in all of Jordan, there is no compulsory taxation, and where there is no tax base, the kind of financial activity which calls for computers is very limited. The main use for computers comes in centers of power which do not exist in Judaea and Samaria since everything is concentrated in the hands of the military government, the civil administration, and the banks. But all the banks which were operating before 1967 are paralyzed and only Israeli banks are functioning. This situation has brought about lots of cash transactions and a reduced need for banking services. For purposes of demonstration, the largest computer system in Israel is Bank Le'umi's computer. The users of the computer are large companies which manage their financial activities, payroll and accounts with the help of a computer. Such companies have not been established in the territories for various reasons. Thus, it has turned out that only one bank (in Gaza), two municipalities (one the municipality of Gaza), and about a dozen small companies make use of computers and need programmers to operate them. Another approximately 70 small factories use personal computers but do not need full-time programmers for them.

Immediate Solutions

The solutions under consideration are very few: emigration of programmers and the increased use of computers in Judaea, Samaria and Gaza (that is, use by Arab users because in the settlements there are already several computer schools in operation as well as branches of Israeli computer schools. Emigration of programmers and their families is almost impossible because of the severe limitations placed on the entry of Palestinians by many Arab countries. A Palestinian businessman who is a resident of Judaea and Samaria and who wants to visit Saudi Arabia for business reasons, for example, has to wait about 6 months for approval of an entry visa. And here we are speaking of an established businessman. It is safe to assume that a young person who is likely to emigrate eventually will be delayed indefinitely. Work opportunities abroad are open to youths who have studied abroad (usually they do not return here after the completion of their studies) and to a lesser degree to those who have studied at an institution which is recognized and supported by a U.S. academic institution such as Bir Zayt University.

The key to the second possibility, the increased use of computers among the Arab population in the territories, is entirely in the hands of the government and the military government. The mayors in most of the towns of Judaea and Samaria are appointed by the civil administration. Even if it were possible to convince the mayor of the urgency of the need for a computer for the orderly functioning of the town, the government would not be likely to rush into investing in a computer, at least given the current economic situation. Israeli residents who are used to getting computerized water bills and city taxes do not remember bills done by hand, but in Judaea and Samaria, tens of thousands of bills are still done by hand, only a part of the bills are handled, and, because they are not set up to do monthly billing, they get by with bi-monthly bills. With the rate of inflation at 27 percent a month, the loss is enormous. The municipality of Gaza has already mechanized its tax collection system (an accomplishment which took only 6 months compared to about 3 years that a similar project in Tel Aviv took). And the money saved due to the speeded up collection system and the payments linked to the day of payment covered the costs of installing a computer in half a year. Nablus, Janin and Hebron need big computer systems like the one in Gaza which occupies six programmers and operators, but the decision about installing a computer is up to the military rule.

Sources in the government told us that their attitude towards computerization in the towns is positive. It saves money, it is good for the town budgets and good for the residents. They said that the towns would be computerized. There is a problem in the process of computerization because a large percentage of the streets and neighborhoods are not numbered, but this can be solved as it was solved in Gaza.

The government also decided recently not to delay private factions which want to computerize their businesses. One of the institutions which is computerized on the West Bank is Bir Zayt University.

Another obvious solution is the establishment of work places in the territories by setting up progressive projects the way it was done in Israel by means of Israeli initiatives. The money for this activity must come from

abroad, but the severe oil crisis affects even Palestinians living in Saudi Arabia and in the Gulf States. For now they cannot afford to invest in new projects. Even old enterprises and institutions on the West Bank and on the Strip are running into problems because most of the support in the institutions in the territories does not come from Arab countries but from Palestinians living there.

A few months ago, a directive was put out by the White House to recruit primary capital by means of Jewish and Arab magrates in order to establish a solid financial base in the territories. One of the proposals presented to the group was to set up a branch in Judaea and Samaria for large U.S. computer companies. Since the cost of a programmer here is about \$5 an hour and in the United States it can be as high as \$35 an hour, the proposal could offer a good practical solution even though from an economic point of view the main profit would go to the United States (because the marketing and administration are there). There has been no response yet to this proposal and it seems to be dependent on the entire above initiative.

One solution proposed by Israelis is an association between Israeli companies and companies in the territories for the sake of export to Arab countries. A Jerusalem-based company just completed publication of a large Hebrew-Arabic dictionary and before that published a telephone directory in Arabic (for residents of Israel, Judaea, Samaria and Gaza). Theoretically, they should get computer work from the large Arab market and do it here with the use of unemployed computer workers. In fact, the idea is not practicable because it is hard for companies from the territories to operate in Arab countries and also because the Arab boycott necessitates proving that no Israelis are involved in the production of any product destined for Arab countries.

Who is Buying?

In Ramallah, there is one big computer company, Arab Computer Systems, owned by Hanna Jid'on (managed by his sons). The company has an agency for the sale of Hewlett-Packard computers in Judaea, Samaria and Gaza and a gentleman's agreement with computer and measurement systems (Hewlett-Packard agents in Israel) preventing competition elsewhere. The company also has distribution rights in Jordan and elsewhere for Televideo terminals and Anadex printers, but as has been said already, the marketing possibilities for Jordan are very limited. In an effort to relieve some of the employment pressure, the company has tried to market personal computers along with programmers, but this again is only a short-term solution.

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KUWAIT

NATION'S TRADE WITH SOVIET UNION DETAILED

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 11 Oct 85 p 11

[Article: "Millions of Dollars in Trade between Kuwait and the Soviet Union"]

[Text] A report by the official Soviet agency TASS revealed yesterday that the volume of trade between the Soviet Union and Kuwait came to about \$5 million in 1984.

In the report it was stated that Soviet exports to Kuwait consist basically of pipe, Kuwait's imports of which came to about US \$2 million. Lumber's share rose to approximately \$1 million.

The share of machinery, heavy equipment and means of transport assumed third place, totalling \$380,000, and cement totalled \$220,000. Household consumer goods came to \$200,000.

TASS stated that the Soviet Union for its part buys various goods, raw materials and traditional Kuwaiti export commodities. Contracts are signed with the Soviet Union's foreign companies and commercial institutions.

TASS said that the important area in the Soviet Union's relations with Algeria consists of the construction of irrigation projects, which are considered of maximum importance for the development of agriculture in Algeria, as well as the construction of irrigation dams, land reclamation and desalination.

Syria's exports to the Soviet Union are represented by textiles, perfumes and cosmetics.

The report stated that in the case of Egypt, the Soviet Union exported more than 7,000 Lada automobiles to that country in addition to Vaz 2107 and 2105 [cars], which constitute more than 51 percent of the share of total Soviet automobile imports to Egypt. Their value up to the end of 1984 came to about \$30 million.

The report did not address itself to commercial ties between the Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia, where the volume of trade, according to other official

reports, exceeded the volume of trade between the Soviet Union and Algeria last year.

It should be noted that a joint Arab-Soviet industrial-commercial committee came into being in the early eighties and that most Arab countries, including some Gulf Cooperation Council countries, have been taking part in it.

In 1983, this committee met in Moscow, where the participants in this symposium demanded that the Soviet Union's imports, especially of consumer goods, to the countries of the Arab Gulf region be increased; at the same time these import many consumer goods from other socialist countries.

11887
CSO: 4404/42

KUWAIT

COMPANIES ISSUE NEW SEMI-ANNUAL STATISTICS

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 8 Oct 85 p 14

[Article: "For the First Time in the History of Kuwait, Companies Issue Budgets Every 6 Months"]

[Text] An official source in the Kuwait securities market stated yesterday to AL-QABAS that most Kuwaiti companies registered in the Kuwait securities market have recently sent their semi-annual budgets to the market management in execution of the decree of the Kuwait securities market committee in this regard, for the first time in Kuwait's economic history.

The source said that the competent agencies in the market are diligently working to study and analyze these budgets now so that it will be feasible for them to disseminate information among the public after it has been analyzed in the manner and method observed in accordance with the rules in these cases, but that these budgets still have not been examined officially, although they have been approved by the companies' boards and overseen by the accounting office.

The official source asserted that the process of publishing this information on companies every 6 months is aimed at serving the transacting public and strengthening the process of market transactions as a result of the availability of adequate information on the true state of the companies' shares in circulation.

The budgets of five companies were issued yesterday. These are the Petroleum Investment, Telephone Communications, Pharmaceutical Industries, Livestock Transport and Trading and Kuwait Poultry [Companies].

Kuwait Poultry

From the Kuwait Poultry [Company] budget one may learn that the profits this company realized in the past 6 months of this year came to 2,095,000 Kuwaiti dinars, while per-share profitability came to 95 fils in the same period.

Stockholders' equity in this company rose from 14,119,000 dinars to 15,214,000 dinars, that is, an increase of 1,095,000 dinars.

Pharmaceutical Industries

It is apparent that the profits the Pharmaceutical Industries Company realized in the first 6 months of this year came to only 114,000 dinars, while per-share profitability was no greater than 17 fils in this period.

Shareholders' equity in the company on 30 June 1985 came to 5,239,000 dinars, an increase of 2,859,000 dinars over total equity for 1984.

Livestock Transport and Trading

The Livestock Transport and Trading Company realized profits of 3,225,000 dinars in the first 6 months of this year, while the volume of reserves and profits carried over in the first half of this year came to 14,404,000 dinars.

Per-share profits in this period came to 149 fils, while the stockholders' equity on 30 June 1985 was 36,052,000 dinars, an increase of 3,225,000 dinars.

Mobile Telephone Communications

With respect to the budget of the Telephone Communications Company, the figures state that the company's profits in the first 6 months of this year came to 1,029,000 dinars, since reserves and profits carried over increased from 1,316,000 dinars in 1984 to 2,345,000 dinars in the first half of this year. Per-share profitability in this period was 41 fils.

Petroleum Investment

As regards the Petroleum Investment [Company] budget, the profits the company realized during the first 6 months of this year came to 349,000 dinars. Reserves and profits carried over in the first half of this year came to 22.22 million Kuwaiti dinars, while the volume of stockholders' equity up to 30 June 1985 came to 132,204,000 dinars, an increase from 125,324,000 dinars or an increase of 6.88 million dinars. Per-share profitability in the first half of this year was 63 fils.

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CSO: 4404/42

KUWAIT

FINANCE MINISTER SUBMITS BANK LOAN DATA

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 13 Oct 85 p 3

[Article: "The Minister of Finance, in Three Replies to Deputy Sami Al-Munayyis: 4,438,000,000 Dinars in Bank Loans to Individuals and Institutions"]

[Text] The minister of finance and economy, Jasim al-Khirafi, stated that the value of loans granted by Kuwaiti banks to individuals and institutions has come to 4,437,948,000 dinars and these total 49,064.

This was stated in a reply Minister al-Khirafi gave to a question by Deputy Sami al-Munayyis. In reply to another question from Deputy al-Munayyis, he added that loans granted by commercial banks worth more than half a million dinars come to 3,218,000,000 dinars in value.

In his answer to a third question by Deputy al-Munayyis, the finance minister disclosed that the total loans given to bank board members came to 275.9 million dinars.

In his replies, Minister al-Khirafi stated that the value of the collateral was far less than the total loans in the three cases, pointing out that all the details cited in the answers are based on information from the governor of the Central Bank.

In his first reply, the minister of finance mentioned that the number of loans granted by Kuwaiti banks to individuals and institutions came to 49,064, with a total value of 4,437,938,000 dinars, broken down as follows:

Less than 20,000 dinars: a total of 44,544 loans with a total value of 110,423,000 dinars.

From 20,000 to 50,000 dinars: 1,071 loans with a total value of 35,793,000 dinars.

From 50,000 to 100,000 dinars: 879 loans with a total value of 59,519,000 dinars.

From 100,000 to 250,000 dinars: 991 loans with a total value of 158,284,000 dinars.

From 250,000 to 500,000 dinars: 557 loans with a total value of 197,697,000 dinars.

From 500,000 to 1 million dinars: 350 loans with a total value of 252.21 million dinars.

From 1 to 2 million dinars: 260 loans with a total value of 369,107,000 dinars.

From 2 to 5 million dinars: 190 loans with a total value of 592,806,000 dinars.

More than 5 million dinars: 202 loans with a total value of 2,662,099,000 dinars.

The minister of finance said that the total value of the collateral for these loans, consisting of stock, real property, land, bonds and deposits, came to 2,497,000,000 dinars, in addition to promissory notes with a total value of 977 million dinars.

He pointed out that the loans had been disbursed to finance various economic activities, in particular to finance trade, stocks, real property, construction, services and industry.

In his reply to the second question, the minister of finance pointed out that the value of the credit facilities granted by commercial banks in the form of loans, withdrawals on the open market and discounted commercial paper in units of more than half a million dinars for purposes of financing trade, contracting, real estate and stock activities came to 3,218,000,000 dinars up to last 31 March.

He added that the value of the collateral offered for these facilities by the same date came to 2,272,000,000 dinars, pointing out that it was difficult to mention the date of the grant of each loan separately because an individual loan could rise or fall during its life pursuant to the client's payment of part of the loan or acquisition of an increase in the loan granted to him.

In the course of his response to the third question, the minister of finance stated that the total loans granted by commercial banks to their board members came to 275.9 million, to be disbursed on transactions in stock, real property, trade and contracting.

he added that the value of those loans which were backed by collateral came to 81.3 million dinars and that collateral worth 143.6 million dinars was provided in the form of stock, real property, bonds, gold and deposits.

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

INTERVIEW WITH 'ARAFAT ABOUT ISRAELI RAID ON TUNIS

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 14 Oct 85 pp 8-9

[Interview with Yasir 'Arafat by Ahmad Ra'fat: "The Israeli Airplanes Took Off From a NATO Base"; in Tunis, 8 Oct]

[Text] What exactly happened in Tunis? Although much has been written and will be written about the Israeli raid on PLO headquarters more than 2,400 km from the occupied territories, questions concerning the raid are increasing in number rather than decreasing. When we arrived at 'Arafat's headquarters at 10:30 pm last Tuesday to hold this interview, there was no doubt in our minds that an interview would not clarify the mysteries still surrounding the event; time alone would be responsible for dispelling all the fog. AL-DUSTUR's interview with Abu 'Ammar [Yasir 'Arafat] took place moments after the ambassador of the People's Republic of China had left the PLO chairman's office, which had seen delegations and ambassadors of Arab and foreign countries coming all day to offer condolences and condemnation of the attack.

We began the interview with the following question:

[Question] Abu 'Ammar, did the Israeli attack surprise you, or were you expecting what happened?

[Answer] We had information to the effect that the Zionist government was planning to carry out a series of terrorist operations against the Palestinian resistance. During recent months, Israeli authorities threatened to strike at the Palestinian resistance after the rise in operations by the resistance both inside and outside the occupied territories.

A few weeks ago, Yitzhaq Rabin publicly threatened to strike the Palestinians "wherever they are, from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean."

On the 26th of last month, the newspaper YEDI'OT AHARONOT published an article indicating that Mosad had sent a group of spies to Cyprus to observe the movements and departures of commandos from Cyprus to Lebanon and other Arab countries.

On the basis of this information, the Israeli raid on Tunis and the PLO was not a surprise to me. However, I did not believe that their insolence and savagery would embolden the Israelis to launch an attack on an independent country some 2,400 km distant from them. That was something I never imagined.

From al-Saqiyah to Hammam al-Shatt

Do not forget that the casualties who fell at Hammam al-Shatt were not all Palestinians. Tunisians, brothers in blood and in one holy war, also fell as martyrs during the raid. Among the casualties were a number of women and children whose only sin was that they were living near the PLO buildings. President Bourguiba spoke the truth about the heinousness and scale of the attack when he compared it to the French colonial government's February 1985 attack against the Algerian freedom fighters and Tunisian citizens in the city of Saqiyat Sidi Yusuf.

In Hammam al-Shatt, Palestinian blood mixed with Tunisian to proclaim to the world that our struggle is one and that we share aspirations in our fight against Zionism.

[Question] Where were you when the Israeli planes were bombing the headquarters of the Palestinian leadership? How did the chairman of the PLO escape death?

[Answer] Contrary to what was published in the newspapers and echoed in the media, the headquarters of the PLO leadership were not located in that area. The Israelis bombed my personal residence with the aim of killing me. Thank God they failed in their dastardly attempts. At the time, I was doing physical exercise not far from the area that was bombed. When I heard the sound of the bombs, I headed to the area of the incident. I thank God for having protected me. Do not forget that I am a son of the Holy Land and that my faith in God and in His will is strong.

[Question] Do you have exact information about the number of victims?

[Answer] Rescue operations are continuing, and rescue workers are still trying to extricate victims from the ruins. Up to now, 72 victims have been found. The number of wounded is higher than that number.

"I Know the Name of the American Base"

[Question] From the very first moment, you indicated that America was involved in the attack. Do you have any proof?

[Answer] According to information now in the possession of PLO military officials, I can tell you that Israel's claim to have used 6 planes is a lie. Those who were in the area at the time of the attack made eye-witness observations of 8 planes taking turns in bombing the area, while 8 other planes were providing cover and defense. Therefore, the Israeli planes that carried out the attack were 16 F-16 aircraft, not 6 as claimed by Israel.

These planes have to be refueled at least twice during the round trip. According to our information, such a number of planes would need 6 tanker planes in order to carry out their mission. According to our information, Israel does not have such planes. Israel has Hercules 130 tankers; however, it is technically difficult for such planes to refuel F-16's. The F-16 will refuel only from the DC-9, DC-10 or Boeing 707.

According to the information available to us, these planes came from one of the NATO bases subject to American control in the Mediterranean. I have the name of the base but will not announce it now.

[Question] Were European countries involved with Israel in the attack?

[Answer] According to our information, France and Italy provided no assistance to Israel and had no foreknowledge of the attack.

The Peace Process

[Question] What are your thoughts about the development of the situation after this Israeli attack, especially the Middle East peace process?

[Answer] Certainly, this operation will have a negative impact on the Middle East peace process. The purpose of Israel and Washington behind this raid aimed at my life is to impede the peace process and torpedo the 'Amman accord that I signed with King Husayn. This is another indication that Israel and America do not want peace. The entire world has now come to perceive this reality and the scope of the Israeli-American plan. We now ask the world community to offer guarantees to move the peace process forward.

[Question] How do you envisage the influence of the world community to which you are appealing for the offering of guarantees to move the peace process forward?

[Answer] I shall give you an example. The European nations and the European community now have to shoulder their responsibility. The Security Council and the United Nations, both of which have showed their inability to defend international law, have to shoulder their responsibility and play their role seriously.

We say that whenever Israel is in a position of isolation, it does its utmost to get out of that position by committing crimes.

[Question] From what you have said, we gather that you still believe the peace process must continue in spite of what has happened. Is that the case?

[Answer] I said in the speech I delivered in the U N in 1974 that I carry an olive branch in one hand and a rifle in the other, and that I shall use this hand or the other according to the circumstances.

We do not want fighting for the sake of fighting, but only to regain our rights and return to our homeland. We decided in our National Council in 1982 to approve the Fes peace proposal. In 1985, when we announced that we approve the principle of land in exchange for peace, we were sincere in our words.

[Question] Shim'on Peres announced that the attack on Tunis was a reaction to the assassination of three Israelis in Larnaka. What is your response to that justification?

[Answer] We have no connection with what happened in Cyprus. It is Israel that has trumped up this charge. Israel and its intelligence apparatus are responsible for the assassination of the three Israelis. I do not have any knowledge about the incident. However, I would add that these "tourists" were no ordinary tourists; they were Israeli spies sent by Mosad to watch the movements of Palestinians.

The 26 September issue of THE JERUSALEM POST called attention to the subject and to the activity of these three Israelis. Nevertheless, I condemned the operation from my office in Tunis.

[Question] To what movement do the Palestinians belong who carried out the terrorist operations of bombing the Cafe Paris and the offices of British Airways in Rome?

[Answer] Their having come to Italy from Syria will give you the answer about their political affiliations. The terrorist operation aimed at the office of British Airways was connected with the British prime minister's stand and her announcement of her readiness to meet with a joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation. If a small group of Palestinians carries out terrorist operations, that does not mean that the PLO or the Palestinian people are involved in them.

[Question] What will your reaction to this unjust attack be?

[Answer] During coming days, you will see a rise in resistance inside and outside the occupied lands. The Palestinian people will respond to this act of terror carried out by the Israeli government, which received unlimited support from America.

12937/7687

CSO: 4404/29

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

RAFIQ AL-NATSHAH INTERVIEWED

Riyadh AL-YAMAMAH in Arabic 23 Oct 85 pp 32-33

[Interview with Rafiq al-Natshah, member of the PLO Central Committee and representative of Fatah in Saudi Arabia, by Sa'd al-Mutalliq: "We Are For the Revolution, Against Terrorism"; date and place not given]

[Text] The sequence of developments that began with the Israeli air attack on Tunis and ended with the incident of the Italian ship and the hijacking of the Egyptian airliner to Sicily and with Britain's retreat from meeting the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation in London--all these events were the subject of a long conversation between AL-YAMAMAH and Rafiq al-Natshah, a member of the PLO Central Committee and representative of Fatah in Saudi Arabia.

[Question] Some observers believe that recent events in the Middle East have harmed the role of the PLO and reduced its effectiveness, especially since the commando operations that have taken place were mostly individual operations with which the PLO has denied any connection.

[Answer] The military operations that our people have carried out in the occupied territory, operations that have covered the entire area of Palestine from Galilee to the Negev and Dimona, and from Hebron and Gaza to Jerusalem, Nablus, Haifa and Tel Aviv, show that these operations are the expression of the revolution of a people resisting by means of stones, knives and any weapons they can obtain. We participate by espousing these operations, since they are an expression of our basic military line, a line that is our *raison d'etre* on the Arab and international scene. Were it not for the armed struggle, there would be no justification for our existence. We have believed and continue to believe that the only way to liberate Palestine is armed struggle--not because we desire bloodshed, but because of our despair of the possibility of reaching solutions by any other way. Day after day, events prove that no other way lies open to us other than this one.

We therefore proclaim that every military operation that takes place in the occupied territory is done on the part of the Palestinian revolution. As for terrorist operations that take place against civilians in any place in the

world, we in fact have no relation with such operations. We believe in the revolution, not in terrorism. We carry out revolutionary, not terrorist activity. The assertion that the PLO's role has been muzzled is to be rejected. The PLO extends throughout the world through its organizations, offices and political contacts. We do not believe that the intransigent American position which supports Israeli terrorism and which regrettably practices terrorism on the international level as a great power can evaluate the extent of the PLO. The organization remains effective in the region and is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. It enjoys the support of the whole world. Its role has not been muzzled; rather, it is increasing daily in strength. The retreat of the British government and America's intransigence do not mean the muzzling of the PLO. Look at our people inside and outside the occupied territory and at the masses everywhere and you will know the extent of the support received by the organization.

[Question] After the incident of the attack on PLO headquarters in Tunis, it has been proved that nothing will restrain Israel as long as the Arabs differ among themselves. Observers generally have noted the strong reaction on the part of Egypt. What is your comment?

[Answer] The Egyptian people is a true Arab and Muslim people, one that has marched with events in the region, espoused and cooperated in Arab causes, and fought and offered its sons as martyrs along with us. In the recent terrorist operation in Tunis, one of our martyrs was an Egyptian brother. When the Egyptian people cooperate with our cause and when the Egyptian government takes such an honorable stand concerning recent events, expressing the stand of its people and its faith in the Arab cause, then matters have returned to normal.

The recent events have proved the true nature of the Egyptian people and the depth of its belief in the Palestinian cause. They have proved that Camp David has not penetrated the Egyptian people in the least. We salute the Egyptian people through your magazine. We salute especially that so-called madman, whom we consider quite reasonable, who gave expression to the honor of the Egyptian people and of the entire Arab nation by taking revenge in his own way on those shameless Israelis who were behaving insolently on Egyptian soil while the operation was being carried out. We see Egypt as Egypt of the Arabs, Egypt of Islam. We do not believe that Egypt will some day distance itself from the Arab cause. We have great hope that the stand of the Egyptian government and of President Husni Mubarak will continue to express the hopes of the Egyptian people for a distancing from Camp David and for solidarity with the Palestinian revolution. We look forward to the day when Egypt will return to the Arabs and the Arabs to Egypt.

[Question] The recent incident of the hijacking of the Italian ship must have left its effect on the reputation of the organization and on your relations with Italy, considered to be one of the European nations most sympathetic to the PLO. What is your assessment of the incident?

[Answer] First, we condemned the operation. The PLO's role, as all impartial people in the world have acknowledged, was an honorable one. Our relations with Italy are good. We acted to end the problem, and that re-

dounds to our honor, not to our condemnation. Two Palestinian leaders acted to solve the problem when everyone else had failed. It was those who wanted the problem to become more complicated so as to exploit it to thwart the PLO who took refuge in an act of air piracy, an act which America committed in order to keep the question alive and to point to the PLO and the Palestinian people as terrorists. People will not be deceived. The whole world acknowledges the constructive role we have played in ending the problem. The PLO's reputation, thank God, has been enhanced by its having undertaken this task. Our job, as I told you at the beginning of the conversation, is armed struggle and revolution, not terrorism. This is a subject that Italy well understands, as do Egypt and the whole world also.

[Question] Do you think that America's show of strength in hijacking the Egyptian airliner after the ship incident was an appropriate action?

[Answer] We would rather have had America show its strength against the Israeli aircraft that left the occupied territory to strike at PLO headquarters in Tunis. America did not see those planes, in spite of their large number; America saw the single Egyptian civilian airliner and showed its strength to intercept it. That is terrorism and air piracy. It is unfortunate that it was carried out by a great power such as America, which claims to be against terrorism while practicing it at the highest level.

[Question] Are there contacts going on between the PLO and Italy about trying the hijackers in Tunis?

[Answer] Italy, as well as some of the affected countries that had citizens on board the ship, bound themselves in writing to the results of the PLO's contacts with the hijackers. They agreed to end the problem, and that the PLO would take the hijackers and try them in Tunis. However, America broke her promise as usual and kidnapped the men.

We ask for them because they were coming to Tunis for their trial. When we ask for them, that does not mean that we support them. We in fact announced our condemnation of the operation, and we acted to stop it. The natural course would have been for everyone to have carried out what he had promised and approve in writing.

[Question] After Tunisia refused to receive the airliner carrying the hijackers, how did that affect relations between the PLO and Tunisia?

[Answer] The relations between us and our sister state, Tunisia, and the great Tunisian people are relations that rest upon the Tunisian blood that has been mixed with ours, whether in our war against Israel or in the raid that Israel launched against PLO headquarters. Our relationship with Tunisia is something too great to be influenced by such trivialities. We do not know the circumstances surrounding Tunisia's not receiving the aircraft. Tunisia has announced that it received no request; Egypt has announced that it made a request. We are not judges in the case. We believe that this is such a slight matter that it will have no effect either on Palestinian-Tunisian relations, or on Egyptian-Palestinian relations, or on Egyptian-Tunisian relations.

[Question] After the Israeli raid on PLO headquarters in Tunis, both Egypt and Iraq expressed their readiness to welcome the organization. Do you intend to accept the offers?

[Answer] We have offices in Cairo, and Egypt has not prevented us from using them. We use our Cairo offices in a way that is well-known, and we use our offices in Iraq openly. We have offices in every Arab country. There is no reason for us to move from Tunis, either on account of the Israeli raid or for any other cause. We remain in Tunis for one reason: the government and people of Tunisia accept us.

[Question] The British government, after first agreeing to receive the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, refused to do so. Is this a result of American-Israeli pressure, or is it the result of the recent events?

[Answer] This position constitutes a retreat by the British government. British officials within Britain have stated that the reason was American pressure. This is what we have also stated, saying that it was a result of American pressure. Does the British government think we shall abandon our principles and renounce our fundamental policies for the sake of a meeting with its foreign minister or prime minister? Can we, for the sake of such a meeting, contradict the decisions of the [Palestine] National Council and the PLO charter?

12937/7687

CSO: 4404/29

SAUDI ARABIA

POLICE OFFICERS RECEIVE PROMOTIONS

Beirut LA REVUE DU LIBAN in French 19-26 Oct 85 pp 22-23

[Article: "Prince Nayef Ben Abdel-Aziz Awards Diplomas to 55 Members of the 13th and 14th Classes; Newly Promoted Officers Have Received Proper Training Which Will Make It Possible for Them to Carry Out Their Duties Correctly"]

[Text] Under the patronage and in the presence of Prince Nayef Ben Abdel-Aziz, Saudi minister of the interior, two classes of officers (the 13th and 14th classes) of the General Security Service have received their diplomas after they had completed their training.

The 2 classes include 55 university-trained officers, 52 of whom are Saudis and 3 of whom are citizens of other Arab countries.

After Prince Nayef reviewed the guard of honor, a verse from the Koran was read. Then the director general of the Security Service delivered a speech for the occasion. General Abdallah Ben Abdel-Rahman el-Sheikh began by welcoming the minister of the interior, as well as other personalities who were present.

He stated that the members of the two classes had completed their university studies abroad and had received their military and scientific training in Saudi Arabia. He said: "We hope that they will serve the king and the fatherland alongside their elders, providing for the security of their fellow citizens."

General el-Sheikh added that, in accordance with the directions given by King Fahd and Crown Prince Abdallah, police and security agents receive proper training, making it possible for them to carry out their missions in the right way.

Then, addressing himself to Prince Nayef, he went on to say: "In accordance with your instructions that no officer shall be promoted until he previously goes through a training program to increase his ability to carry out his functions, 15 training sessions were held last year at the training centers of the Directorate of Police and at the General Administration Center in Riyadh. A total of 579 police and security agents have attended accelerated

training courses. Furthermore, they have become more proficient in foreign languages.

Comments of the Director of the Security Officers Training School

Then Capt Mohamed Abdallah, the director general of the Security Officers Training School, welcomed Prince Nayef to the ceremony before reviewing the program followed by this institution to expand the areas of knowledge of the graduates of the school, so that they can more effectively perform their duties.

He declared that training sessions had been held in the areas of criminal science, the anti-narcotics struggle, the control and guarding of prisoners, police administration, etc.

He added: "Colleagues from the United Arab Emirates and from North Yemen have joined us, in addition to members of the National Guard, the Army, Navy, and Air Force."

Captain Abdallah continued, speaking to the minister of the interior: "Your continuing presence at these ceremonies demonstrates your desire to see our officers complete their training. This encourages them to settle down to performing their duties in a zealous and conscientious way, in order to achieve your noble objectives, such as the maintenance of security and the struggle against crime in its various forms, under the wise leadership of King Fahd and the crown prince."

And Members of the Two Classes

Lt Khaluk Ahmed el-Samari was the spokesman for the two classes. He mentioned the various areas of study to which they had been introduced, under the guidance of qualified teachers who are experienced in the fields of religious, social, cultural, administrative, criminal, and military studies, in addition to practical exercises to apply their training in the field.

The names of the officers of the two classes who spent 6 months in the school were then read. They had received training in both the scientific and practical areas.

After having awarded the diplomas to the new, university-trained officers of the General Security Service, Prince Nayef returned to the Ministry of the Interior, where he signed a contract with a French firm which specializes in the issuance of identity cards. These identity cards will be issued to Saudi citizens and to foreign nationals residing in the kingdom. The contract is worth 28,549,707 rials and is valid for 1 year.

Franco-Saudi Cooperation

On this occasion Prince Nayef expressed his satisfaction with the cooperation that had been achieved between the French and Saudi ministers of the interior,

as well as with the support which France has continued to provide to Saudi Arabia in this field.

Prince Nayef also expressed his admiration for French technical programs, "which have reached a high level of quality."

Speaking in turn, Pierre Rocalf, French ambassador in Riyadh, who attended the signing of the Franco-Saudi contract, thanked the responsible leaders of the kingdom for their confidence in France, adding that "for France it is a great honor to cooperate with Saudi Arabia."

The new identity cards which the French company is charged with providing will be impossible to counterfeit. The cards will be small and will be turned out electronically. The production center will be in Riyadh, while the assembly of the necessary information to produce the cards will take place in the various state offices. This data will be communicated automatically to the production center in Riyadh.

The French company will be responsible for training Saudi officials in the maintenance and proper functioning of the center in Riyadh, after its construction is completed. There will be no need for further foreign assistance.

Automatic System

It should be pointed out that in September 1985 the Saudi state services began to use the automatized system in the registration of citizens and the issuance of personal identity cards, through offices located in various areas of the kingdom.

The issuance of driver's licenses will soon be accomplished, using the personal identity data of citizens, on the basis of mechanized information centers which use ultramodern equipment.

The National Information Center, which comes under the Ministry of the Interior, drew the particular attention of Prince Nayef Ben Abdel-Aziz and other leaders.

An automated system has also been adopted in airports and surface transportation stations. At present the General Administration of Passports is registering foreigners arriving in Saudi Arabia, to whom it issues personal identification documents instead of residence permits.

Prince Sayef announced after the signature of the contract with the French firm that the Ministry of the Interior is considering adopting a newly developed personal card, in place of those which every Saudi citizen has. This card will be issued without difficulty, once the person provides the necessary information and a photograph to qualified civil registry officials in the area where they live.

The Security of the Citizen Is the Priority Objective

The minister of the interior went on to say that his department continues to work to ensure that the citizen has the maximum amount of welfare and security possible. He expressed the desire to do his duty in the best way possible, keeping in mind the directions given by King Fahd.

For his part Dr Ibrahim Awaji, secretary of the Ministry of the Interior, declared that the system for the issuance of personal identity cards was obtained from a developed nation and is aimed at ensuring the tranquillity of the citizens of the country when they deal with various official services. He continued: "These cards cannot be counterfeited and will replace a number of other kinds of identity cards presently in use by Saudi citizens.

"The implementation of such a project is the result of continuing contacts between the Saudi and French Ministries of the Interior. This is a new step forward in a technical sense. It will spare the citizen a great deal of difficulty and applying in different places when he wants to obtain an identity card."

Dr Nasser Abdel-Aziz el-Sacre, director of the National Information Center, spoke at some length in the same sense, declaring that the system adopted by the Ministry of the Interior will use procedures developed by modern technology. He said: "It will make it possible for a Saudi citizen to obtain his passport and his driver's license without delay, by showing his personal identity card to the appropriate state services. The passport and the driver's license will be issued automatically."

Dr El-Sace continued: "The new system will facilitate movement by Saudi citizens and their travel abroad."

The National Information Center, we have learned, has 275 officials in its employ, 90 percent of whom are Saudi citizens. Its activities take place in seven provinces of the kingdom.

Dr Ibrahim Awaji, Dr Abdel-Aziz El-Sacre, and Sleiman Al-Mazroub, director of the Administration for Orientation and Culture, were present at the signing of the contract between the Ministry of the Interior and the French firm.

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AFGHANISTAN

REPORTER RELATES VARIOUS ASPECTS OF JOURNEY

Capital Displays Uneasy Calm

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 27 Oct 85 p 4

[Four-part article by Mushahid Hussain]

[Text]

Landing in Kabul after a 75-minute flight on an Aeroflot jet from Tashkent one can have a good view of the Afghan capital's demographic profile: a valley surrounded mostly by barren hills and mountains.

The capital's airport itself resembles more a military airfield than a normal civilian airport. Most of the activity at the airport was that of military helicopters and transport planes. Indian Airlines and Aeroflot maintain regular services out of the capital. Most of the hills overlooking the capital are manned by radar.

STATE OF ALERT

The city of two million residents seems quite peaceful and presents a 'business-as-usual' normality in terms of everyday life, movement of transport and people, activities in shops and government buildings. During a five-day stay in the Afghan capital (October 4-9), there was no indicator of a state of siege or any fighting. However, while a state of siege did not exist in Kabul, a state of alert is definitely apparent in the capital of a country which is now a major flashpoint for Superpower contention. There are visible signs of abnormality: the night-time curfew (10 p.m. ... 4 a.m.) which started with the Soviet military intervention in

December 1979 is still in force. Kabul's clear blue skies are witness to the frequent noise and whirring of military helicopters which are seen flying at a low height moving in different directions away from the city. All important buildings and installations are guarded by Kalashnikov-totting young military guards who also physically search visitors. The Hotel Intercontinental is perched high on a hill located at the outskirts of capital. Of its 240 rooms, only 10 were occupied.

CONSPICUOUS ABSENCE

While the city, particularly its bazaars and shopping centres are bustling with life during the day, it does not convey the impression of a city under foreign occupation. At least in Kabul, the regime seems to be very much in control of the situation. What is particularly interesting in Kabul is the almost conspicuous absence of Soviet soldiers and citizens. While some Russians were seen on the armoured cars in Kabul, most of the Soviet Army is tucked away somewhere out of the city centre or probably posted in other parts of Afghanistan.

Another aspect of interest to an outside visitor is the relative absence of slogans or red emblems of Kabul's walls and streets which were apparently the order of the day during the period of Tarraki

and Hafizullah Amin. In fact, the new state emblem of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, adopted after the Soviet intervention and induction of the regime of Babrak Karmal in December 1979 shows a pulpit of a mosque with an open Quran flanked by sheaves of wheat.

For a Pakistani used to Islamisation in various forms and manifestations in the last so many years, it is interesting to note the construction of new and beautiful mosques in Kabul and a marked official overt emphasis on Islam. The 'Azan' is broadcast five times a day on Kabul radio. There are photographs of Babrak Karmal offering prayers plus frequent references in his speeches to the period of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) and the Khulafa-Rashidin. According to official statistics provided by the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, 57 new mosques were constructed since 1979 and 527 existing ones completely renovated. According to these statistics there are a total of 610 mosques in Kabul alone. Those desirous of performing Haj are provided with a stipend by the

State.

Dotting the walls and boulevards are larger-than-life portraits of Babrak Karmal which are indicators of a growing personality cult. No official speech is complete without a reference to "Ratig" (comrade) Babrak Karmal. Offices and government buildings also have photographs of Lenin, Marx, Engels and Gorbachev. The Karmal cult is apparently an attempt to project the leadership of a man who represented a minority faction within the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and whose two predecessors had short violent tenures of rule. It is also meant to signify that there is no possibility of dispensing with Babrak Karmal, thereby introducing an element of permanence in his leadership of the Soviet supported regime. Invariably the day's TV and radio broadcasts begin with news of Babrak Karmal or mention of some speech delivered by him on an issue.

Not surprisingly, there are frequent references to Pakistan and General Ziaul Haq in the context of the Afghan question. Afghans are also avid listeners of BBC. They seemed quite well informed on contents of its local language broadcasts.

Afghanistan, like its big neighbour in the north, is heterogeneous country incorporating divergent tribes and nationalities. These include Pakhtuns, Baluch, Uzbek, Tajik, Turkman and Hazara. Despite the preponderance of Pakhtoons, the preferred official medium of communication is "Dari" which is a local variant of Farsi. Russian is catching up among the elite classes and most of the Afghan leadership is fluent in Russian, many of whom have also studied in Soviet Union.

OVER-RIDING CONCERN

In spite of the apparent normalcy in the Afghan Capital, there is no doubt that the insurgency launched by the Mujahideen is the singular over-riding concern among the people and the leadership. There are references to it in almost every official pronouncement. While the Capital city itself does not seem

directly feeling the atmosphere of war (the last bomb blast took place four months ago), it is brought home to every Afghan family from the TV as well as radio. All able-bodied Afghans of 18 to 25 years of age have to undergo compulsory military training in two segments. They are first inducted for three years, then they return to civilian life for three years after which they again return to military service for three years. There are reports of periodical defections from the ranks of Afghan conscripts. Even Hindus and Sikhs living in Afghanistan are not exempt from conscription, although they are spared the ordeal of going to the front. There are said to be about 20,000 Hindus, mostly Sindhis and Punjabis, and about an equal number of Sikhs settled in Kabul city. Almost all of them are engaged in business. Shalwar Kameez as a dress form has caught on with some Afghan girls in Afghanistan.

MILITARY JARGON

The war in Afghanistan has spawned certain kind of military jargon which needs to be deciphered. In order to understand their meanings some examples: -- "Undeclared war" (this refers to insurgency launched by Mujahideen from bases in Pakistan and Afghanistan with US assistance) -- "Counter revolutionaries and bandits" (The Mujahideen) -- "Deceived and misled" -- (Refugees who left their country and are now returning back to it) -- "Internationalist Assistance" (help being provided by USSR) -- "limited military contingent" (the 100,000 plus Soviet army in Afghanistan).

Till 1984, the basic thrust of Afghanistan's propaganda singled out Pakistan, together with other countries -- USA, China, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, France, Britain and West Germany -- for fomenting insurgency, but in the last one year, Pakistan and Iran are being equated in the propaganda war of Kabul. According to official Afghan sources, this new propaganda stance was in response to increased propaganda offensive launched by Iranians in the last one year.

New Reforms Implemented

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 28 Oct 85 p 4

[Text]

In order to refashion Afghanistan according to the dictates of their ideology, the PDPA, with Moscow's support, is engaged in a process which can be termed as "Sovietisation" of Afghanistan. While the purpose is that of building an egalitarian, welfare state, the pattern that is being pursued seems strikingly similar to other socialist states. The infrastructure and institutions are being tailored in accordance with the model practised in the Soviet Union, as well as in other Eastern European socialist states.

In this new order, the PDPA is trying very hard to build sectors of support among such elements as women, youth, farmers, intellectuals and tribal people. Those responsible for implementing reforms pertaining to women, education and land are basically party cadres, most of whom have been trained in the Soviet Union. According to PDPA figures, there were 18,000 party members in April, 1978 when the SAUR revolution was launched. Now the Party claims a membership of 1,40,000, including 15,000 women. The Democratic Women's Organisation (DWO) is headed by the well known Afghan woman activist, Dr. Anahita Ratebzad, who is also a member of the party's leading body - the Political Bureau. Kabul now even has a few women bus drivers (at least three) and more women are receiving education, many of whom are also seen on Kabul University's Campus.

WOMEN AND CULTURE

The dress pattern of women can be generally classified in three distinct categories: women with veil particularly in the bazars, women who wear scarfs with skirts and those who just wear skirts without scarfs.

Apart from Dr. Anahita Ratebzad, the other woman who is active in public life is Babrak Karmal's wife, Mehbooba. Fiftyish and heavy set, Mehbooba Karmal talks smilingly of "her thirty years in politics". The Karmals have four children - two daughters and two sons - all under thirty.

The eldest child, a daughter, recently graduated from Moscow State University in Law and is now in Kabul at the Academy of Sciences. The other three children are all studying in Moscow - one in Patrice Lumumba University doing law, a daughter at the Moscow State University studying economics and another son at the same school working for a degree in International Relations.

Mehbooba Karmal says she was never averse to her husband's political activities which often landed him in jail. She supports a large family because even if there are more children, they will grow up to be of use. It depends on women to carry the responsibility of bringing up children if it can be afforded. Although she is against the veil, she feels "it is every woman's right to decide for herself and nothing should be imposed by the State in this connection". She seems to be quite practical in her approach and attitudes to problems of society, adding that "even though some traditions may not be good we do not want to tamper with them". On the question of marriage, her views reflect her basic practicality: "It

should be a mixture of love and arranged marriage. Sometimes love marriages create problems and arranged marriages often consolidate relationship. I cannot say about my own children; it is still a question mark". Regarding dowry, Mehbooba Karmal said that it is no longer a problem now, but alimony is. "Often poor people who cannot afford, have to write a lot of money for alimony".

POTENTIAL

Discussing the potential of conflict between family life and public career for those who choose public life, Mrs. Karmal said "some women like Mrs. Gandhi who are in politics have to choose between serving society or their family". Apart from doing party work, Mrs. Karmal works in a new institution called Watan Nursery, where children of the poor, the destitute and those who were killed in battle are reared and educated.

For children a new organisation has also been formed which is called "Young Pioneers", whose membership incorporates children between ten and fourteen years. After this most of them go into the Democratic Youth Organisation which serves as a nursery for training new members for the party. Many children and young students are sent to various institutions in the Soviet Union and other socialist states. According to one unconfirmed figure there are 20,000 students from Afghanistan studying in the Soviet Union, not counting cadres, government officials, and army officers. A lot is being done on the adult literacy front and according to official figures, illiteracy which stood at 95% before 1978, is now down to 65%. Additionally, there is marked emphasis on construction of low cost housing and about 100 new flats are ready for occupancy every month. Slum areas in Kabul are being razed to be replaced by new high-rise flats.

In its endeavours to build

sectors of support within Afghan society, the PDPA is trying hard to influence rural areas particularly, because 84% of people are engaged in agriculture. According to Dr. Abdul Ghaffar Lakanwal, the West German trained Minister for Agriculture and Land Reforms, three per cent of his country's population held 30% of land; it had to be redistributed and ceiling of ownership fixed. Land has now been categorised according to its quality and in the top category 15 acres (8 hectares) of land can be owned per family. Previous debts have been abolished and the role of money-lenders who used to charge heavy interest has been finished. Union of Peasant Councils are being organised at the village level and these bodies now have within their domain self defence units, health clinics and literacy centres. In keeping with religious sensitivities of the people 'waqf' land has not been touched.

In their emphasis on education, the health sector is also being given priority and according to official figures there are about 3,000 Afghan students in medical schools which now produce some 300 doctors per year. During the period of monarchy about 100 doctors per year were being produced. There are also said to be over 1000 doctors from the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, plus a few from India.

During a visit to Kabul University, an animated discussion took place with members of the Faculty of Law and Political Science of which Babrak Karmal is also a graduate. This Faculty has 500 students of which 100 are party members and 30 teachers of which 20 belong to the party. The University itself presents an air of normality, just like any other Campus where boys and girls move about in a relaxed atmosphere.

IDEOLOGICAL FACTOR

According to Faculty members since the April Revolution, new subjects have been introduced in the curriculum reflecting "socio-economic needs and

realities of the country". Marxism-Leninism is now taught as part of Sociology, plus theory and practice of the state, a subject taught in all socialist countries, which has also been introduced in Kabul University. There is also constitutional law focussing on the Afghan constitution and a number of subjects pertaining to Islamic law have been retained. Asked whether the ideological factor is taken into consideration when teachers are selected for the Faculty of Political Science and Law, the reply came: "We do not try to impose our ideology on our students, we only try to convince them or work through persuasion. It is upto the students themselves to decide. Since, at this stage of revolution, we are facing an undeclared war on our frontiers, the ideological factor is important, but there is no bar on non-party persons to join our faculty".

Afghan professors are very keen to ask questions concerning Pakistan's relations with their country, Islamisation, status of women and the political situation in Pakistan. There was an element of lack of information in their understanding of the Pakistani situation, when they expressed their surprise on being told that there is no law forcing Pakistani women to wear the veil.

They were very keen to learn "The Muslim's views on the Afghan situation. The Muslim's formulation on the Afghan issue was summed up as follows: "First of all we condemn Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan because it is a violation of international law, the UN Charter, and the principle of non-interference in internal affairs of states. This we do on a universal basis, be it America in Grenada and Nicaragua, Vietnam in Kampuchea, China in Vietnam, Iraq in Iran and Israel in Lebanon. Secondly, we believe that there should be a political settlement of this issue based on direct talks between Islamabad and Kabul. Thirdly, we are also against involvement of the United States of America in this situation

and we do not think it would be in the interest of Pakistan as well as countries in the region if this area become an arena for super power confrontation".

On this came the reply: "Pakistan has always been used by the USA since the fifties in an anti-Soviet role. The Americans have always been keen to have bases close to the Soviet border. The Americans cannot have bases in this region in Iran or Afghanistan, only in Pakistan. According to Pravda, Pershing missiles are being stationed in Pakistan to be used against the Soviet Union. Ayub Khan said only back in 1959 that Pakistan will be a bulwark against communism. This role continues till today".

During these discussions one of the questions pertained to the credibility of the media as well as the fact as to how much of reporting was really accurate and objective. On this an old Afghan professor, a former diplomat, told an interesting joke. "One head of state was making a speech and during his speech, he mentioned some statistics of his country's progress. One person in the audience, a merchant stood up and said that these were wrong and based on lies. Later, the head of state called the merchant and asked him why he thought these were incorrect. The merchant said he knew the truth because he travelled a lot and saw what actual progress was being made. Upon this, the head of state advised the merchant: you must travel less and read more news papers".

Saur Revolution a 'National Democracy'

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 29 Oct 85 p 4

[Excerpts]

The Revolution's ideologue, Mahmood Baryalai, at 42, is without doubt the most articulate spokesman of the Revolution. Young, energetic and brilliant, he speaks with eloquence and clarity without relying on jargon or rhetoric. He is a younger brother of Babrak Karmal and the principal ideologist of the party. Mahmood Baryalai has a certain fondness for Pakistan because he was the first Ambassador of Afghanistan posted to Pakistan in the early days of the Revolution. That was the period of his forced exile on account of differences between Khalq and Parcham. Mahmood Baryalai has good memories of his stint in Pakistan as his country's envoy and he says he made many friends here. He is currently a member of the Politburo and Secretary of the Central Committee of the PDPA and head of its Department of Ideology and International Affairs. In a wide-ranging interview which went on for a few hours at the offices of the Central Committee in Kabul on October 8, Mahmood Baryalai provided an insight into his party's approach on various issues. Excerpts from the interview:

Factors leading to the Party split in 1967 and factors for unity in 1977.

"This (split) is a common phenomenon which is evident in Pakistan also - parties are formed and then they split over issues. However, this was not the case with our party, even if you try to destroy a progressive party, you can't really annihilate it. So the best way is to split it through agents provocateur and conspiracies. This is what happened to us too in 1967.

We had one party programme, common tactics and strategy, same ideology and same friends and enemies. Even when split, we didn't become enemies of each other. The need for unity arose in the seventies when Daud was the Head of State. Actually, he was a continuation of the Royal Family's role. We realised that Daud was turning to the Right. The Shah was ready to pay him billions to wipe out the progressive and democratic forces. He was coming closer to Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the U.S. Even with Pakistan, which he was supposed to have hated, he was ready to enter into an agreement. When we saw through his designs, we realised the need for unity in 1977 and the result of that unity was in the victory of the Saur Revolution less than a year later."

Some Western observers have called the Saur Revolution an "accidental coup" which took place in the immediate context of Amir Akbar Khyber's murder. It was a "hasty move", hence the mistakes.

"Those who say this have no real concept what a Revolution is. For long, the West called the October Revolution a 'Bolshevik coup'. They even opposed the Cuban Revolution, calling it a 'government of criminals'. Obviously when we had our Revolution, we didn't exactly expect London and Washington to applaud us. Revolutions are not of one kind: they can be of different types and varieties. Of course, in the classic sense, there is the French Revolution. But the main objective is the same: the seizure of political power. But that is not the end but a means to an end. The purpose is fundamental restructuring of society. A series of coup d'etat, as happens in a number of countries, cannot be classified as revolution.

Our party which led the Revolution planned for it. Of course, you cannot give a precise date on which you plan to launch the Revolution, but the timing has to be correct. As Lenin said (regarding the October Revolution) (October 24 is too early and October 26 too late; October 25 is just right." For us April 27 (1978) was just right. We seized an historic opportunity. Don't forget, ours was

a very well organised party, with a tested leadership and we had staged thousands of demonstrations where people participated in large numbers. We used the Army to seize power: It was our party members who did so, and after capturing state power, they handed over to a Revolutionary Council comprising top leaders of our party. And this question of legitimacy? Everybody recognised our government. I was the lawful ambassador of Afghanistan to Pakistan, received and recognised by General Ziaul Haq. Nobody questioned the legitimacy of the Zahir Shah's royalist regime: How it came to power? Not even 500 people would vote for him. They could never organise a meeting where a thousand people could gather. Our leaders attend meetings where over 200,000 people are present."

Some Western observers have written that the Pushtunistan issue was one point of contention in the 1967 Khalq-Parcham split.

"This is not true at all. It was never an issue. Of course, there can be differences on it, even now maybe. After all, some people are nationalists. But let me make it clear: We do not lay claim to any territory of Pakistan. Pushtunistan is not an issue for us: it is for the people of Pakistan to decide. However, we do support the national liberation democratic movements of all the people of Pakistan. This is support for a principle based on the ideology of our party, but not for a secessionist cause. This support for national liberation democratic movements extends to

all countries, not just Pakistan, but Iran and other countries too".

What have you learnt from your past experiences? What are your strengths and weaknesses, particularly given the context that there are Soviet troops in your country.

"Soon after our Revolution a lot of mistakes took place with the result that our Revolution could not proceed at an even pace. Our previous leadership was in a hurry to move forward. It did not have a correct assessment of the objective and subjective realities prevailing in the country. Some 'ultra-left' errors were made. Ours is a backward country, where the people did not have a high degree of political consciousness. They tried to impose a democratic land reform on a peasantry which was not prepared for it. Hence, they (peasants) opposed these measures. Literacy classes were forcibly started with a 70-year old woman or an 80-year old man, being made to attend. Then came the other extreme. There was a time when Amin was ready to make up with Gulbadin Hekmatyar. Apart from these mistakes, there was the factor of outside intervention of imperialism. They could not tolerate a progressive regime in Kabul.

Historically, the British wanted Afghanistan to be a buffer against Russia. And then you have the phenomenon of the so-called "Free Tribes" (Baqai-e-Ghair). It was part of this buffer state concept. They did it before too: in the 1920s when we had the progressive King Amanullah, who wanted to modernise Afghanistan, the British had him ousted through conspiracies and propaganda against him in the name of religion. Now that role has been assumed by the United States. Let me just give you one instance of this propaganda war against Afghanistan's Kabul Radio broadcasts in various languages for 43 hours a day, while hostile propaganda against Afghanistan is beamed for 150 hours a day. The imperialists are using two propaganda weapons against us: silence and lies. Silence about our achievements, lies about the situation in Afghanistan. We know that Afghan refugees in Pakistan are probably convinced that the doors of all mosques in Afghanistan are shut.

They say the communists have taken over. We don't say our Revolution is socialist, let alone communist. These are problems for the future. Ours is a national democratic revolution which wants to

eliminate illiteracy and eradicate poverty. You know even the big capitalists and feudalists supported our Revolution. Even they were tired of the monarchy. We are trying to change the face of Afghanistan: make it modern, progressive and independent. The majority of people support us. After all, our party has a long history behind it. The imperialists keep quiet about our achievements in education, industry, housing, agriculture and for the cause of women. So far as the USSR is concerned, it is our trusted friend. We are bound by the 1921 Treaty which was endorsed by all Kings and regimes of Afghanistan. Didn't the American Revolution seek the assistance of French forces in their fight against the British? General Jean Lafayette fought with the Americans against the British. So what's wrong if we ask the USSR to send in its limited military contingent to defend our Revolution? The imperialist role is nothing surprising: They have done it all over the world. You see Nicaragua. One day they will also do it against Pakistan."

How do you evaluate the Islamic Revolution in Iran?

"It is probably the most complex and complicated Revolution of modern times. It was a big Revolution with mass participation and so many elements and forces. Slowly and slowly they are changing course. What did the Revolution stand for: abolition of monarchy, land reforms, nationalisation of foreign trade, democratic rights and anti-imperialism. They've reneged on almost everything but it is still anti-imperialist, although more in form rather than content. They attack the US but remain part of the imperialist system with close ties with Japan, West Germany, UK, etc. In domestic policy, they first attacked the liberals, then the rationalists, then the Mujahideen. Then the Tudeh. Also, the minority nationalities like Kurds and Turkomans. But there is no doubt that a section of the clergy is progressive and anti-imperialist. All this is being held together by a miracle called Khomeini. Once he is no more, we don't know what will happen: civil war, a coup d'etat, or the clergy bashing each other. Iran is quite interesting and unique. We are following it with great interest".

'New' Society Constructed

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 30 Oct 85 p 4

[Text]

The PDPA is proceeding fast in constructing a new society in Afghanistan, with almost total reliance on the Soviet Union. The ideological contours of this society are based unmistakably on Marxist-Leninist principles. Although during his interview with 'The Muslim', Babrak Karmal refused to commit himself to Marxism-Leninism, documents of the PDPA as well as its programme and speeches of Karmal leave no doubt on this count. In a speech delivered in Kabul on January 10, 1985, to mark the 20th anniversary of the Party, Babrak Karmal stated: "Guided by an advanced revolutionary theory (Marxism-Leninism) the PDPA programme declared as the final goal of this path of development, the building of socialism in Afghanistan. Our Party has never abandoned and will never abandon this goal".

Formed in 1965, this Party was always a tightly-knit, small cadre-based party. By its own accounts, its membership at the time of its seizure of political power was only 18,000. The key to its success was the fact that the PDPA had a disciplined cadre within the armed forces of Afghanistan, which assisted Daud in ousting Zahir Shah and later played a decisive role in overthrowing and killing Daud. Following the successful military coup in April, 1978, like loyal party members, the army officers promptly handed over power to the party leadership which took over the task of running Afghanistan under Noor Mohammad Tarakki. Babrak Karmal was then No. 2 in the Party hierarchy serving as Vice President.

CONFIRMED PARTYMEN

The army officers who launched the coup in April, 1978, were part of a group of 20 PDPA members, who after graduating from High School, joined the army of Zahir Shah some 17-18 years ago. As a Central Committee official put it:

"They were confirmed partymen and did not have to be ideologically educated. They merely kept contact with the party. Now most of them are Generals. They include the Uloomi brothers, one brother heads the department of defence and justice in the Party and the other heads the army's southern command. General Mohammad Rafi, now the Deputy Prime Minister, was also one of them. So also General Abdul Qadir, who was instrumental in the events of April 27, 1978 and who is now Vice President of the Revolution Council. It was a combination of the Armoured Corps and the Air Force."

Like any other one party socialist state, the official Afghan structure draws no distinction between the party, the government and the armed forces. Many leaders hold overlapping positions. For example Dr. Naib, who is member of the Political Bureau of the Party, now holds the rank of General as Chief of Khad, the Afghan secret service.

During its early years, the PDPA relied a lot on literature supplied by the Tudeh Party of Iran. Tudeh was then a clandestine party operating out of East Berlin while the PDPA was a semi-legal organisation whose members even got elected to Parliament. There were a couple of common factors for the PDPA's Iranian connection. Both countries are neighbours with cultural and historical similarities. The Tudeh Party's Farsi literature was very beneficial to the Afghan Party since it also relies on Farsi a great deal. The PDPA currently has a pro-

gram of "exchanging experiences" with 25 other communist and socialist oriented parties. These include almost all the ruling communist parties (barring China, Albania, Yugoslavia and Romania) plus the Communist Party of France, the Communist Party of India, Communist Party (Marxist) of India and Socialist Party of Japan.

PARCHAMI COMPLEXION

The PDPA's Khalq-Parcham split having healed, as claimed by the leadership, it now has a predominantly Parchami complexion. It has a 13-member Politburo and 45 member central committee. The Parchami Five, who were ousted in June, 1978 as a result of the post revolution split and sent out as ambassadors are all back in the Politburo. They include Babrak Karmal, who went to Czechoslovakia as ambassador, Dr. Anahita Rasezad who was exiled to Yugoslavia, Mahmood Baryalai to Pakistan, Noor Ahmed Noor to USA and Abdul Wakil to UK. It is thus no accident that Hafiz Ullah Amin is portrayed as a CIA agent in party documents. Even Tarakki, while not being directly criticised, is hardly ever mentioned in a favourable light. About 1000 Parchamites were said to be in prison during Amin's days.

These allegations against Hafiz Ullah Amin notwithstanding, the Afghan leadership of today still finds it difficult to defend itself against accusations that it was installed in power by the Red Army and that it is not a legitimate government. This is linked to the other question of who "invited" the Russians, since it is claimed that they entered Afghanistan on official invitation. Asad Kishmand, younger brother of Sultan Ali Kishmand, No. 2 in the Kabul regime, gave a lengthy explanation on this. French educated Asad Kishmand is Deputy Chief of the International Relations Department of the PDPA. "The choice was between a fascist regime and a progressive regime. Amin was preparing an alliance with Gulbadin Hikmatyar as Prime

Minister. We planned an insurrection for March 10, 1979 but it was discovered and a lot of our comrades were arrested. Then we planned another one just two weeks before December 27, 1979. In fact, I personally held negotiations with Settem-e-Melli because we wanted to plan something. There were other groups too which wanted to unite against Amin. Comrade Babrak Karmal returned to Afghanistan secretly two-and-a-half months before December 27, to organize everything. We had a stormy central committee session before December 27 where Noor Ahmed Noor, Aslam Watanyar, and, Sayed Gulabzoi almost had a shootout. The Revolutionary Council, meeting in secret session, elected Babrak Karmal and he invited the Soviet Union in. The Revolutionary Council also ordered Amin's execution."

Regarding the insurgency, Asad Kishinmand has this to say: "We are facing serious problems and difficulties on our borders. Most of our cities and highways are now safe. We are realistic: We are not those who close their eyes to the existing situation. There are destructive activities and acts of economic sabotage but you are these are concentrated on the border: in Khost, Barikot and Joja Mandan. We know that leaders of some so-called Islamic groups, based in Pakistan, want to return to Afghanistan but they are not allowed. For example, a well-known religious leader, Mian Guljan Agha, was keen to come back. They have sent messages. But people like Sayaf, Gulbadin, Gilani, Khales, Mujadadi, Rabbani, Nabi Mohammadi will never be accepted by us. There has been heavy fighting in Barikot and Khost. Last year, in Joja region, Sayaf's men even used cannons and tanks against us. Barring planes they had everything. Our troops were led by General Mohammad Nabi Azimi."

SCHISMS

Behind the veneer of high-sounding rhetoric and tall talk, there is tacit admission of the difficulties faced by the regime which is still dependent for its survival on the presence of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan. In a recent speech reported by Kabul New Times (October 1), Babrak Karmal himself referred to the "present difficult conditions of the undeclared war and the stubborn resistance of the armed counter-revolution."

That there are certain schisms within the party and these do surface on occasion was indicated recently in a report published in the October 5, 1985 issue of Kabul New Times. Under the headline "anti-party activity disclosed", the report referred to "a clandestine anti-party group and unsatisfactory activity of the police of Logar", saying that "it resorted to subversive activities". After stating that the Provincial Party Committee Secretary of Logar had been removed, the report concluded that "this group has stood against the unity of the party, the internationalist unity and friendship with the peoples of friendly countries". This is an obvious reference to the Soviet Union. Probably, "the anti-party group" must have had certain reservations regarding the party's policy and relationship with the Soviet Union.

Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that in almost every major public speech, Babrak Karmal and his associates lavish warm praise on the Soviet Union, its communist party, its leaders, particularly Lenin and Gorbachev. In fact, in one of his speeches Babrak Karmal even went to the extent of stating that "patriotism and Sovietism are inseparable".

For its part the Soviet Union has also hardened its diplomatic position on the Afghan issue and strengthened its support for Babrak Karmal and his regime. The question of withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan is now labelled as a bilateral matter to be sorted out between Kabul and Moscow, and one which is not open for discussion at the U.N. proximity talks at Geneva. The reports which circulated in the diplomatic grapevine in 1983 about a "Zahir Shah option" and that the Soviets were even sending signals to him is now part of history.

NEW ORDER

The Soviet Union is firmly behind Babrak Karmal and the New Order which Moscow expects Karmal and his associates to build in Afghanistan. Official Soviet speeches also refer to the "irreversible" aspect of the Afghan Revolution which, in effect, implies that the changes post-December 1979 will not be allowed to be rolled back. Even the Soviet Foreign Minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, in a speech before the U.N. General Assembly on September 26, 1985 underlined that the "way of life of the Afghan people must be guaranteed" before there could be any political settlement. The Soviet Union is saying all this on the assumption that despite the difficulties and embarrassment in Afghanistan, time is inexorably on the side of Moscow.

The choice that Pakistan's policy makers will have to face is to either accept the reality of a Soviet-supported socialist Afghanistan on our frontiers or to continue pursuing a policy that seeks to reverse the post-December 1978 Afghan status quo. While there are other elements, including domestic determinants of our American connection, which are inextricably linked with this policy, two questions need to be asked in order to better understand our response to the changing situation. Whether the pursuit of a particular kind of policy for the last six years has moved Pakistan closer to the objective that it set before itself, (i.e., removal of the Karmal regime), and, secondly, whether the powers that be can delink the Afghanistan issue from continuation of the status quo in Pakistan, which was substantially sustained and strengthened as a result of the Soviet intervention next-door through massive infusion of Western political, economic and military support.

AFGHANISTAN

BRIEFS

MUJAHIDIN CLASH WITH TRIBESMEN--Violent and bloody clashes took place between the Afghan Mujahidin and tribesmen in Bajaur Agency as a result of which 18 persons were killed and 6 critically injured. Kalashnikovs, mortars, and bombs were used in the foray and the wounded were taken to the Bajaur Agency hospital. According to residents of the village of Char Malang, it was reported that Afghan refugees had been paid to kill the residents of the Bajaur Agency. As a result, the villagers went to the tented villages of the Afghan refugees to protest. This angered both sides and a violent clash ensued. The Mujahidin organization deemed it an act of subversion and stated that the agents of the Kabul government had instigated the local residents who had attacked the refugees, killing five of them. The names of those killed are Mir Salam, Akbar Khan, Sa'id 'Alam, Aqa Jan, and 'Abbas Jan. Three local residents were also killed in the clash which ended with the intervention of the officials. Two of the wounded persons were later admitted to Lady Reading Hospital. [By the staff correspondent Aurangzeb Durrani] [Text] [Rawalpindi HAIDAR in Urdu 12 Nov 85 p 1 GF] /8918

CSO: 4656/23

IRAN

U.S. THREATENED: GULF TO BECOME 'REAGAN'S BURIAL SITE'

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 6 Oct 85 p 11

[Text] News agencies have reported that American officials have announced that in the event of a public request from member countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, this country would give them military assistance with the Gulf.

These comments by American officials show the Great Satan's intense desire to launch vain propaganda in the Persian Gulf, and they also show that the White House is looking for a pretext to make itself a partner in keeping security in the Persian Gulf, at least in the realm of propaganda, which it has done. Yet time and again officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran have announced that the security of the Persian Gulf is the responsibility of countries in the Gulf area. As the most powerful of these countries, Iran has always tried to keep the security of this strategic area and to defend its sanctity, and it has encouraged the other countries of the Persian Gulf to do the same.

On the other hand, in view of the current circumstances with the imposed war and the Islamic Republic of Iran's victories, Saddam and his courtiers and followers, who see themselves in the process of collapsing, are trying to portray the Persian Gulf as insecure, hoping to find a way to save themselves by making a crisis in the area.

Saddam and his American bosses realize well that immediately after the glorious triumph of its revolution, the Islamic revolution of Iran was faced with numerous small and large plots from the satanic powers, especially the Great Satan, and that, through the grace of God and the bravery of Muslim people, it has always been proud and victorious in its confrontations with plots such as the economic embargo, the military raid against Tabas, the Nuzheh coup d'etat, the plots of the political mini-groups, the disturbance in Kordestan, and the imposed war which the inhabitants of the White House, in cooperation with other dominion-seeking powers in the East and West, directly and indirectly organized against the Islamic Republic of Iran. In all of these instances the enemies of Islam have tasted bitter defeat.

The truth is that America, in view of the blows it has suffered from the revolutionary nation of Iran, does not consider it in its own interest to intervene militarily in the Persian Gulf, but if it should decide in ignorance to intervene directly, causing a war to erupt in the Persian Gulf in order, as it believes, to save its protégés in Baghdad from certain collapse for a time, however short, naturally it will face a nation that will turn the Persian Gulf into a graveyard for American soldiers.

America must realize that the nation of Iran, from the time it fought the shah's regime for the victory of the Islamic revolution, knew well that it was faced with America and world imperialism, and it fought with the shah and his supporters as the agents of imperialism. Now also, as this nation continues its "sacred defense" at the fronts of the imposed war, it sees Saddam as the fawning slave of Washington, and has accordingly made a decisive decision to overthrow him, in order to bury an agent of imperialism in history.

Therefore, the ultimate wish of such a nation is to come face to face with the roots of corruption in the area instead of fighting the agents of imperialism, and to use all of its power to uproot the source of corruption in the world. With a direct intervention by the Great Satan in the Persian Gulf, a suitable opportunity would be given to the combative and heroic nation of Iran, and this time the "real enemy" would be standing close to his own grave.

The cry of our heroic people at the Friday prayer in Tehran this week was "The Persian Gulf of Iran, a burial place for Reagan." This is a serious rallying cry, and America knows that the Iranian nation is so serious that it will act on this cry.

9310

CSO: 4640/43

IRAN

IRP ORGAN REMINDS U.S. OF 'LEBANON NIGHTMARE'

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 5 Oct 85 pp 1, 12

[Text] In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

The Baghdad regime senses that it lacks the necessary capability to create a complete crisis in the Persian Gulf area, so it has appealed to Washington for this purpose, encouraging American officials to intervene openly in the Persian Gulf. American officials have made this request contingent upon an official and public request from member countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, and they have announced that in the event of a public request to America from member countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, this country would give them military assistance.

Although this statement from Washington is nothing new, the fact that it is being made under current circumstances is reason for reflection, and it must be made clear that in the event of American intervention in this vital waterway irreparable consequences will befall the Persian Gulf sheikhdoms on the one hand, and American interests throughout the world on the other. Comments such as this are made periodically by the Baghdad regime's overseas supporters to bolster the morale of their regional supporters in time of crisis in order to put a temporary end to the hesitation and uncertainty of the regime's local supporters and to assure them that if conditions become more critical, they can count on Washington's support and aid.

If such verbal and unfounded support can hearten the Baghdad regime's local supporters and encourage them to give greater support to the war criminals ruling Iraq, this says something about them, because the acceptance of such comments and drawing assurance from such remarks illustrates the ultimate in inexperience of every sheikhdom accepting these remarks. The countries of the region have not forgotten that America and its NATO allies went to Lebanon with their armies, but soon thereafter the American generals raced with the officers and soldiers under their command to flee Lebanon, the Lebanon nightmare has not yet left the minds of American military men. This means that Washington, perceiving the sensitive situation in the area and the aroused state of Muslim nations against America, never sees it in its own interest to send its soldiers with its own hands to their deaths and to bring new coffins back to the American nation every day as the wages of intervention overseas.

Reports received say that in this regard Washington has made its intervention contingent on an almost impossible condition, and has announced that only in the event of a public and official request from the member countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council would it give them military aid. Although this is based on the premise that the Persian Gulf sheikhdoms clearly see the current situation and especially the inevitable collapse of the Baghdad regime, and can specify

their own interests in this sensitive situation, it is also well if we study another dimension of the situation, and see what the chain of consequences would be if America were invited to the region on the basis of vain hopes in this area.

Since the Persian Gulf sheikhdoms can feel the sensitivity of the area first hand, they ought to be able to imagine the consequences of a major inflammation in the waters of the Persian Gulf, and before taking any steps in this matter, they must think of the effects and even its future legacy in the area.

As far as Islamic Iran is concerned however, it has so far been content to issue ultimatums, but in the event something like this occurs, the ultimatum will be over and there are many steps that could be taken and which have at the same time already been justified to the nations of the region and the world. Islamic Iran has announced repeatedly that it wants no wider war, and wishes to move in the direction of peace and tranquility as soon as possible after the "cause of turmoil" in the area has been uprooted. At the same time, however, in the event that the war in the Persian Gulf area is widened from this or that source, it is the clear right of Muslim Iran to put a stop to it with a maximum of power, and in that event the heat of the fire will be felt more and better inside the straw palaces.

There are many measures which are even now clearly rightful and accepted recourse for Islamic Iran, but the officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran have always tried to treat some of the rude sheikhs of the area with "kindness" and patience, but if this patience leads to more rudeness in the courts, then Iran's obligation will be different.

Apart from these matters, it is necessary to stress this basic point that if the people of the martyr-nurturing nation have only attacked Ba'thist Iraq in the course of their five years of self-defense and have made the Baghdad regime the target of their attacks, in the event of such a development they will aim their weapons at the American forces and those who invited them to the area. What is undoubtedly not in the interest of America or any of the region's courts is for them to become the direct targets of the fiery bullets of the combatants of Islam in the Persian Gulf.

And Peace.

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CSO: 4640/39

IRAN

IRP ORGAN ANALYZES EVENTS LEADING TO POSSIBLE CLOSURE OF GULF

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 8 Oct 85 p 11

[Text] In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

Last week the American Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a meeting to discuss Iran and Iraq attended by several American experts. During that meeting the economic, social, and political circumstances as well as the arms resources and foreign relations of Iran and Iraq were studied to find a way to end the imposed war.

Although these American experts admitted that the "savage bombing" of non-military targets in Iran cannot bring this country to the negotiating table, they finally concluded that the destruction of Iran's oil reserves and export terminals by the Iraqi regime will make it impossible for Iran to continue the war. In drawing their conclusions, they also stressed that the best thing for America to do would be to quietly support the peace efforts of the General Secretary of the United Nations.

Therefore, American representatives and so-called experts divided responsibilities between Washington and Baghdad concerning the imposed war in their meeting. On the one hand they encouraged the aggressor Iraqi regime to attack ships, oil reserves, and economic targets in the Persian Gulf and to cause more turmoil in the area using dollars and weapons poured in from East and West, and on the other hand they pointed out to the White House that it should pressure the General Secretary of the United Nations, by using influence in the United Nations, to try to impose peace on the Islamic Republic of Iran as soon as possible to prevent the collapse of a defender of all the standards of imperialism in the Persian Gulf area.

The surprising thing is that these so-called American experts have been blind, whether before the triumph of the revolution and the struggle of the people or after it, and especially regarding the matter of the occupation of the American spy nest, which was described by the Imam, who saw the consequences precisely, as a higher revolution than the first one. Despite all this, these people have not yet properly recognized the spirit of the Iranian nation, and so far the Westerners, and especially the Americans, have not been able to recognize the Islamic revolution of Iran and analyze it properly, or else they are making themselves ignorant and do not wish to face reality. What appears even truer, however, is that, in the words of Hojjat ol-Eslam va-ol-Moslemin Hashemi Rafsanjani, "Westerners analyze like cows," and they understand nothing of the power of faith, will and the resistance of the Muslim nation of Iran. They have not gone after the real root of this subject, and asked why all the plots and tricks of the enemies of the Islamic revolution of Iran have been crushed by the patience and resistance of the people of Iran.

Concerning the creation of turmoil in the Persian Gulf, it is worth mentioning that just as events and indications show, praise God the Islamic Republic of Iran has complete control over the strategic areas of the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman. The detainment of ships carrying suspicious cargos by the brave forces of Islam and the unloading of those cargos which would strengthen the military base of the Baghdad regime are illustrations of the power and dominion of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Persian Gulf area. Another proof of this claim was the staging of the largest sea maneuvers by the Islamic Republic of Iran's navy in the strategic areas of the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman.

It is in view of this same power and combative capability of the Islamic Republic of Iran that Washington and its collaborators ought to listen well and take this warning from the officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran. If the interests of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Persian Gulf are threatened and the Islamic republic cannot export its oil, then no ship will be able to go through the Straits of Hormoz, and not one drop of oil will be exported through the Persian Gulf, and the first ones to suffer from this will be the Western governments.

Another significant point is that several members of the hypocrites attended the meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The boastful hypocrites, who gave themselves a revolutionary face and shook the skies early in the revolution with their cries against imperialism, have now even discarded their feeling of patriotism by going to the West whining and pleading for shelter, giving their approval to theories on how to destroy the economic interests of their country, receiving in return several pamphlets and thick books from their bosses, no doubt containing instructions on how to carry out their slavish responsibility to the Great Satan. But all the hypocrites, American bosses and the 'Aflaqist rulers of Baghdad know well that this time, as always, they will only meet defeat, and that the victor in this battle will be the proud nation of Iran.

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CSO: 4640/43

IRAN

TURKEY BLASTED FOR MAINTAINING DIPLOMATIC TIES WITH ISRAEL

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 9 Oct 85 p 20

[Text] Recently Turkey's high-circulation newspapers published a news item concerning a meeting between this country's Foreign Minister Halefoğlu and Yitzhak Shamir, Foreign Minister of the Zionist regime during a United Nations General Assembly meeting in New York. Last week, however, the newspaper CUMHURIYET, another high-circulation newspaper from this country wrote in an article titled "Halefoğlu will not meet with Shamir" that Halefoğlu vigorously condemned Israel's air raid on the Palestinian camp in Tunis.

This newspaper added: Halefoğlu assessed the situation with the officials accompanying him in New York and after this assessment he said that he had decided to unilaterally cancel the meeting with the Foreign Minister of Israel.

On the other hand, the newspaper MELLIYET published in Turkey wrote the same week: The Prime Minister of Israel Shimon Peres has asked to meet with Turkey's Prime Minister Turgut Özal for the purpose of normalizing relations with that country, and a meeting between the prime ministers of the two countries will take place in New York between 28 Mehr and 3 Aban [19 to 25 Oct].

The preliminaries for this meeting, which is taking place to strengthen ties between the two countries, were actually made during Zionist Prime Minister Shimon's trip to Ankara three months ago.

During that trip arrangements were made for the prime ministers of the two countries to meet during the United Nations General Assembly meeting in New York to assess the matter of strengthening ties. Likewise, a meeting between four Turkish Majlis representatives with Zionists, the meeting between Turgut Özal and Jews in the American congress last Farvardin [21 Mar - 20 April 1985], as well as the meeting between this country's foreign minister and the ambassador of the regime occupying Jerusalem in Washington must be considered other factors preparing the way for the coming meeting between the prime ministers of Turkey and the Zionist regime. In addition to these things, recently Turkish Foreign Ministry officials, while participating in Israel's so-called national day celebration at this country's consulate in Ankara, tried to display publicly the Turkish regime's inclination to have closer ties with the regime occupying Jerusalem.

Although prior to this the Turkish government has refused to show any inclination to establish relations with the regime occupying Jerusalem, and has only implicitly given official recognition to its ties with the Zionist regime and kept its ties with that country at a limited level

by authorizing this regime to open a consulate in Ankara, recent acts and responses in the Turkish policy-making apparatus pertaining to Israel show this government's inclination to have open relations with the regime occupying Jerusalem.

The Turkish government is trying to strengthen its ties with the Israeli Zionist regime at a time when it has bound itself to Islamic countries in order to heal its dying and bankrupt economy, and has recently intensified its commercial and political exchanges with Islamic countries. There is no doubt that the establishment of close relations between the regime occupying Jerusalem, in view of this regime's crimes, especially its crimes of the last few years in Lebanon as well as its dastardly bombing of the PLO headquarters in Tunis, will have an effect of Turkey's prestige in the public eye of Islamic countries, and it is quite clear that this effect will eclipse the economic and political interests of the Turkish government. This is because the Turkish government is welcoming the creation of close and public ties with the regime occupying Jerusalem, at a time when this regime is intensifying its war with Muslims and has taken its crimes against Muslims to places such as Tunis which are great distances from occupied Palestine. Likewise, the Turkish government must realize that before the other Islamic countries protest the acts of this government, 99 percent of the Muslim population of Turkey will condemn this act and work to oppose it.

In any case, Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Özal's coming meeting with Shimon Peres, Prime Minister of the Zionist regime, is a risk being taken by the Turkish government that will endanger its political, economic, and military position in the area and among Muslim countries, because holding this meeting puts the Turkish government's stamp of approval on the corrupt and occupying nature of the Zionist regime and shows that it endorses all of that regime's crimes against Muslims.

Of course the unilateral cancellation of the meeting between the prime ministers of Turkey and Israel by Halefoğlu was to some extent an admirable act which ought to result in world public opinion pressure against Israel, but the renewed announcement of a coming meeting between the prime ministers of the two countries will ultimately shake the position of the Turkish government in the public opinion of its own Muslim people and in the public opinion of other Muslim countries of the world.

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CSO: 4640/42

IRAN

PAPER SAYS AFGHAN NATION'S FATE 'NOT NEGOTIABLE'

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 31 Aug 85 pp 1, 12

[Text] In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful. Yesterday marked the end of the Geneva negotiations, which was in fact an indirect negotiation between the Marxist regime of Afghanistan and Pakistan government. Diego Cordovez, deputy secretary of the United Nations for Political Affairs, announced that a new round of talks will take place in Geneva on December 16-20.

At the end of this round of negotiations, the deputy secretary of the UN described the talks as very difficult but extremely fruitful. He also pointed out that for the first time he participated in negotiations between the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union in an official capacity. He also announced that they have reached a sensitive and principal point in the negotiations. Cordovez seemed to indicate that all the problems have been ironed out or will soon be resolved. These statements which seem to be part of a major political propaganda -- are intended to create a psychological war and to discourage the Muslim Afghan revolutionaries, especially at a time when they are engaged in an intensive and decisive war with the Soviet Union and their mercenary followers in Kabul.

The Muslim Afghan revolutionaries have expressly stated their opposition to any agreement which could be reached at this conference from the very beginning. They have announced that they will never officially recognize Kabul's Marxist regime and that they will consider it as a sign of the Soviet political and military violation and they will fight it with a vengeance.

From the viewpoint of the Afghan people, particularly the Muslim revolutionaries, the Geneva conference officially recognizes all the parties that express a willingness to interfere in the affairs of Afghanistan, but as far as the nation of Afghanistan is concerned, the true representative of that country was not present during the negotiations. The communiques issued by the Muslim revolutionaries are very direct and clear. The fact that they were not represented in the Geneva conference does not worry them at all; however, their principal complaint focuses around political and military invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet forces, and that is a matter that should not be ignored. They say that the Red Army has entered Afghanistan as an aggressor and they demand that it leave their country unconditionally--without any negotiations so as not to give Moscow a pretext of an interested party in the negotiations. Furthermore, they

consider the Marxist regime of Kabul as an offshoot of the military and political invasion of the Soviet Union in the Islamic land of Afghanistan and not only will they never officially recognize this regime, but they'll continue their incessant fight against that regime.

They say that the right to determine the fate or destiny of the people of Afghanistan must be solely their own privilege and under no circumstances will such prerogative or inalienable right be given to others--even Pakistan will not be allowed to enter into negotiation on behalf of Afghan people and bargain for their destiny.

They believe that the issue of Afghan refugees is a secondary problem which should be considered as a consequence of the Red Army's invasion and establishment of a criminal Marxist regime in Afghanistan.

They say that the mere presence of the representatives of the Soviet Union, the United States and the Marxist regime of Afghanistan at the Geneva conference substantiates the fact that the continuation of this present policy is but a direct interference in the affairs of Afghanistan. Consequently, each participant is trying to gain the upper hand in the usual bargaining procedures which goes on in such conferences. This means that Moscow and the Marxist regime of Kabul by using Geneva conference are trying to achieve certain results which up to now they've not been able to accomplish in Afghanistan through the use of military force and numerous massacres. In other words, the Geneva conference is a rendezvous for all those parties who only think of their own interest and aim at reaching a goal when all other criminal military acts have failed to impose their objective on the people of Afghanistan.

The Geneva conference claims to be against injustice and violence, but at the same time officially recognizes the aggressor and the despotic regimes. If Moscow and the Marxist regime of Afghanistan were not so sure of winning, would they ever have participated in the negotiations or let the United States and Pakistan take part in the negotiations too? Are negotiations which mainly reflect the interest of the aggressor and its resultant violent regime acceptable to the oppressed people of Afghanistan?

All the people who are interested in the issue of Afghanistan--whether justly or not--should consider this basic principal that the right to determine the fate of Afghanistan is an inalienable and unnegotiable right of the people of the country. Naturally, every negotiation which fails to consider this basic principal is doomed. The reason that the Afghan nation has fought and continue to do so is because it does not maintain that the aggressors have any interest in Afghanistan but the Geneva conference is based exactly on the opposite principal which negates the very right of the Afghan people.

All the events in Afghanistan are interconnected and one cannot separate or isolate an issue without considering the total analysis of other related events.

One fact remains and that is the invasion of Afghanistan by the Red Army and everything else should be investigated within the framework of this transgression. There will not be any negotiations in which the interest of an aggressor and its resultant regime of aggression are accepted. This is a fact which has been ignored by the UN and thus once more it has become a mere tool used by the arrogant powers for manipulating the events in Afghanistan.

13130

CSO: 4640/738

IRAN

PROSECUTOR GENERAL ORDERS FOR LIST OF FUGITIVES CONTACTING COURTS

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 2 Oct 85 p 2

[Text] Following the statements of the state prosecutor general which were made a few days ago regarding the dangers arising as a result of the return of the fugitive capitalists and the need for securing the rights of the general public and legal confrontation with the fugitives, a circular signed by Seyyed Mohammad Musawi Kho'ini, the state prosecutor general, was issued to all Islamic revolution courts throughout the country which reads:

Contemporaneously, with the victory of the Islamic revolution and thereafter during the first few months and years after the advent of the revolution a few corrupt wealth-hoarders fled the country or hedged and played hide and seek from one city to another. The reason being that either they felt insecure by facing the hezbollah nation or they did not find the atmosphere and the Islamic cultural revolution much to their liking. In the absence of such individuals the society's oppressed people, namely the very bare-footed and hovel-dwellers took possession of properties of these individuals--whether land or residential dwellings--and in most cases such expropriations were officially or unofficially encouraged by some of the personalities of the revolutionary society. In other instances, there were some factories involved where the owner(s) for fear of his life from the factory-workers could not return to their factory and as a result the government took control of such factories and restarted their operations. Thereafter, the workers who had been given to believe that the factory in question was being run and administered by the government did their best--even better than before--to keep the factory going, and in some cases they raised the production level to a profitable stage. Now, as some reports have it, these individuals have returned from abroad or they've come out of their hiding-places in another town to their original city and with the help of an attorney they've been able to go to court and in certain instances they've been successful in obtaining a court order for dispossession of a farmer who has been working for several years on a piece of land trying to make do with a very meager income. In other cases, they've obtained eviction orders from the courts which in certain instances involves the eviction of some of our sisters who for the love of God, Islam and the Islamic revolution have had to forgo their youth and take care of an invalid spouse who has sacrificed his health in the war-front for God's sake. Another example pertains to cases where the ex-owner of a factory repossesses a plant--a plant which has been made operational through the use of foreign exchange obtained from the sale of oil--the oil which has been obtained

at the price of the blood of the martyrs from the deserts, the seas and Kharg Island. Now, these fugitives call their return, this inauspicious comeback something which is done for the sake of the revolution, God, Islam and the enlightened hearts!

Hereby, all the Islamic revolutionary courts are instructed to forward the names of such individuals who have referred to the courts or those who will in the future do so--whether or not such individuals have been able to obtain a court order which fulfills their interests. The list of names should be complete with all the necessary information regarding the place of work and abode together with the name of their attorneys and the description of all the properties which have been repossessed. All the abovementioned lists should be promptly sent to the general prosecutor's office so as with due consideration to the legal procedures, all the necessary measures towards securing the rights of the general public--with its priority of securing the values of the revolution--can be taken.

12719

CSO: 4640/55

IRAN

KHAMENI'I: WE CANNOT RELY ON SUPERPOWERS ASSISTANCE

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 15 Sep 85 p 3

[Text] Yesterday morning, the Minister of Post, Telegraph & Telephone, accompanied by communications specialists, visited President Khamene'i.

During this visit, [Minister] Morteza Nabavi briefed the President on communications projects being undertaken throughout the country and their expansion into the country's deprived regions. He called the expertise level of the country's communication specialists adequate and said that our experts are presently recognized as leaders in this field. He added that in the 1985 Seminar on Space, Iran occupied one of the deputy [as published] seats, along with the United States and Italy.

Afterwards, the President, in a speech to the visiting communication specialists said: "Considering our claims and slogans, we should not trust those regimes who possess advanced technologies." He added: "Presently, Western technological advances are based on incorrect principles. Western civilization is headed towards a dead-end from which, with the present regulations governing, it will not be able to return."

Hojjat ol-Eslam Khamene'i said: "We are not against scientific advancements, but we oppose the godlessness that is part of Western culture."

The President then referred to the role of communications in the war and said: "Communication must be placed at the service of the war. The Army and Revolution Guards Corps, utilizing their remarkable expertise in this field, can cooperate with the communications company to bring about constructive and useful results."

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IRAN

EDUCATION MINISTER ELABORATES ON HIRING OF QUALIFIED TEACHERS

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 16 Sep 85 p 3

[Text] Ahvaz, KEYHAN correspondent--The Minister of Education and Training expressed hope that by the year 1365 [21 March 1986-20 March 1987], the majority of qualified teachers and educators will be covered by hiring regulations.

According to the KEYHAN correspondent, the Education and Training Minister, during his tour of the southern war fronts, took part in a press conference during which he explained his views on the conditions of the fronts, cultural deprivation of Khuzestan, new decisions and actions affecting the fighting students, prevention of moral decay of some students and hiring educators.

In answer to the question of why the hiring regulations affecting qualified teachers and educators have not been made clear until now he said: "Last year when the budget was sent to the Majlis we tried to hire qualified teachers and educators; but considering the conditions prevailing in the country this was not done and the Majlis brothers promised us that this will be done at another time. We hope that during the year 1365 we will be able to hire the majority of them and hope that when the war ends there will be a review of all government employees' salaries."

The Education and Training Minister also addressed the issue of what had been done to prevent moral corruption in some students at the beginning of the new school year: "A directive," he said, "has been issued by the Education and Training Ministry. Educators and school principals have been made responsible in obtaining, upon admission, the personal promise of such students that if they engage in any unruly activity, they may be given one or two warnings. If they do not improve, they will be dealt with effectively. It must be noted that some of the people who bring moral corruption to the schools do not do this on their own. In fact, there is a suspicious political move which is being directed from certain places and the students who fail to save themselves [from such problems] will not only fall behind in their education, but will also be isolated by the Hezbollahi students in the social and political arenas."

With regards to students who are serving on the war fronts, the Education and Training Minister said: "During the past year, several million tumans

were put at our disposal by the President. This has enabled us to support the classes of our fighting students at the front and behind the lines. We hope to receive such assistance this year as well." He added: "At the present time there are 14,000 students in educational centers at the front. These students should feel more relaxed about their education and the possibility of being accepted into the university. Hopefully, some of their problems will be resolved in the near future."

In response to our correspondent's question that in view of poverty and cultural deprivations in the Province of Khuzestan, what priorities have been set by the Ministry of Education? The Minister said: "As for cultural deprivations, there are other regions worse than Khuzestan, but, at the present time, except for what local administration can do by utilizing the existing forces, nothing else can be done because we lack adequate facilities."

The Education and Training Minister pointed out the position of Iranian forces in the Majnun Islands and noted: "The most interesting thing to me is the supreme sacrifice and power of those who built roads "inside the sun" which perhaps is the most notable and important event in the history of the war. As a result of this, Iraqi forces are in such a difficult position that for the fear of surprise attacks by Islamic forces, they keep shooting flares all night long. But the Ba'thists must know that despite day or night, they will soon be surprised and will lose many new territories again."

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IRAN

BRIEFS

JAPANESE ASSISTANCE SOUGHT - The public relations office of the Ministry of Agriculture announced that in continuation of the joint cooperation between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Japan regarding the study of the comprehensive agricultural development plan of the Caspian Sea littoral regions the second delegation of Japanese specialists which arrived in Tehran met and discussed with the deputy minister of agriculture. In this meeting, the need for continuing cooperation between Iran and Japan was duly emphasized. It should be noted that a memorandum of understanding for the purpose of preparing a comprehensive development plan for the Haraz River watershed in Mazandaran Province, was signed last year between the Ministry of Agriculture and Japan's International Cooperation Agency. According to the memorandum of understanding the first group of Japanese specialists arrived in Iran last year and together with their Iranian counterparts from the Ministry of Agriculture they carried out the first study and survey for the collection of all the necessary information and statistics. [Text] [Tehran BURS in Persian 29 Sep 85 p 1] 12719

CSO: 4640/55

NEPAL

JUNE BOMB EXPLOSION SAID TO SPARK REPRESSIVE ACTION

Suva THE FIJI TIMES in English 5 Nov 85 p 7

[Article by A.J. Singh]

[Text] Thousands of people have been arrested in Nepal following a series of explosions in June. The Government has taken other measures, too, including a clampdown on the press. Gemini News Service reports that the tough measures, coming on top of an already difficult economic situation, may increase popular discontent.

NEPAL was taken by surprise when the bombers struck in mid-June, killing seven people and injuring another 30. Hardly had the shock of the attacks subsided, when the Government launched a counter-attack with equal severity.

First came the arrest of thousands of people, mainly from the Terai region in the south. Observers claim that at least 10,000 are in jail, mostly on suspicion of having connections or sympathies with terrorist organisations. Allegations of inhumane conditions and of torture have been made.

Especially hounded are those who had a connection, however remote, with 50-year-old Ram Raja Prasad Singh, whose United Front (UF — also called Tiger Terai) claimed responsibility for the June bombings.

Next came a spate of anti-Indian propaganda in local newspapers. This was followed by a ban on Indian publications.

In addition, over 100 Nepali newspapers and magazines opposed to the country's political system or displaying pro-Indian sympathies were banned.

It is alleged that mail is being censored, especially incoming letters from India or abroad.

The Government has passed a Terrorist Offences Act under which a special court is to be set up to try suspected terrorists.

Those found guilty of acts leading to death will face the death penalty; causing serious injury will be punishable by sentences ranging from five years to life. The proceedings of the court will be secret, the accused will not be allowed legal representation, and the onus will be on proving innocence rather than guilt. Appeal to the Supreme Court will be allowed.

Life imprisonment in Nepal normally means 20 years hard labour; for those convicted under the Terrorist Act it will mean 30 years.

Thapa (not his real name) says that when he visited his arrested brother in jail, he was shocked by the conditions: "His hands were in iron shackles and so were his legs. Only convicted murderers have been kept in jail like that in the past."

Thapa's brother is a farmer living in Terai who had a slight acquaintance with Ram Raja Prasad Singh.

Says Thapa: "I've learnt that many others have been arrested simply because they had been friendly to Ram Raja Prasad Singh when he was a legislator or a practising lawyer. Most of those arrested have no criminal or political records. They are ordinary law-abiding citizens."

There are still doubts in Katmandu about the identity of the bombers. Many feel that the two terrorist organisations which claimed responsibility were simply cashing in on an event which they had not organised.

Surprisingly, the police are still seizing packets of explosives from buses or finding them concealed in the personal effects of travellers. Relatives of those arrested claim the evidence is planted by government agents.

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